The REVIEW *of* RELIGION

Volume II NOVEMBER, 1937 Number 1

EDITOR
Raymond C. Knox

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Herbert W. Schneider

SECRETARY
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

Salo W. Baron
Cornelius Clifford
Louis H. Gray
Clarence A. Manning
Cyril C. Richardson
William Adams Brown
Horace L. Friess
Eugene W. Lyman
David S. Muzzey
Ryusaku Tsunoda

The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscription: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

COPYRIGHT 1937 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

ARTICLES

The Mystery Frescoes in the Mystery Villa of Pompeii. By Margarete Bieber 3

The *A Priori* in Rudolf Otto's Theory of Religious Experience. By John M. Moore 12

A Naturalistic View of "Numinous" Experience. By Waldo Jewell-Lapan 25

The Harijan and Hinduism. By George Weston Briggs . . . 33

BOOK REVIEWS

Raoul Allier: *Magie et Religion.* (Wendell T. Bush) 60

Ruth Benedict: *Zuni Mythology* (D. Demetracopoulou Lee) . . . 61

(Continued on next page)

Gregory Bateson: *Naven: A Survey of the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture of a New Guinea Tribe Drawn from Three Points of View.* (Ruth Benedict) 63

Giuseppe Furlani: *La Religione degli Hittiti.* (Benjamin Schwartz) . . 66

Theodor Weindl: *Monotheismus und Dualismus in Indien, Iran und Palästina.* (John Clark Archer) 75

Derke Bodde: *Annual Customs and Festivals in Peking.* (Horace L. Friess) 78

Albert Lewkowitz: *Das Judentum und die geistigen Strömungen des 19. Jahrhunderts.* (Salo W. Baron) 80

W. O. E. Oesterley: *The Gospel Parables in the Light of Their Jewish Background.* (Joseph Haroutunian) 83

Erwin R. Goodenough: *Religious Tradition and Myth.* (Ralph Marcus) 86

Irving Woodworth Raymond: *Seven Books of History Against the Pagans: The Apology of Paulus Orosius.* (Cyril C. Richardson) 90

St. John of the Cross: *Complete Works.* (Irwin Edman) 92

Alois Thomas: *Die Darstellung Christi in der Kelter: Eine theologische und kulturhistorische Studie zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Volkskunde des Weinbaus.* (Meyer Schapiro) 100

W. R. Matthews: *The Purpose of God.*
A. E. Avey: *Re-Thinking Religion.* (Eugene W. Lyman) 102

Rufus M. Jones: *Some Problems of Life.* (Raymond C. Knox) . . . 105

Corliss Lamont: *Man Answers Death: An Anthology of Poetry.* (George Lawton) 109

Book Notes. L. Gougaud: *Les Saints irlandais hors d'Irlande.* H. Delehaye: *Etude sur le Legendier Romain.* E. Mugler: *Rom und Luther-Franck.* A. J. Riley: *Catholicism in New England to 1788.* M. A. Ray: *American Opinion of Roman Catholicism in the Eighteenth Century.* H. Pleijel: *Der Schwedische Pietismus in seinen Beziehungen zu Deutschland.* M. W. Hess: *The Name Is Living: The Life and Teachings of Isaac Penington.* A. Richardson: *The Redemption of Modernism.* D. J. Fleming: *Ethical Issues Confronting World Christians.* H. N. and R. W. Wieman: *Normative Psychology of Religion, etc.* 112

Among the Periodicals 124

THE MYSTERY FRESCOES IN THE MYSTERY VILLA OF POMPEII

By Margarete Bieber
Associate Professor of Archaeology, Columbia University

The ancient Mystery religions are rightly considered to be of the greatest interest to the Christian world, because from them many ideas of eternal value, such as that of purification, have been taken over and developed in the Christian religion. Sometimes these pre-Christian Christian ideas have been exaggerated, as in the writings of Rizzo and Macchioro,[1] who see pure Christian ideas in the frescoes of the Mystery Villa. Even Rostovtzeff, in a fascinating little book,[2] sees mysteries and their revelation everywhere, even in the innocent Hellenistic study of a beautiful cock on a tablet, with a still-life composed of fruits and a napkin, found in an underground summer dining room near a corridor where wine jars were stored.[3] On the other hand, some scholars are interested only in the artistic merits of the ancient religious representations, such as Pfuhl and Curtius in their important books on ancient painting.[4]

There are, of course, many pictures like the above-mentioned cock, which do not need any other than an artistic-aesthetic explanation. There are others which have no artistic value at all, but which elevate the reverent spectator by their deep religious feeling, as in the case with most of the paintings in the Roman catacombs. But in Greek art there are many works of the highest artistic merit which are imbued at the same time with deep religious feeling. "Why did the artist of the pediment sculptures of the Parthenon execute his figures all around with the same completeness, although no human eye could see the backs and upper parts of them from below?" an unbelieving student

1. G. G. Rizzo, "Dionysos Mystes," *Memorie Reale Academia di Napoli*, III, 1914, 39 ff. Pls. I-IV. V. Macchioro, *Zagreus, Studi sull'orfismo*, 1920; *Zagreus, studi intorno all'orfismo*, 1930; *From Orpheus to Paul*. New York, 1930. Cf. also D. Comparetti, *Le Nozze di Bacco ed Arianna*, 1921. M. Bieber, "Mysteriensaal der Villa Item," *Jahrbuch des deutschen archaeologischen Instituts*, XLIII, 1928, 298 ff. Pls. 5-9.

2. M. Rostovtzeff, *Mystic Italy*, 1927.

3. Rostovtzeff, *loc. cit.*, p. 62 ff. Fig. VIII. E. Rizzo, *La Pittura ellenistico-Romana* 10, Pl. XVI. Rizzo rightly calls these small pictures, 'xenia.'

4. E. Pfuhl, *Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen*, II, 868 ff. L. Curtius, *Die Wandmalerei Pompejis*, 1929, 343 ff.

asked the other day. "Because they did not work for men but for the gods," was my answer. The temple on the Acropolis was dedicated to their highest and most venerated goddess, Athena, who had given them the victory over the Persians, and the artists worked for her praise and pleasure.

The frescoes in the Villa of the Mysteries (also called Villa Item from the first discoverer of the site) are among those great treasures of art which give joy and instruction at the same time to the beholder. The frescoes are in the large room at the south-west corner of the



TAV. B - PIANTA RICOSTRUITA DELLA VILLA NELL'ETA CALCAREA E DEL TUFO
FIGURE 1

building, thus belonging to the oldest part of the Villa (Fig. 1). This part is dated 250-200 by Maiuri, who has published an excellent and georgeously illustrated volume on the Villa.[5] But the frescoes

5. A. Maiuri, *La Villa dei Misteri*, I, text. II, colored plates 1931.

were painted in the second Pompeian style, that is, not before Sulla had conquered Campania in 80 B.C., and not after the period of Augustus, when this style was replaced in Pompeii by the third, or ornate, style. Maiuri (p. 100) dates the frescoes in the Augustan period. I cannot follow this suggestion, because we know the style of the Augustan period in Rome from the house in the garden on the Farnesina, now in the Museo delle Terme,[6] and the house of Livia on the Palatine[7] to be already a forerunner of the fourth, or phantastic and intricate style of the Claudian, Neronic, and Flavian period. Here we have still the sober and grandiose style which to me seems characteristic of the period of Cæsar and Cicero and parallel to their writings. Therefore, I date the frescoes in the middle of the first century B.C.



FIGURE 2

The question of date would not be so important if those scholars are right who believe that these frescoes are copied as a whole from an older picture, thus not representing the artistic and religious feeling of their own time, but that of a previous period. I suppose these scholars have not studied the frescoes in their place and have not taken into consideration the situation of the room (No. 5 in Maiuri, Tav. B., Figs. 1 and 2). It opens to the west with a large door, and to the south with a large window on the portico alongside the terrace above the subterranean passage. On the north it opens with a small door into a bedchamber with a double alcove. Thus it was open for visits and inspection from all sides, and probably formed a unit with the adjoining cubiculum, which may be described as a bridal chamber. The portico was later changed into a closed corridor, but the columns of the old

6. *Monumenti antichi dell'Instituto*, XII, *Supplemento*. Mau and Lessing, "Wand- und Deckenschmuck eines römischen Hauses ans der Zeit des Augustus." Pfuhl, *loc. cit.*, 880 ff. III, Figs. 719 f. Curtius, *loc. cit.*, p. 108 ff. Figs. 64-68.

7. *Mon. antichi dell'Instituto*, XI, Pls. 23-44. Pfuhl, *loc. cit.*, 870 ff. III, Figs. 708 and 728-731. Curtius, *loc. cit.*, 90 ff. Figs. 54-55, 62-63.

portico were left standing before the window in order to admit enough light for the study of the paintings. This fact shows that they were appreciated, not as reproductions of older-paintings, but as testimonials of a living art and of a living faith.

This faith was the Dionysiac Mystery religion in the peculiar shape it had taken in the Hellenistic period on Italian soil. Dionysos and Aphrodite are the chief gods of Pompeii; in almost every house the figures of these gods, their followers, or their influence are painted. Wine and love filled the life of many of the inhabitants of Pompeii. Dionysos is himself a great lover. His marriage with Ariadne, who had been abandoned by Theseus, was a symbol of the transition from sorrow to joy, from darkness to light. His mysteries were not as holy or as conservative as the Eleusinian mysteries. Demeter and Kore made their believers come to Eleusis, or to the few dependent sanctuaries of the Eleusinian cult at Athens and Alexandria, if they wanted to be initiated. Dionysos went through the world accompanied by his beloved wife, Ariadne. Everywhere men and women could become his followers. They fell into ecstasy by drinking his gift of the vine, and raved, made music, and danced in the guise of satyrs (Plate, III), and mænads (Plate, VIII). It seems that in Athens the maidens were introduced into the Dionysiac cult by the Basilinna, the priestess of Dionysos, who in the guise of Ariadne married the god. In the wedding month (Gamelion) the young brides were admitted to the sanctuary of the wine god in the Lenaion, thus named for the pressing of the grapes, which gave the precious gift of the god. After they had been purified and initiated they were ripe for marriage and love.

I think, therefore, that the ceremony represented in the 'Mystery room' is not an ordinary initiation, but the introduction of brides into the mystery of the wine god. His happy marriage is the prototype of all happy marriages. That is why he and Ariadne are represented in the center of the rear wall of the room (VI: Fig 2, and Plate) opposite the main entrance, and they are flooded with light from the large side window. The real center is taken by Ariadne seated on a high throne before a cult statue. We can reconstruct the upper part of the group, now destroyed, from a cameo at Vienna (Plate, *reverse*) and similar coins in Smyrna. This is probably a celebrated group, taken

over, as are other single figures, from older works of art. Ariadne is the principal personage because this is a woman's feast. Dionysos reclines drunken with wine and love in her lap. The wine is in the hands of his satyrs (Plate, V) of which three are represented to his right (left of the spectator). The oldest lets the youngest drink out of a deep bowl, while the middle one holds the other sacred symbol of the gods, the stylised mask, above the naturalistic head of the living old silenus. I do not believe that this is a scene of divination,[8] for the satyr bends his head much too deep into the bowl so that he could not see anything, and the mask cannot be reflected in the bowl, as the angle between the mask and the opening of the bowl is much too great. The bowl is held upward, the mask is to the left above the head of the old satyr facing the spectator. This type of handleless bowl is a drinking cup (σκυφος or κοτυλε) used in the ritual scenes of women celebrating the Dionysiac Lenaion festival.[9]

Music, which belongs to the Dionysiac, as to all ancient cults, is made by another old silenus who plays the cithara, throwing up his head in ecstasy (Plate, III). He is on the longest northen wall, separated from the corner and the rear wall by the idyllic group of a Pan and a Paniska (Plate, IV). The girl is suckling a small kid. The idea expressed by many scholars that this little goat is Dionysos himself is impossible, because the parents of the kid, a large goat in the background and a smaller she-goat in the foreground, are also present. Moreover, Dionysos is never himself a goat. The goat is his sacred animal, which is sacrificed to him. It is slaughtered because it is an enemy to the sacred grapes of the god, which it destroys by nibbling the young sprouts. The idea of the animals suckled by females is wide spread in the Dionysiac religion. We find it in the *Bacchae* of Euripides at the end of the fifth century B.C.

8. Mudie Cooke-Tillyard, *Journal of Roman Studies*, III, 1913, 167 ff.; Macchioro, *Zagreus*, 94 ff.; Jocelyn Toynbee, *JRS*, XIX, 1929, 74 ff. I agree with Miss Toynbee's excellent article in so far as she also sees prenuptial initiation rites. We disagree in so far as she believes that there is only one bride going through the different rites, while I see several brides in the different scenes, as their appearance, faces, hairdress, and clothes are considerably varied. I believe in the unity of the continuous ceremony, which is given for the initiation of a group of several brides; each bride is shown in a different situation completing the others.

9. Frickenhaus, "Lenäenvasen," 72. *Berliner Winckelmannsprogramm*, 1912, 28 f. Figs. 11 B; 18 A, B; 19 A, B; 22 A; 28 A, Pl. 2, 13; 3, 16-17. Bieber, *Arch. Jahrb.* d. I. XLIII, 1928, 321 f. Fig. 14.

Next to the idyllic group at the corner between the long wall and the rear wall is a fleeing girl, who has come from the groups on the rear wall, for she looks back at them, and the old silenus who lets the young satyr drink turns to look after her (Plate, V). Here the liknon is unveiled, i.e., the sacred basket with the mysterious objects of the Dionysiac cult, outstanding among them the phallus, the symbol of fertility. The veil is lifted by a kneeling mænad. Behind her was probably an assistant mænad and one of the several brides who are initiated at the same time. The upper part is lost, but she seems to draw back in terror while the other bride is fleeing. The horror is not only injected by the huge symbol, but by the sinister winged figure, who lifts a rod to strike the back of a kneeling girl (VII: Fig. 2, and Plate). This girl is beyond the corner of the rear wall and the southern window wall (VIII: Fig. 2, and Plate). She hides her face in the lap of a matronly companion, who strokes her hair with one hand, but removes the dress from her back with the other hand, in order that the rod of the winged figure may reach it. Again we have a composition which reaches over the corner in a very clever manner. The striking figure is explained as Telete, Initiation, or more likely Aidos, Shame, who strikes the young girls when they are initiated into the mysteries of love and marriage. The flagellation of youths and virgins before they can be declared ripe and mature for independent private and public life is a custom found all over the world. The idea is that purification and fertility are necessary for brides, who are to become mothers of a family. This is best known from antiquity in the Roman cult of the Lupercalia, the cult of Faunus.[10] The priests sacrificed goats, cut straps from their hides, and with them beat the women to purify them and make them fit for the bearing of children. This happened in the month of February which is named from *februm*, cleansing or purification.

Before the women were admitted to the initiation they were given instruction and had to perform a sacrifice. These two scenes are represented on the southern wall next to the small door, leading to the bed-chamber (I-II: Fig. 2, and Plate). Out of this door a matron steps and joins the group of a bride to whom a boy is reading from a scroll. This is a boy acolyte, who had to have both parents living,

10. L. Deubner, "Lupercalia," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XIII, 1910, p. 481 ff. Jocelyn Toynbee, *JRS*, XIX, 1929, 67 ff., especially 77 ff.

and who was used in mystical as well as wedding ceremonies. He reads to one bride the sacred laws, while a second carries a dish with cake, used in the cult of Dionysos as well as in weddings, to the group II in which a priestess prepares a sacrificial basket. She is seen from the back. With her left hand she lifts the veil from a basket held by an assistant, with her right hand she holds a laurel branch over a dish, while another assistant pours wine over it from a jug. She will probably put the purified sprig into the basket.

After the girls have gone through all the ceremonies, and the ritual flogging, they become mænads and dance in honor of the god. This is shown in the beautiful nude girl (Plate, VIII) seen from the back playing the castanets with hands lifted over her head, one of the most beautiful figures among the twenty-nine on the frieze.

After the completed initiation the bride is ripe for marriage. In a group (IX: Fig. 2, and Plate) to the right of the window, corresponding to the dancing mænad to the left of the window (VIII: Fig. 2, and Plate) she is decked and given an elaborate hairdress with the help of a handmaid and an Eros who holds the mirror. The Roman bride had a definite headdress of six braids (*sex crines*). We see here the hair divided into at least four parts and two more may be hidden. A second Eros looks on from behind the bride beyond the corner of the window-wall and the front wall. Again the action and the expression lead around the corner to show that the whole frieze is a unit. On the other side of the main entrance, between it and the little door leading to the cubiculum, is a matronly woman seated on a couch, resting her cheek on her right hand and displaying her left hand with a wedding ring (X: Fig. 2, and Plate). She is, no doubt, seated in the bridal chamber after the wedding has been performed.

From these considerations it seems to be apparent that the frieze was designed for the special room, and that the Dionysiac Mysteries are represented in the form in which they were performed at Rome in the first century B.C. They have now a mild form without the tortures, wild orgies, and riots that made the Roman senators in 186 B.C. forbid the nocturnal gatherings of the religious associations. We are in the period of Cæsar, and probably in the house of a rich Roman educated in the Greek spirit and the Greek religion. We are in the important historical moment when Greek civilization passed over into the Roman and when Greek ideas, Greek art, Greek religion, and Greek

philosophy, were taken over by the Roman people to be developed into a practical form capable of conquering the whole spiritual world.

There is a second monument of the same period and of a similar character. It is unfortunately not left in place, but has been partly destroyed and the rest divided between the Museums of Naples and New York: the frescoes from a large room from a Villa in Boscoreale.[11] In both cases, on the rear wall opposite the entrance, there were gods, and on both long sides, mortals. In Boscoreale, on the rear wall, Aphrodite was in the center. Dionysos and Ariadne were to the left, the three Graces on the right side. Again we see a combination of the gods of Love, and Wine, in this case combined with the representation of female grace. On each of the long sides there was in the center a couple, a man and a woman, the woman with the marriage ring, the man with weapons. One of the men (in the Metropolitan Museum) is nude like a Hero. He has probably fallen in the same war from which the other man has returned. But he was a victor before he died, for he has brought home his shield. One of his daughters takes it into the inside of the house, moving toward a small door and looking back with a pathetic expression. Another member of the family, probably an older daughter, plays the cithara, turned toward the gods. Behind her chair is a little girl, who resembles her, and is probably her daughter or little sister. At the side of the couple on the other wall was an old man coming out of a sham door, as the matron in the Villa of the Mysteries comes out of the door by the cubiculum. The figure on the other side of the second couple is lost. It was probably an old woman to match the old man.

Here we have in my opinion a portrait of some noble family. Near the corner between the entrance and the left side wall was the oldest member of the family. In the center of both walls were the two sons with their wives, and on the right side-wall the youngest members were beside them. The arrangement is thus similar in spirit to the one in the Villa of the Mysteries: the story begins with the oldest generation of the family at the left side from the entrance, the doors are taken into account, and the rear wall opposite to the main entrance is dedicated to the gods.

I cannot believe that either of the frescoes is copied as a whole from

11. Barnabei, *La Villa Pompeiana de Fannio Sinistore presso Boscoreale.* A. Sambon, *Les Fresques de Boscoreale.*

older pictures. They not only fit the room, but are also in the spirit of their own period, the austere greatness of the late Roman Republic, i.e., the period when the Roman Empire of the ancient political Universe and the Christian Empire of the spiritual Universe were prepared. The people who have gathered to venerate the gods in Boscoreale, and the brides who are initiated into the Dionysiac Mysteries, are not Macedonian rulers, as has been said by Studniczka,[12] and as many others have believed, and they are not Greek followers of Dionysos of the classical period, as Macchioro,[13] and again many others, have believed. They are Italians of the first century B.C., painted by a late Hellenistic artist like Timomachos, who was a favorite of Cæsar and who had painted a "Noble Family,"[14] the best title which could be given to the frescoes from Boscoreale also. The group in the center of the Mystery Villa may be called Liber and Libera, the liberators, the name which in Italy was given to Dionysos and Ariadne.

ILLUSTRATIONS

FIG. 1. Plan of the Villa. From A. Maiuri, *La Villa dei Misteri*, I text Tav. B. opposite p. 38.

FIG. 2. Plan of the "Mystery Room." From Maiuri, Fig. 45 on page 125.

Plate, *verso*. Cameo at Vienna. From Maiuri, I, Fig. 58, page 151.

Courtesy of Libreria dello Stato, Rome

Plate, *recto*. Frieze of the "Mystery Room." From V. Macchioro, *From Orpheus to Paul*.

Courtesy of Henry Holt & Co.

12. Studniczka, *Jahrbuch d. deutschen archaeol. Instituts*, XXXVIII/IX, 1923/1924, 64 ff. Cf. Curtius *loc. cit.*, 114 ff. Figs. 77 and 79 and p. 279 ff. W. Tarn, *Cambridge Ancient History*, VII, 1928, p. 87.

13. Macchioro, *Zagreus*, 132. Cf. also M. Cooke, *JRS*, III, 1913, 157 ff. Pls. 8-14. Cf. on the other hand M. Bieber, *Arch. Jahrb. loc. cit.*, 306 ff. and Maiuri, *loc. cit.*, 166 f.

14. Cf. Pliny, XXXV, 136, "cognatio nobilium, palliati quos dicturos pinxit, alterum stantem, alterum sedentem."

THE *A PRIORI* IN RUDOLF OTTO'S THEORY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

By John M. Moore
Assistant Professor of Ethics and Christian Evidences, Hamilton College

Among theories of the nature of religious experience perhaps the most distinctive, and certainly one of the most influential, is that of Rudolf Otto, who for many years prior to his death last March was Professor of Theology in the University of Marburg. Professor Otto's immense learning and philosophical acumen combined with subtle psychological insight to make him one of the most original and significant religious thinkers of our time. He wrote widely in the fields of philosophy and theology, the history of religions, and the theory and practice of worship. His chief book, *Das Heilige*, has passed through more than twenty editions and has been translated into many languages.

Otto believed religious experience to be a specific kind of experience, marked off from other kinds by its unique qualities. He wrote: "If there be any single domain of human experience that presents us with something unmistakably specific and unique, peculiar to itself, assuredly it is that of the religious life."[1] Otto differed therefore from William James, who questioned whether religious experience contains anything of a psychologically specific character. He belonged to the tradition of Schleiermacher, with whom he agreed in his emphasis upon a distinctive religious feeling as the basis of religion. He undertook to improve upon Schleiermacher by giving a more precise analysis of religious feeling, and by working out a more satisfactory theory of the relations between religious feelings and religious beliefs.

It is in the former enterprise that Otto made his most valuable contribution to the psychology and philosophy of religion. No one has been more successful than he in describing and analyzing certain of the subtle and manifold kinds of feeling which characterize the religious life. To designate these emotions he tried to use words which are rich in emotional coloring, and which suggest the particular quali-

1. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, translated by John W. Harvey. London, 1928, p. 4.

ties of religious experience. He drew upon ancient as well as modern languages for this purpose, and when adequate terms were not available, he invented them and filled them with appropriate meaning. He was sensitive to the emotional values and precise meanings of words, and his usages have enriched the vocabulary of religion.

Otto held that introspection of deeply felt religious experience reveals a mental state which is "perfectly *sui generis* and irreducible to any other," an "absolutely primary and elementary datum." To designate this state and the category of valuation which he held to be implicit in it, he coined the term "numinous" derived from *numen*. Numinous feeling is not an unanalyzable mental element, however, but a complex of component factors or moments. It is not necessary here to explain his analysis of numinous feeling in detail, for this aspect of Otto's thought is everywhere familiar.[2] On the subjective side it is "creature-feeling"—Otto's substitute for Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence." On the objective side it is experience of a *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. Each of these words designates significant and complex factors in the experience. At the center is the mental reaction of stupor or dumb amazement which indicates that the religious object is "wholly other." The essence of the divine is profoundly mysterious; nevertheless it arouses "determinate affective states" in human experience. There is religious awe, which must be sharply distinguished from merely natural fear, majesty or overpoweringness, energy or urgency. And along with these are the profoundly attractive elements which suggest the divine attributes of love, mercy, pity, and comfort.

It is evident that Otto enjoyed a rich and profound religious experience and that he possessed a masterly skill in psychological description and analysis. But it is equally clear that the center of his interest was not in religious psychology, but in developing an interpretation of religious experience which would serve as a foundation for theological construction. Perhaps it is for this reason that he assumed without argument that all normal and developed religious experience conforms to the pattern which he described. He showed no interest in James's suggestion that there are "varieties of religious experience." He did not, of course, claim that the numinous feelings which he decribed are actually experienced by everyone, but he maintained that

2. *Ibid.*, Ch. III-VI.

lack of them is significant of lack of development of the religious faculty. Everyone is capable of having them, in the sense that everyone possesses, at one or another stage of development, a religious faculty or predisposition which is universal in mankind.[3] The religious consciousness has its own innate structure and makes use of its own *a priori* categories.[4] The heart of Professor Otto's theory of religious experience lies in these contentions, and to them we must now turn our attention.

The Idea of the Holy opens with a polemic against rationalism in religion. By rationalism Otto meant the assumption that God can be completely and adequately known by means of concepts and the tendency to neglect or overlook the unique elements of feeling in religious experience. He held that there are non-rational depths in the being of God which can be known only in some other way than through concepts. This way is provided by the religious feelings which have already been described. Numinous experience is taken to be immediate knowledge of the non-rational aspects of the divine.

In proof of this crucial contention, Otto asserted in the first place that the experience purports to have immediate objective reference; its objectivity is a psychological datum. Numinous feeling "indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self." "This," he said, "is so manifestly borne out by experience that it must be about the first thing to force itself upon the notice of psychologists analyzing the facts of religion."[5] He quoted approvingly William James's statement, "It is as if there were in the human consciousness *a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence,* a *perception* of what we may call *'something there,'* more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed."[6] Hence he concluded, "This 'feeling of reality,' the feeling of a 'numinous' *object* objectively given, must be posited as a primary immediate datum of consciousness."[7]

There is a fatal confusion in this argument on account of the ambiguities in the concepts both of immediacy and objectivity. Otto writes

3. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 7, cf. Ch. XIV, XVII.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
6. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience.* New York, 1902, p. 58.
7. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 11, note.

as if a feeling of immediate presence were sufficient evidence of true presence, but this is by no means the case. As F. R. Tennant has pointed out, a careful distinction must be made between merely felt or "psychic" immediacy, and immediacy which is shown to be genuine by psychological analysis.[8] And it is quite evident that there is no genuine immediacy in this case. For the numinous feeling is regarded as having "reference to an object outside the self." The presence of an interpretation or judgment here is obvious; hence the "numinous object" cannot be said to be immediately present. Nor can the interpretation be said to have immediate certainty, for a feeling, however vivid, cannot guarantee the validity of an inference. There is no warrant for supposing a feeling to contain an immediate knowledge of its cause, and in any case the supposition contradicts the alleged immediacy. The claim that numinous feeling signifies the presence of some particular kind of object, a numen, God, or whatever, requires verification. A similar criticism must be made of Otto's claim that a feeling of objectivity in numinous experience guarantees the reality of a numinous object. For objectivity is of several sorts, and a mere feeling gives no basis for discriminating between them. The numinous object may be simply an object of thought or of imagination, but if believed to be real it may become the focus of feelings as rich and varied as those which Otto described. Whether or not its reality is objective in the ontological sense must be determined by further inquiry.

There is little room for doubt that the subtle distinctions which Otto was able to make in the sphere of numinous feeling are due to the presence in these emotional states of more or less undeveloped ideas as to their objects. Numinous awe is different from ordinary fear because of an obscure notion that the object feared is no ordinary object. Otto would doubtless have agreed that such ideas are present, for he was concerned to show that ideas develop out of, and in the midst of, such states of feeling. But he seems to have believed that in every case the idea is determined by some original qualitative difference in the feeling. But this is impossible to prove and very improbable, for it is a matter of common observation that emotions may be determined by ideas. This is by no means to deny that feelings sometimes suggest ideas; it is simply to question whether differences in the ideas

8. F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*. Cambridge, 1928. Vol. I, p. 46.

that interpenetrate religious experience are to be accounted for in terms of differences in underlying feelings, and to suggest the possibility that at least some of the subtle varieties of religious emotion are to be accounted for by the presence of ideas.

Professor Otto's claim that numinous experience has direct cognitive validity does not escape from the difficulties of all such claims of immediate knowledge. A feeling which is directly had, *erlebt,* is not cognitive in any proper sense. If a person reflects on the experience, he may say that he knows he is experiencing a feeling of awe or mystery, such as those described by Otto, for example. His experience becomes cognitive by becoming reflective, and its cognitive value is strictly determined by the amount and kind of reflection to which it is subjected. When reflection interprets the experience in terms of objective significance there is always need for whatever kind of verification is appropriate and possible. Before verification has taken place the experience may be said to be cognitive in a provisional or hypothetical sense; after verification it may be said to be cognitive in the ordinary sense of probable knowledge.

The basic issue here, however, is no recondite problem in genetic psychology but a question of valid procedure in philosophy and theology. Otto evidently believed that if an idea has grown out of a feeling its validity may be tested by its fidelity to the feeling. He repeatedly attempted to decide theological or philosophical problems and to test doctrines by appealing to feelings which are believed to underlie and to determine them. For example, he held that numinous feeling casts a decisive vote for the primacy of will rather than reason in the divine nature. He maintained that in numinous experience the subject is conscious of his status as creature (*Geschöpflichkeit*) rather than of his having been created (*Geschaffenheit*).[9] This is certainly a convenient method of theological criticism and construction; but its untrustworthiness is apparent, for it involves an unjustified reliance upon the direct cognitive value of feeling.

As it has been already suggested, however, Professor Otto did not rest his claim for the cognitive value of religious experience upon the alleged testimony of immediate feelings alone. He asserted that religious experience has *a priori* elements or categories which serve this cognitive function. Otto is here employing a Kantian notion, though

9. Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 24.

he is by no means following Kant's interpretation of religion. Thinkers who have been greatly influenced by Kantian ideas have generally acknowledged that Kant's list of the categories is defective, and that the method by which he deduced them in the *Critique of Pure Reason* from the principles of the traditional logic is quite inadequate. Various philosophers have attempted to work out a more satisfactory table of categories, and to show more convincingly the source from which they are derived. During the early years of the present century a number of German thinkers, of whom the most eminent was Ernst Troeltsch, were suggesting that there must be a specific religious *a priori*.[10] Kant had not recognized any such category, but had held that religion is based upon ethics. Religion to him was not a distinct area of experience, but "the recognition of our duties as divine commands." He believed religious convictions to be postulates which are necessitated by the rationality of the moral law. The religious man believes in God, freedom, and immortality because these beliefs are involved in his conviction that doing his duty is reasonable. To Troeltsch and others it seemed that Kant, in thus regarding religion as little more than an appendix to morality, was too much under the domination of eighteenth century rationalism. Religion is to be regarded as having its roots in a distinct kind of experience, and this experience must have its own *a priori* categories. The problem that remained was to determine the precise nature of these *a priori* elements in religious experience. This is the problem which Professor Otto tried to solve.

The category peculiar to religion, Otto maintained, is the idea of the "holy." This contention must meet the common assumption that "holy" simply means "absolutely good," and that therefore the "holy" is simply a form of this basic ethical concept. According to Otto this common assumption is totally wrong. The category of the "holy" is a complex category whose constituents are, on the one hand, moral and rational ideas, and on the other the obscure structure of numinous feelings which we have already described. These numinous feelings are more primordial than the moral and rational ideas which now predominate in the meaning of holy. Otto wrote, " 'Holy,' or at least the equivalent words in Latin and Greek, in Semitic and other ancient languages, denoted first and foremost *only* this overplus: if the ethical element was present at all, at any rate it was not original, and never

10. Ernst Troeltsch, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Tübingen, 1913. Vol. II, pp. 754-768.

constituted the whole meaning of the word."[11] These terms rather designated a "unique original feeling response, which can be in itself ethically neutral."

There is some ambiguity in Otto's thought on the question whether numinous feelings independent of ethical ideas ever constituted the whole of religion, or whether there may not have been from the beginning a tendency to express these feelings in ethical terms. Critics of Otto have sometimes assumed the former interpretation, and have condemned him on the ground that this implies that primitive religion had no connection with ethics and makes the connection of religion with ethics purely artificial. But the assumption that this is what Otto meant is by no means the only possible interpretation, for Otto held that the connection between religion and ethics is intrinsic and necessary. What Otto wished to emphasize was that the feeling elements in religious experience are primary and that the thought-elements, including ethical ideas, are secondary, representing a "filling in" or "schematization" of the numinous feelings. For this reason he spoke of the idea of the holy as a schematized category.

This terminology and the basic notion of a schematized category is also derived from Kant, and while Otto does not use the conception in the same sense that Kant did, there is a rather close parallel between the two. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant derived the categories from the principles of logic, which, he assumed, reveal the ultimate forms of judgment. But in order to be applicable to actual spatial and temporal experience, the categories must be combined with space and time, which Kant regarded as forms of intuition. This Kant called the "schematization of the categories." The categories which Kant actually employed, the "principles of the pure understanding," are the categories thus "schematized." Otto's conception of schematization, as applied to the idea of the "holy" involves a somewhat analogous situation. The problem is that of accounting for the fact that the basic ideas of religion have a complex meaning and seem to be derived from diverse roots. One of these roots lies in a distinct area of experience, the numinous feelings, while others are lodged in ethics and metaphysics. Otto's way of accounting for this situation was to maintain that the religious *a priori* is a complex or schematized category. Just as Kant's principles of the pure understanding represent a combina-

11. Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 6.

tion of two factors, one derived from bare intuition and the other from the activity of the mind in judging, so Otto's category of the holy is a combination of factors derived respectively from feeling and from the mind's rational activity. "The 'holy' in the fullest sense of the word is a combined, complex category, the combining elements being its rational and non-rational components. But in *both*—and the assertion must be strictly maintained against all sensationalism and naturalism—it is a *purely a priori* category."[12]

Professor Otto offered other examples of complex or schematized categories of this type. "The intimate interpenetration of the non-rational with the rational elements of the religious consciousness, like the interweaving of warp and woof in a fabric, may be elucidated by taking another familiar case, in which a universal human feeling, that of personal affection, is similarly interpenetrated by a likewise thoroughly non-rational and separate element, namely the sex instinct."[13] But aesthetic experience furnishes the closest parallels, for it too has both rational and non-rational aspects, and its categories are similarly complex. And like religion, it furnishes examples of both legitimate and illegitimate rationalization.

Otto employed this notion of schematization to indicate the nature of the connection between religion and ethics in experience. Here the connection is between feelings and ideas; yet it is not merely accidental or historical, a mere association, but a "necessary connection according to principles of true inward affinity and cohesion." The fact that category and schema belong together is "a necessity of our reason." "Now the relation of the rational to the non-rational elements in the idea of the holy or sacred is just such a one of 'schematization,' and the non-rational numinous fact, schematized by the rational concepts we have suggested above, yields us the complex category of 'holy' itself, richly charged and complete and in its full meaning. And that the schematism is a genuine one, and not a mere combination of analogies, may be distinctly seen from the fact that it does not fall to pieces, and cannot be cut out as the development of the consciousness of religious truth proceeds onwards and upwards, but is only recognized with greater definiteness and certainty."[14]

12. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 47.

Here Otto guarded himself against an error which is frequently charged against him, that of assuming that there was a time when religion consisted simply in irrational and non-ethical feelings, and that the process of rationalization and moralization represents the introduction of alien factors into the religious consciousness. It must be admitted that Professor Otto sometimes spoke as if the numinous feelings might exist in isolation from moral and rational ideas, and might even develop by themselves into higher and purer forms. But he also wrote, "Incomplete and defective as the process of moralizing the 'numina' may often have been throughout the wide regions of primitive religious life, everywhere there are traces of it to be found."[15] He believed that the history of religion shows two distinct processes of development, the refinement of the consciousness of the numinous as such, and the process of its rationalization and moralization. Sometimes he apparently made these processes independent of each other, but more often he recognized that they are intimately and necessarily connected, each conditioning the other as an indispensable condition of advance.

The relationship is further shown by the fact that moral and metaphysical ideas serve as symbols or 'ideograms' for numinous feelings. The dangers of moralism and rationalism in religion arise when it is assumed that they are perfectly adequate symbols, or when it is forgotten that they are symbols and derive their meaning from their background of feeling. But, as we have seen, Professor Otto further insisted that these 'ideograms,' imperfect symbols that they are, possess a cognitive status and objective reference which is conferred upon them by the underlying category of the holy. We must now inquire into the justification of this claim.

By what right are the numinous feelings "schematized" by ethical or other rational ideas so that these ideas may serve as symbols, not only of the experiences themselves, but of objective realities? It is apparent that the crucial problem lies in Otto's conception of the nature of the connection between these feelings and ideas; or, to use his own terminology, between the non-rational and the rational aspects of the complex category of the holy. The relation is obviously not one of implication; nevertheless the process of interpreting the numinous feelings in terms of ethical and rational ideas is "*felt* as something

15. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

axiomatic, something whose inner necessity we feel to be self evident." It is very significant that Otto went on to say, "But then this inward self-evidence is a problem in itself; we are forced to assume as obscure, *a priori* knowledge of the necessity of this synthesis, combining rational and non-rational."[16] It is apparent that here again he fell back upon "feeling," interpreted as *a priori* knowledge, and the criterion of self-evidence or immediate insight.

We must therefore ask what Otto meant by the *a priori*. In the case of the rational and ethical ideas which constitute the "schema" of the category, Otto meant that they are not derived from sense perception, but from "an original and underivable capacity of the mind implanted in the 'pure reason' independently of all perception." Otto believed that the numinous feelings come from a similar source:

> But in the case of the non-rational elements of our category of the Holy we are referred back to something still deeper than the "pure reason," at least as this is usually understood, namely to that which Mysticism has rightly named the "fundus animae," the "bottom" or "ground of the soul" (Seelengrund). . . . [The numinous] issues from the deepest foundation of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses, and, though it of course comes into being in and amid the sensory data and empirical material of the natural world and cannot anticipate or dispense with those, yet it does not arise *out of* them, but only *by their means*. . . . The proof that in the numinous we have to deal with purely *a priori* cognitive elements is to be reached by introspection and a critical examination of reason such as Kant instituted. We find, that is, involved in the numinous experience, beliefs and feelings qualitatively different from anything that "natural" sense-perception is capable of giving us. They are themselves not perceptions at all, but peculiar interpretations and valuations, at first of perceptual data, and then—at a higher level—of posited objects and entities, which themselves no longer belong to the perceptual world, but are thought of as supplementing and transcending it. . . . The facts of the numinous consciousness point therefore—as likewise do also the "pure concepts of the understanding" of Kant and the ideas and value-judgments of ethics or aesthetics—to a hidden substantive source, from which the religious ideas and feelings are formed, which lies in the mind independently of sense-experience; a "pure reason" in the profoundest sense, which, because of the surpassingness of its content, must be distinguished from both the pure theoretical and the pure practical reason of Kant, as something yet higher or deeper than they.[17]

16. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 116-118.

The essence of this argument is the contention that numinous experience contains interpretations and valuations which cannot be derived from ordinary sense-experience and which must therefore come from a substantive source in the mind itself. The numinous feelings and valuations, being specific and unique, are only to be derived from "predispositions," "potentialities," or "capacities" of the human mind. This is a very curious argument, and one which leaves the real problem untouched. Otto's complete repudiation of the idea of the evolution or transmutation of experienced qualities means that all distinguishable qualities which ever have been or ever will be experienced by anyone must be regarded as the mere coming to light of potentialities of the human mind. There is then no means of escape from this wholesale subjectivity except by the equally wholesale assumption that these qualities are immediately cognitive. But as we have already pointed out, qualities or feelings are not cognitive save as they are interpreted, and their valid interpretation is not immediately self-evident but requires verification.

Professor Otto's reference of both the qualitative and structural aspects of religious experience to *a priori* sources is surely an example of exaggerated apriorism. We may rightly ask, what then is *a posteriori* in religious experience, in fact, in experience of any sort. The reply might be that these qualities must await their appropriate stimuli to call them forth. But it is obvious that there is a wide difference between response to a stimulus and knowledge of it, and of its relations with other entities. A feeling-response must never be supposed to yield an immediate knowledge of its cause. We need guidance in our interpretation of experience, and this guidance can only come from the structural elements of the experience. The more important part of Otto's apriorism, therefore, is his contention that the structural aspect of religious experience is not to be explained in terms of experience itself, but is to be derived from the structure of the mind.

In the first place it may be remarked that even if this contention be granted, Otto has not thereby justified his claim that religious experience is directly cognitive. For if the structure of our experience is subjective, we have still to seek the warrant for the claim that experience brings us into contact with objective reality. Sometimes Otto attempted to get over this difficulty simply by appealing for the recognition of cognitive faculties within the human spirit.[18] The

18. *Ibid.*, cf. p. 11, note; pp. 116-119.

potentialities and capacities of the human mind are grounded in turn upon absolute mind as pure actuality. This position is barely suggested in *The Idea of the Holy,* but is developed at length in Otto's earlier book *Naturalism and Religion.* The argument resolves itself ultimately into the claim of immediate knowledge which we have already discussed. But Otto also attempted to escape from the difficulty through a modification of Kantian teachings as to the status of the categories. He depended here upon the little known Kantian philosopher, Jacob Friedrich Fries. In his *The Philosophy of Religion based on Kant and Fries,* Otto credited Fries with having proved that the categories are objectively valid by showing that they are forms of the basic ideas of the unity and necessity of Being.[19] The categories therefore represent not simply the structure of the human mind but also the structure of objective reality.

It would seem perfectly obvious that all of these varied appeals to the *a priori* contain one form or another of the basic assumption of rationalism, that there is a pre-established harmony or congruence of structure between the mind and reality. In spite of Otto's extensive use of Kantian terminology, he really abandoned the basic position of the critical philosophy. And in spite of his emphasis upon feeling and the non-rational his interpretation of religious experience depends at every crucial point upon the historic assumptions of rationalism.

The difficulties both in the Kantian position and in that of Otto may be greatly simplified by a somewhat different approach to what these philosophies call the *a priori* categories. Otto was right of course in maintaining that experience contains structural elements, and that these forms are not derived from experience in the sense of being pieced together out of sensations. But they are derived from functions performed in experience. Kant rightly regarded the categories as modes of mental activity, but his followers went on to make the unnecessary and misleading assumption that they were imposed upon experience by a transcendent self. Their origin lies rather in tentative activities whereby the intelligent organism seeks to control and comprehend its experience. They begin as accidental or experimental variations and experience sifts out those which perform a satisfactory function. The formal structures of experience are hypothetical and instrumental. William James compared them to a net which is thrown over

19. Otto: *The Philosophy of Religion based on Kant and Fries.* London, 1931, pp. 49-53.

experiences in the hope that it will yield a catch.[20] These forms and systems gain empirical meaning as they are found to be applicable to experience. The categories are simply those forms of thought whose applicability to experience has been so often demonstrated that they have become habitual and unquestioned.

If this conception of the *a priori* is made the basis of a reinterpretation of Otto's analysis of religious experience the way is opened for both an enrichment and a simplification of his theory. The richness and subtlety of his description of religious feelings may be fully recognized. But there is no need for attributing to the numinous feelings so much fixity of structure as he has done. The numinous feelings which Otto describes represent a selection from more extensive varieties. And on the other hand one is spared the difficulties in attempting to defend the view that religious experience is immediately cognitive. It should rather be thought of as having a preliminary and a consummatory function with respect to knowledge. It is precognitive in that it provides a fertile field for the production of interpretations and hypotheses; it is postcognitive in that it clothes ideas and ideals with a rich texture of feeling.

20. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*. New York, 1893. Vol. II, Ch. XVIII. Cf. pp. 638, 665.

A NATURALISTIC VIEW OF "NUMINOUS" EXPERIENCE

By Waldo Jewell-Lapan

Although *The Idea of the Holy* by Rudolph Otto contains a penetrating analysis of one type of religious experience, two elements of his treatment invite further consideration. These are his distinction between the "rational" and "irrational" aspects of God, and his identification of Deity as a transcendent, supernatural reality.

Beginning with the immediate religious experience and working always within its totality, Otto distinguishes between the activity and its object. The latter he designates as a "numinous category of value";[1] the former as the "numinous state of mind."[2] Both are analyzed, being accepted as fact according to the indications of the experience.

The experiencing of the numinous is found to be a *sui generis* activity, explainable in terms of a unique and original "predisposition"[3] in man. The primary characteristic of the activity is what Otto calls "creature-consciousness." This is

> the emotion of a creature abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is above all creatures.[4]

A peculiar dread not identical with "natural" fear; a sense of being daunted by the awfulness of the numen; and a feeling of "self-annihilation"[5] are mingled in creature-consciousness with an overpowering attraction toward the numinous object. The entire activity thus described is emotional and "irrational." The object of it is likewise "irrational," although independent of the experiencing, since the numinous is

> felt as objective and outside the self.[6]

Not only is the "numinous" experienced as being outside the self, but it is also felt to be essentially so "wholly other" in kind and charac-

1. Otto, Rudolph, *The Idea of the Holy*, translated by J. W. Harvey. London, Oxford University Press, 1925, p. 7.
2. *Ibid.* p. 7.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

ter from the self that it is inconceivable in conceptual terms, and hence is "irrational." Because of this disparity felt between man's self and the object of his experience,

> the concepts "transcendent" and "supernatural" become forthwith designations for a unique "wholly other" reality and quality, something of whose special character we can *feel*, without being able to give it clear conceptual expression.[7]

The numinous object is, then, according to Otto, *sui generis*, transcendental and "irrational."

As the feeling of "creature-consciousness" involves several unique emotional responses, so the numinous object is felt to be characterized by a number of unique attributes, such as "awfulness," "overpoweringness," " 'energy' or urgency" and "fascination." These characteristics of the numinous object as well as that of being "wholly other" are elements in the immediate religious experience, and so far the analysis deals only with feeling and what is felt, with the "irrational" aspect of Deity. According to Otto, however, there is also a "rational" aspect.

> It is essential to every theistic conception of God, . . . that it designates and precisely characterizes Deity by the attributes Spirit, Reason, Purpose, Good Will, Supreme Power, Unity, Selfhood. The nature of God is thought of by analogy with our human nature of reason and personality; only whereas in ourselves we are aware of this as qualified by restriction and limitation, as applied to God the attributes we use are "completed," i.e., thought as absolute and unqualified. Now all these attributes constitute clear and definite *concepts:* they can be grasped by the intellect; they can be analyzed by thought; they even admit of definition. An object that can thus be thought conceptually may be termed *rational.*[8]

The concepts thus applied to God are "schema," derived directly from the religious experience, with which they have an exact correspondence.[9] For example, the element of "fascination" in the numinous is conceptualized in terms of Love, Mercy and Pity, the element of energy becomes Power and Will, while the creature's feeling of dread is translated into the Wrath of God, Justice, and Righteous Indignation. The attributes thus formulated, however numerous they be, do not exhaust the character of Deity. They are, rather, predicates of an unknowable and inconceivable subject, made by analogy, and con-

7. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

nected with the moral and social development of human kind, being, therefore, subject to development and refinement.

Since, however, the predications made of God vary with the changing morality and intellectuality of a culture, they can hardly express the true nature of God, since neither He nor His attributes can be thought of as subject to change. Being merely analogies drawn from man's experience of nature, such as objectivity, power and unity, or analogies taken from his own personality like spirit, love and will, these attributes of natural experience, though rational in nature become unintelligible when applied literally to a supernatural reality.

Moreover, it is apparent from Otto's whole description of the "rational aspect of Deity" that the purpose of the preceding analysis of the experience was to lay a foundation for this consequent theology; and while his treatment of the experience is one of straightforward analysis, the interpretation of it is less analytic than apologetic. Beginning by isolating the experience from all other types of experience, he thereby forces the interpretation of it to be in terms different from those which account for the rest of experience. Following his initial analytical procedure, and accepting the independent existence which the numinous object is experienced to have, let us examine the experience in conjunction with other types of experience to ascertain whether its object is necessarily supernatural as well as transcendent; that is to say, let us endeavor to ascertain whether this religious experience can, like all other experiences, be adequately accounted for in terms of nature.

If the object of the religious emotion is empirical, it should be capable of identification. Otto points out that in what he calls the "daemonic" stage of numinous experience various localities such as mountains and desert spaces, certain species of animals, and even individual men of unusual impressiveness are felt to possess a "numinous" quality. In its most fully developed stage, however, the experience of the numinous, although instigated by some natural stimulus, seems to have as its object the pure numen, unassociated with any natural phenomenon and unidentifiable outside of the emotional experience. Since for Otto the numen itself is supernatural this account leads to considerable difficulty. In the more primitive stages, the supernatural numinous is felt to be a quality of natural objects; later the experience of the purely supernatural is stimulated by natural objects. This makes

an abrupt discontinuity between the two stages, while in the second stage there is a puzzling conjunction of realms of being, since the stimulus to the experience belongs to a different realm from the object of it. When the numen is interpreted as natural, however, there is neither discontinuity between the stages nor confusion of realms of being; and the "numinous" can itself be identified in terms of the experience of it.

The experience indicates that the "numinous" is objective and unconditioned. Although to naïve experience all natural entities are objective, it is only nature in its entirety that can be called wholly unconditioned; and this nature, including as it does man and his activities, is not only that, the existence of which is unconditioned and self-subsistent, but is itself the condition of all particular existences. Otto mentions what he calls "creature-consciousness" as an immediate subjective aspect of the numinous experience. This creature-consciousness is a feeling of dependence and of self-nothingness before that which is "supreme above all creatures." Now, although man is a part of nature, or rather, just because man is a part of nature, he is helplessly dependent upon it; and while he can modify certain of its modes and aspects, he himself is entirely determined by it.

It is precisely that which we are irrevocably dependent upon which appears to us as awful and overpowering. Many disturbances of nature such as cyclones and tornadoes, earthquakes and famines certainly have these same characteristics; but as Otto points out, the dread experienced before Deity is not identical with the fear of any particular natural object, nor is the "awfulness" felt in Deity the same as the fearfulness of an immediately threatening physical calamity. Because Otto posits a unique supernatural object, and a unique faculty of experiencing as the ground for these distinctions, he does not analyze the differences after mentioning them. In any naturalistic interpretation of the religious experience, however, such an analysis is demanded.

Two factors are immediately discernible which appear to offer sufficient grounds for the differences experienced both in the attributes of the objects and in the quality of the emotions. Although whatever threatens man with death may be said to possess the extreme of terribleness in virtue of implying the extremity of danger, the impending doom remains, nevertheless, particular; its threat, therefore, limited,

and its power not absolute. Nature as a whole is not particular, and its conditioning of man is absolute. Not for one instant of time, nor in even one activity can he deliver himself from the limitations which it imposes upon him. The disparity, then, in the attributes of awfulness and overpoweringness as felt in nature as a whole and in any particular object is one of intensity. It is the distinction between what is absolute and what is limited.

This alone does not explain the difference in the quality of the emotion, the ground for which is to be found in the distinction between the practical and contemplative or aesthetic state of mind. Objects which portend immediate danger are feared, and fear is a practical emotion, incompatible with contemplation. On the other hand, nature as a whole offers no immediate threat to man. Before it he has no need of practical reactions; indeed, it is only in a state of contemplation that he can feel its awfulness; and this is qualitatively different from the common garden-variety of fear. There is no implication here that the only "awful" object of contemplation is nature as a whole. Imminent danger, not terribleness in itself, is the spur to fear; but when fearful particulars become objects of contemplation, although the emotional dread which they arouse is qualitatively the same as that felt in the religious experience, the difference of intensity before the limited and absolute still remains.

Another attribute noted by Otto is that which he calls " 'energy' or urgency," and describes as

> a force that knows not stint nor stay, which is active, compelling and alive.[10]

As the procedure here is an attempt to identify the numinous object within the realm of nature in terms of the attributes it is experienced to have, it is not fitting merely to point out that Otto's description conforms to nature considered as a whole, as though nature were being taken for granted and the attributes of the numinous were being grafted upon it. Rather, it is evident, when the described attribute of "urgency" is considered, that in the other types of human experience, the whole realm of nature, and only that whole realm is characterized by "a force that knows not stint nor stay."

The attributes so far discussed are in Otto's analysis predicates of

10. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

the numinous object, which itself is primarily experienced as being the "wholly-other" and which he terms the "Mysterium."

> The truly "mysterious" object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently "wholly-other," whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb.[11]

Man continually experiences that which is other than himself in the objects around him. Mountains and shells, and stars, these have an existence outside of man and unconditioned by him, an existence unlike his own in feeling neither pity nor pain. Like man, however, such objects are finite and conditioned, characteristics which he also possesses. The totality of nature, being other than man in the same way that particular objects are, is not finite nor conditioned. Thus it is wholly-other than man. This difference of kind, moreover, is rendered "incommensurable" with man and incomprehensible to him in virtue of the fact that nature, although it does not think, yet displays order and intelligibility, and while it does not will nor possess purpose, still achieves endings. It is in this respect that nature becomes so "mysterious" to man, since without his faculties of willing or thinking, it yet brings forth ends, and possesses a structure which in its entirety is beyond his powers of apprehension.

In his common experience of nature, then, man finds that which appears "wholly-other" and "mysterious" to him. Were nature absolutely different from him in kind, he could have no consciousness of it; but man is himself natural, a part of that which he regards as other than himself, and appropriate to it. It is the appropriateness of his thinking to the order of nature, and of his willing to the effectiveness of nature, that renders nature to him so mysteriously like and unlike himself.

Otto, then, describes the supernatural numinous object as being objective, self-subsistent and wholly-other, with the attributes of awfulness, overpoweringness and urgency. In other realms of human experience, nature in its totality is found to be characterized in exactly the same way, and so characterized more consistently than could any supernatural reality. Moreover, there is found in nature a reason why

11. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

human attributes are given by analogy to Deity, while it is important to remember that the other "rational attributes" predicated of God, such as eternity and infinity, are drawn directly from our experience of nature.

"Fascination" is the last element which Otto describes as belonging to the numinous object in which man

> feels a something that captivates and transports him with a strange ravishment.[12]

The numinous is experienced to be of supreme value, and because of this the attributes of Love, Mercy, Pity are predicated of it.

How does this coincide with other realms of experience? Nature is experienced as being passionless, nor can we attribute the elements of our own experiencing to it. But, it was found that in the realm of knowledge, the ground for ascribing reason to Deity is the fact that nature is intelligible and so man finds it, not thinking, but thinkable. In the same way, common experience indicates that nature, although it neither treasures nor despises, yet possesses values independent of us.

Language illustrates this. The object which we love is loveable, that which we abominate is abominable, and in naïve experience it never occurs to us that our hating makes a person hateful; but that we hate just because he is hateful. The implication of this is that natural objects possess characteristics which make them intrinsically valuable, or potential values to a valuing organism. According to this view, values are the actualization of the potentially valuable with the potentially valuing, just as sensations are the actualization of the sensible with the potentially sensing, and knowledge the actualization of the intelligible with the thinking.

Naïve experience finds the valuable in particular natural objects, in a sunset or delicious food, in a book or a friend. Such things as these comprise the goods of life; and in the same fashion all things that produce pain, are regarded as the ills of living.

All objects and situations man reacts to pleasurably or painfully, and even total indifference is in itself a kind of evaluation. Now it is objects and situations themselves which appear pleasant and unpleasant, so that in this context, nature which comprehends and comprises

12. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

them all, becomes a realm of value just as in the context of knowledge we find it to be a realm of mind.[13] As nature includes both knower and object known, so it also includes both the valuing man and the things which he values.

The element of fascination in the numinous experience, then, is not wholly divorced from other types of experience, but may be accounted for in terms of nature, just as the attributes of awfulness, urgency and wholly otherness may be. Therefore, although Otto employs these deliverances of religious experience to support the postulations of a supernatural reality, an examination of that experience in conjunction with other types of human experience seems to indicate that such an interpretation is unnecessary, and at times inconsistent, inasmuch as nature alone provides sufficient and consistent grounds to account for the facts.

13. Woodbridge, F. J. E., *Realm of Mind.*

THE HARIJAN AND HINDUISM

By George Weston Briggs
Professor of the History of Religions, Drew University

I

Two Hindus divide the leadership of the Harijans between them: one from the ranks of caste, the other from those of the outcastes; one claiming to speak for them by reason of having made himself an untouchable through precept and example, the other because of his birth; one insisting that he spoke in behalf of the Depressed Classes at the last Round Table Conference by reason of his position in the Indian National Congress as representative of all Indians, the other officially the representative of the Harijans at the same conference in London; one seeking to cure this evil of untouchables from within, the other outside of Hinduism; one believing in *varṇāśrama* as a divine institution providing ultimately for the redemption of the outcaste, the other having no confidence in the Hindu system, and holding that the history of its working right down to today shows that there is no hope there for the Harijan. Both are barristers-at-law.

The fundamental attitudes with reference to the momentous question of untouchability are characteristic of the men and of their backgrounds. The career of Mr. Gandhi is familiar to the world at large, although his basic ideas about caste are not so well understood. He was born within the caste system and belongs to the third *varṇa*, the *vaiśya*. Bhim Rao Ramji Ambedkar is not so well known. A Mahār by birth, he secured an education in his native land under conditions characteristic of caste persecution of the untouchable. He has experienced the same kind of treatment at the heavy hand of organized Hinduism right up to the present time. H. H. the Gaekwar of Baroda, in whose state he was born, discovered him and rewarded him for his unusual attainments in college by a travelling scholarship abroad. Ambedkar studied in the United States, in Germany (at the University of Bonn) and in Great Britain. He holds the degrees of M.A. and Ph.D. (in Economics) from Columbia University and that of Dr. Sc. (in Economics and Commerce) from the University of London. While in England he was called to the Bar. He is now Principal of the Gov-

ernment Law College in Bombay. He was a member of the Round Table Conferences in 1930 and in 1932, and of the Joint Parliamentary Committee in 1932, and is a nominated member of the Bombay Legislative Council. By him the Untouchable Classes Welfare League was founded.[1] Among other capable leaders within the ranks of the Untouchables are Mr. Rasik Lal Biswas, Baba Patitpawan Das, Rae Bahadur M. C. Rajah, Mr. Shiva Nandanlal Satnami, Rai Sahib Shiam Lal, and Pandit Chandrika Prasav Jigyasu.

The term "Harijan," which means "God's (Hari's) Man," was coined by Mr. Gandhi about nine years ago as a new designation for the outcastes. Other words, still in common use, referring to the same social group are "*Adi-dravida*" (proto-Dravidian), "*antiyaja*" (born at the end, or, whose birth is on the border or outskirts of caste-society), and "Depressed Classes." The last named term is the most acceptable. The group as a whole does not like the appellation "*Harijan.*" Mr. Gandhi's object in proposing the new term was to assert the essential brotherhood and equality of all Hindus and to contribute to the mitigation of the adverse attitudes and conditions which the other words connote. But at the Lucknow Conference (May, 1936) they passed a resolution worded as follows: "This Conference expresses its sense of strong abhorrence and insult at the term 'Harijan' as it is applied to the Depressed Classes, and asks those who have no desire to insult the Depressed Classes not to use the term 'Harijan' in reference to them. This Conference further expresses its dissatisfaction with the Harijan Movement launched by Mahatma Gandhi."

Although the matter has been in dispute until quite recently, today the untouchables are acknowledged to be Hindus. Otherwise there is no point to the present effort to keep them within Hinduism, or that they intend to go elsewhere. Note also Pandit Malaviya's statement below. The proportions of the problems which the Depressed Classes embody may be judged from the number of persons involved. According to the "Simon Commission Report" (1930), the untouchables comprise 20% of the population of British India, or 30% of the Hindu population of the same area, and they number 43,000,000 (p. 37). If the corresponding population of the Indian States be added, the figures reach 60,000,000.

1. There is a good account of Dr. Ambedkar in *The New York Times*, November 30, 1930; and one by Mahadeva Desai in Mr. Gandhi's paper, *Harijan*.

The disabilities of the Harijans include denial of the use of certain classes of roads, and of wells and temples. They are held to pollute caste people either by presence or by touch. In general, their treatment is characterized by contempt and exploitation. The conditions which are imposed upon them overstep, in many instances, elementary humanitarian considerations. While the principle of untouchability obtains among all the castes and among all outcastes as well,[2] still, the great cleavage within Hindu society in this respect is found between caste-Hindus on the one hand and unclean Shudras and outcastes on the other. "Untouchability" is, therefore, a deeper problem than any of its manifestations, and Dr. Ambedkar and many others hold that such questions as temple entry and inter-dining, which have attracted so much attention in recent years, are of secondary importance.

Untouchability has received increasing attention in recent years, and the whole of Hinduism has been aroused by issues which such men as Mr. Gandhi and Dr. Ambedkar have raised. For example, in 1932 Mr. Gandhi created an unprecedented crisis in orthodox circles by proclaiming a personal fast. Rather than see the Mahatma die of starvation Hindus came to terms with him, allowing the Harijans to remain within the Hindu community, rather than be classed as a separate political unit. In some respects, in certain areas, notably in progressive Indian states, advances have been made, and even the most recent agitation is reflected in official pronouncements. Three examples will suffice.

On November 13, 1936, the Maharajah of Travancore opened all state-controlled temples within his realm to untouchables, saying that henceforth none of his subjects should be barred from them for reasons "of birth, caste or community." "The Government of Cochin has ordered that the free concessions and other facilities allowed to Depressed Class children in schools should not be discontinued if the children are converted to non-Hindu faiths."[3] And Mysore reports, with reference to the education of the Depressed Classes, that there were 580 schools with a strength of 12,873 students, both boys and girls, in all the Harijan schools in the state. There were 45 college students, 296 boys and 4 girls in high school classes, 227 boys and 5

2. Today this is being emphasized as if it were a new discovery. Every one knows that the untouchables ape the customs of caste people.

3. *Indian Review*, December 1935, p. 838.

girls in the industrial schools of the state. The government has started free boarding homes and has given other facilities for them to study in colleges, high schools, and industrial schools.[4] This sort of action does not, however, go beyond the bounds of segregation and is, therefore, not radical enough to reach the roots of the problem. Still, it is fair to say that over a period of years some advance has been made, more particularly in urban areas and in the ranks of those who have obtained high school and university education. In the vast areas of rural life, however, and in the non-English literate levels of society, progress has been very much slower. An Indian gentleman who watched the venerable Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya administering the *gura mantra* to Harijans at Benares in February, 1936, noted the reactions of two groups of Hindu observers. He says that those educated in English are for democracy, while those educated in Sanskrit, but without English, in commenting upon the reception of those outcastes into caste-Hinduism, said: "The Harijans may be admitted to equality in some things, but we won't eat with them, nor will we form marriage alliances with them."[5] This remark goes to the bottom of the whole matter.[6]

We have stated that Mr. Gandhi stands for a solution of the question of untouchability within Hinduism. He believes in *varṇāśrama* (the four groups which include the various castes), which he conceives to have been an ideal institutional set-up in the ancient past. He wishes to hold Hinduism together, and has for his express object the assimilation of the Harijans to Hindu society on equal terms with caste members. Perhaps the most emphatic expression of his position was his fast in 1932, and his explanation of the meaning of it on September 21 of that year. He said, "No patched-up agreement between caste-Hindu leaders and rival Depressed Class leaders will answer the purpose. . . . If the Hindu mass mind is not yet prepared to banish untouchability, root and branch, it must sacrifice me without the slightest hesitation." And he continued, "I may repeat that it (the fast) is aimed at a statutory separate electorate in any shape or form for the Depressed Classes."[7] When the settlement was arrived at which ter-

4. *Ibid.*, September 1935, p. 621.
5. *Indian Witness*, March 5, 1936.
6. It is stated on reliable authority that the Pandit, who gave initiation to members of the Depressed Classes, refused to see them at his residence later.
7. *Speeches and Writings*, pp. 947, 948.

minated his fast, it was made in terms of a *joint* electorate. This was the famous Poona Pact (September 24, 1932), ratified at Bombay the next day.

While Mr. Gandhi feels that the practices included under untouchability are repugnant to reason and to the instincts of mercy, pity, and love, at the same time he is really an advocate of the caste system (*varṇāśrama*). An astute student of the whole question, himself an Indian, says, "The Mahatma, though in his own life he has shown that he follows none of the rules laid down for caste, has not yet openly associated himself with any direct attack on it."[8]

The *Modern Review* for October, 1935,[9] contains an interview with Mr. Gandhi (revised by himself before publication) in which he says: "Every person is born with definite limitations which he cannot overcome. From a careful observation of these limitations the law of *varṇa* was deduced. It establishes certain spheres of action for certain people with certain tendencies. This avoided all unworthy competition. Whilst recognizing limitations, the law of *varṇa* admitted of no distinctions of high and low: on the one hand, it guaranteed to each the fruits of his labors, and on the other, it prevented him from presuming upon his neighbor. This great law has been degraded and fallen into disrepute. But my conviction is that an ideal social order will only be evolved when the implications of this law are fully understood and given effect to. This law describes the duties of man. Rights follow from the performance of duties."

Dr. Ambedkar's position with reference to these matters is radically different from that of Mr. Gandhi. In an impassioned address at Yeola (Nasik) on the 13th of October, 1935, he said: "I had the misfortune of being born with the stigma of untouchability. But it was not my fault. I will not die a Hindu, for this is in my power." He continued: "We shall cease our fight for equality where we are denied it." It was in this address that he announced that he would lead the Harijans out of Hinduism. That pronouncement at Nasik has stirred Hinduism to its depths, and has brought the orthodox section of the community face to face with fundamental issues. Since then events of significance have followed in quick succession. Dr. Ambedkar ad-

8. *Indian Social Reformer*, December 14, 1935, p. 237. Mr. Ghandi says that *ahimsa* rather than caste is the distinguishing mark of Hinduism.

9. P. 413.

dressed about 10,000 Harijans at Yeola. A little later a great meeting was convened at Barabanki, near Lucknow, with 28,000 present. The Depressed Classes all over India are now on the aggressive. In the fall of 1935 tentative plans were proposed for an all-Indian conference of the Depressed Classes to be held in Lucknow the following year. Early in November (1935), less than a month after he made his statement, at a meeting of the Harijan League at Nasik, the Hindu Śāstras were publicly burned there. This event was made much of in the Press all over India.

II

The reaction of Hindu orthodoxy to the untouchables' threat to leave Hinduism takes many forms. At the time of the Sheoratri festival in Benares, in February, 1936, the venerable Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya administered the *guru-mantra* to a large number of Harijans and urged them to lead a clean life. This *mantra,* the *Sheonam-mantra,* consists of three words, "*Om-namash-Shivae.*"[10] Śiva is the chief Hindu god of Benares. This ceremony was designed to admit outcastes to the rank of caste-Hindus. Again, during the third week of March (1936), the Pandit performed similar services at the holy city of Nasik. He was described as being "on his mission of removing the blot of untouchability from Hindu society."[11] The urgency of the situation is pointed out in the following comment: "When he feels it his imperative duty, at his age and in the weak condition of his health, to devote his energies to persuade his fellow Hindus to give up the notion of untouchability and to treat their brethren of the Depressed Classes as they treat one another among themselves, Hindudom is profoundly moved and the hour has struck for the extinction of this ancient wrong to millions of men and women who have never swerved in their devotion to the Hindu *dharma* . . . Panditjee has not been able to get the depressed classes admitted into the Kalarama temple, to have their right to participate in the car festival recognized by their fellow Hindus, [or] to secure freedom to them to bathe in the sacred pools in the bed of the Godavari. But there is not the least doubt that his visit has shaken orthodoxy to its foundations not only in Nasik but all over India."[12] And, further: "Completely for two hours

10. *Indian Witness,* March 5, 1936.
11. *Indian Social Reformer,* March 21, 1936.
12. *Ibid.*

in the hot sun of March, Malaviya stood bareheaded on the bank of the Godavari, managing every item of Deeksha."[13]

On April 14 and 15, 1936, an All-India Depressed Classes Conference was held in Lucknow. This seems to have been sponsored by the Hindu leaders in the Indian National Congress. It was held about a month before the dates finally set for a conference by the Depressed Classes themselves. Of this April meeting, Mr. Rasik Lal Biswas, President of the All-India Depressed Classes League, on his return from Amritsar where he had attended a Sikh Missionary Conference along with Dr. Ambedkar, said: "I am surprised to read of a so-called All-India Conference of the Depressed Classes League, which is reported to have been held in Lucknow on the 14th and 15th of April. I am the President of the said League, but have had no information concerning this Conference. It is my opinion that this so-called Conference was in no way convened by the Depressed Classes but was worked up as a part of the propaganda of those who are interested in the Harijan Movement." The Conference was evidently a blind. It does show, however, something of the difficulty which the leaders of the movement have to meet.[14]

There has been a rather general attempt to belittle the series of events beginning with Dr. Ambedkar's momentous affirmation. Even the *Indian Social Reformer* said: "Dr. Ambedkar's bombshell turned out to be a damp squib so far as caste Hindus are concerned."[15] However, a vast unrest pervades the untouchables of India, and later events have shown that all communities in India, Sikh, Arya Samaj, Muslim, Christian, as well as Hindu, have been profoundly moved, and that the ultimate effects upon all these bodies will be of great significance. The implications of Dr. Ambedkar's declaration are so far reaching that Pandit Malaviya at Nasik, in March (1936), saw fit to insist that the problem of the untouchables was a Hindu one, and for Hindus alone to settle. He even flung the term "hands off" to others. "We are their elder brothers and will see to it that they re-

13. *Ibid.*, March 28, 1936.

14. This conference was held in a small tent close to the Congress Pandal. Over the entrance were the words "Arya Samaj." Inside, Pandit Malaviya was seated on a platform; but the place was so noisy that it was impossible to hear what he had to say. The Depressed Classes Conference's president and others were frustrated in their attempts to distribute literature.

15. *Indian Social Reformer*, October 26, 1935.

main with us, happy and contented. Moslems and Christians have no claim on them."

Characteristically, he does not consult the masses concerned. He is reputed to have said that even if untouchability be a matter of birth, there is a provision in Hinduism for the removal of their status, and that is "initiation (*mantra dīkṣa*)." This means initiation into "caste"-Hinduism, and is the principle which the Pandit has been using.[16] "The method adopted by the Pandit to admit the Depressed Classes to the caste-Hindu fold was carefully devised so as not to infringe on traditional beliefs. The study of the Vedas is forbidden to castes other than the twice-born. All religious reformers have respected this rule. But they also found that the Shastras themselves had provided other ways by which all classes, men and women alike, could attain salvation equally, if not more effectively, than by the rites prescribed by the Vedas. The great reformer who composed the Bhagavad Gītā expressly declared that the path of salvation which he indicated was a surer and easier one than that prescribed by the Vedas. To one who followed his precepts, the Vedas, he said, were as little useful as water to one swimming in a flood. The Pandit, following in the line of this tradition, administered a simple vow to the Depressed Classes."

Reactionary forces within Hinduism have gone so far as to attempt to divide the ranks of the untouchables by creating factions among them, and by encouraging leadership in opposition to Dr. Ambedkar. Moreover, it is claimed that Dr. Ambedkar and his followers have not received fair treatment in the press in general, and in the caste-controlled press in particular.[17] In recent months many false rumors have been spread abroad about Dr. Ambedkar's agreements with one or another religious body. He has had to make many public denials through the press. J. H. Smith reports Dr. Ambedkar as saying, "I have stopped trying to answer all of the attacks which are made upon me and have ceased trying to clear up all of the misapprehensions." Besides, an attack has been launched against him because he has not forthwith declared where he will lead his following. Although his opponents are impatient, he is in no hurry to make this sort of announcement. This is an illustration of his wisdom. He has declared, however, for autonomy within the various castes which make up the

16. *Ibid.*, March 28, 1936.
17. See *Indian Witness*, November 21, 1935, and December 5, 1935.

untouchable group. His position is indicated by his advice to his own caste fellows, the Mahārs, to decide for themselves. The natural lines along which such great movements move would, as the past has shown, be those of the castes concerned.

The proposed All-India Conference of the Depressed Classes was held in Lucknow, May 22, 23, 24, 1936. Although not a large conference, as was to be expected, since these castes as a whole have no secure economic standing, still it was of great significance. For instance, fourteen speakers representing ten different religious groups saw fit to present to the Conference authoritative pronouncements regarding what they had to offer to the untouchables. The religious organizations were "Buddhist, Bahist, Ahmadhya Muslims, the Orthodox Muslims, the Christians, the Kabir Panthis, Sikhs, Jains, Arya Samajists, and the Orthodox Hindus."[18] It should be borne in mind that the intellectual level of the group was not low, and that there was in the Conference a good number of educated men. The Conference gave seven full hours in the heat of May to a careful consideration of what the various religious bodies had to offer, and in their reactions their sense of fair play was in evidence throughout. The Conference makes plain that the movement is not doomed because the masses of the untouchables are illiterate. It is of interest to note that, although Dr. Ambedkar was unable to attend the Conference, he did not lose his place of leadership, and that his written address was received with enthusiasm. They were evidently in full sympathy with his message, insisting that caste and all its implications must be destroyed. An observer reported that "there is no doubt but that the delegates as a whole are resolved to leave Hinduism." "They challenged the claims of the orthodox Hindus and of the Arya Samajists that brotherhood is possible in these faiths." While it was expected that Hinduism would be attacked primarily because of the practice of untouchability, still, the Conference was characterized by its wholesale condemnation of Hindu practice, of its whole system of idolatry and ritual, and by ridicule and denunciation of the Brahmans. From a survey of the proceedings, it is clear that the delegates thought along broad, fundamental lines. There is to be another all-India Conference in 1937.

18. *Ibid.*, May 28, 1936.

III

One of the results of recent events has been the bringing into clearer view the lines of cleavage within Hindu opinion on the subject of untouchability.

To begin with, there is the orthodox group represented by the Sanatanists, who defend their position by reference to the ancient scriptures. Of them, Mr. Gandhi writes: "I have letters from those who style themselves Sanatanists. For them untouchability is the essence of Hinduism. Some quote scriptures in defense of untouchability. Almost every letter that I have received from them makes these startling admissions: (1) We admit that there is much to be done for the amelioration of the condition of the Harijans. (2) We admit that many caste-Hindus are ill-treating the Harijans. (3) We admit that their children should receive education, that they should have better quarters to live in. (4) We admit that they should have proper arrangements for bathing and drawing water for themselves. (5) We admit that they should have full political rights. (6) We admit that they should have ample facilities for worship, and (7) We admit that they should have all the civic rights that the others have. 'But,' say the Sanatanists, 'we must not be compelled to touch them or associate with them, especially whilst they are in their present condition'."[19]

The editor of the *Indian Social Reformer,* in a leading article[20] criticising Pandit Malaviya, leader of the Mahasabha (the orthodox or fundamentalist organization of caste-Hindus), whose position he states, points out that, while favoring the opening of Hindu temples and other institutions to untouchable classes still, "he (the Pandit) does not approve of any more social intercourse with them than such opening implies. . . . The Pandit's position is the only one compatible with a belief in the Hinduism of which the caste system is an integral part—the so-called *varṇāśrama dharma.* The Pandit holds that caste must endure in spite of the efforts of reformers." Commenting upon this position, the editor says further: "The real issue between the reformers and orthodox Hindu leaders like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, is whether a man or woman should continue to be appraised for social purposes as a member of a particular caste or whether every one should be regarded as a personality with one's individual merits. The difficulties about interdining and intermarriages exist only so long

19. *Indian Social Reformer,* November 12 and 26, 1932, pp. 165, 198.
20. October 22, 1932.

as a man is not a man, but a Brahmin or a Bania, a Mahār or a Bhangi in the eyes of his fellow Hindus. When he ceases to be classified under caste or outcaste labels and is treated as a personality in himself, these difficulties at once cease to exist." Mr. Gandhi would seem to agree with the editor that "caste has to go." And the editor adds: "Caste and outcastes are not two problems but one. Whenever caste has gone, outcaste has followed suit."

For purposes of debate a distinction is often drawn between the four divine orders of society (*varṇa, chaturvarṇa*), and the castes, based on birth, of which each order is made up. In this way the *varṇas* may be attributed to revelation and the castes to tradition. Nevertheless, Mr. Gandhi's remarks, quoted above, show that his view of society as it used to be is exactly that which the caste system sponsors today.

As to the meaning of *sanātana dharma* we may quote Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer (*The Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals*, 1935). He says: "The term has largely come into use in Hindu revivalist circles and an appeal is made to Sanatana Dharma for the purpose of resisting changes in the Hindu law. It is contended that the rules contained in the Dharma Śāstras are eternal and immutable and not subject to alteration. The claim seems to be made on behalf of the whole body of the Dharma Śāstra and not with reference to any particular rules. If it is with reference to any particular rules, the champions of Sanatana Dharma have not explained which of them are, in their opinion, of eternal validity. So far as the orthodox view of the Dharma Śāstra is concerned, it may be taken that the claim of eternal validity covers the whole body of the Dharma Śāstra."[21] Sir Sivaswamy holds that such an interpretation is untenable and continues: "The brief survey we have made of the history of the most important topics comprised in the Dharma Śāstra will convince any unbiased person that the rules of conduct and the ethical ideals underlying them have undergone great changes from time to time in accordance with social needs or changes of public opinion. The changes have in some cases been progressive in character and in other cases of a reactionary or injurious tendency. But whatever may be the character of the changes in particular instances, the claim that the entire body of the Dharma Śāstra is eternal and immutable cannot be maintained."[22]

Now, one way to meet the problem of scriptual support of the

21. *The Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals*, pp. 132 f.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

doctrine of untouchability is to deny that the scriptures support the present caste system. A resolution was sent to the session of the Mahasabha meeting in Poona, December 28, 1935, by the Hindu Sabha of Bombay, which contained the following statement: "Whereas the caste system based on birth as at present existing is manifestly contrary to Universal Truth and morals, whereas it is the very antithesis of the fundamental spirit of the Hindu religion, whereas it flouts the elementary rights of human equality . . . this all India Hindu Mahasabha session declares its uncompromising opposition to the system and calls upon the Hindu society to put a speedy end to it."[23] This was ruled out of order by the Chairman, the Pundit of Malaviya.[24] However, the resolution has been widely published as having passed the Mahasabha.[25] It shows, however, a difference of opinion within the ranks of the orthodox Hindus.

Mr. Gandhi takes issue with the Sanatanists when he says: "My reading of Sanatana Dharma has forced me to the conclusion that caste men have erred in treating a large number of Hindus as untouchables and prohibiting them, amongst other things, from entering temples. You hold that Sanatana Dharma obliges you to regard these very Hindus as untouchables and therefore unfit in any circumstance to enter temples on the same terms as yourself."[26] Again, he quotes Acharya Anandshankar Dhuva and Dr. Bhagwan Das as supporting the view that "Three kinds of 'untouchables' are mentioned in the Hindu Dharma Śāstras: (1) Persons classed as untouchables by birth, i.e., progeny of the union of a Śudra with a Brahman woman, (2) persons guilty of any of the five heinous sins, or of certain practices condemned in Hinduism, (3) persons whilst they are in a polluted state."[27] He then makes the statement, "There is nothing to show that any of the communities now classed as untouchables come under the first category." If this were a correct position, still, it is fair to say that Mr. Gandhi has by no means covered the whole case. But, here he joins with others who maintain that untouchability as practiced today has no foundation in the Śāstras and is only an unhealthy excrescence on Hinduism.

23. *Indian Social Reformer*, December 14, 1935.
24. *Ibid.*, January 4, 1936.
25. *Ibid.*, July 14, 1936, p. 731, quoting Mr. G. Halstead in *Current History* for June 1936.
26. *Indian Social Reformer*, January 14, 1933, p. 314.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 315.

Mr. G. D. Madgavkar, in a recent article says, "The plain issue before us Hindus is whether today we are or are not in favour of social intercourse and, above all, of intermarriage between all castes of Hindus, including the untouchables. On this vital question only one of two positions is consistent and possible. One position is to accept caste as a divine and a sacrosanct institution, above and beyond the pale of worldly considerations. And no benefits, whether eugenic or social, economic or political, from intermarriage can be allowed to affect the maintenance and the permanence of caste. As in the theory of Hindu law, orthodoxy may concede that only four castes and the untouchables should exist. But since it is impossible in practice to go back to these five only, the concession is more apparent than real."

He continues: "This is, in fact, the Sanatanist position and answer. It ignores the fact pointed out by scholars, such as Bhandarkar, that the most ancient Vedas give no countenance to untouchability and allow intermarriage between castes which were a later growth. It overlooks the fact that, whatever its origin, today caste does not correspond and is not related with economic realities such as division of labour or, in some cases, even with real culture and education."[28]

This position, it should be noted, would exclude from Hinduism all post-Vedic developments in the social structure. It *appears* to relieve the scriptures of all responsibility for upholding untouchability, and suggests that Hinduism may be restored to its native purity by removing caste. This is one of the interesting reactions of the present agitation. Mr. Natarajan says: "Untouchability is a blot on Hindu civilization. It is impossible to defend it. It is not, however, an essential part of the Hindu religion any more than child marriage, the restraint on the remarriage of widows, or even caste. These are institutions which can be changed without affecting the vitality of the religion."[29] The editor is impatient with Dr. Ambedkar for not taking this inside view, and he says further, that "they (the Hindu conservatives) would regard Dr. Ambedkar's exit from their society as the removal of a thorn in their side, and will go their way. The fact that, though he has been speaking for some years about leaving Hinduism, he has not done so as yet and even now can only say that he will not die a Hindu, shows that there are some compensations in remaining a Hindu which he is loath to forego. The difficulty in the case of the

28. *Indian Social Reformer*, November 23, 1935, p. 185.
29. *Ibid.*, October 19, 1935, p. 100.

masses of the Depressed Classes whose faith has remained unaffected by their social disabilities, is bound to be much the greater."[30] Still, the opinion shows that there are two irreconcilable parties within the fold, those who would retain caste and thus preserve Hinduism, and those who would eradicate the caste-outcaste aspect of the system and thus restore Hinduism to its former state. "The main difference, and it is an important one, between Gandhi's treatment of untouchability and the *Social Reformer's* approach to it is that while in the former the Depressed Classes and caste-Hindus stand in two separate, not to say hostile, camps, in our conception of the problem both are Hindu reformers and both have to exert themselves each in his own sphere to eradicate the evil."[31]

But there is ground for questioning the position that untouchability is not a doctrine of the scriptures. Dr. Ambedkar points out: "The Hindu religion does not recognize the principle of equality of social status; on the other hand, it fosters inequality by insisting upon grading people as Brahmins, Vaishyas and Shudras, which now stand towards one another in an ascending scale of hatred and a descending scale of contempt. If the Hindu religion is to be a religion of social equality, then an amendment of its code to provide temple entry is not enough. What is required is to purge it of the doctrine of *chaturvarṇa* (four groups of castes). That is the root cause of all inequality and also the parent of the caste system and untouchability, which are merely forms of inequality. Unless it is done, not only will the Depressed Classes reject temple entry, they will reject also the Hindu faith. *Chaturvarṇa* and the caste system are incompatible with the self-respect of the Depressed Classes. So long as it continues to be the cardinal doctrine, the Depressed Classes must continue to be looked upon as low. For the Depressed Classes to say that they are Hindus is to admit their inferiority of status by their own mouth. They can call themselves Hindus only when the theory of *chaturvarṇa* and caste system is abandoned and expunged from the Shastras."[32]

The editor of the *Indian Social Reformer* admits that "the outcaste problem is implicit in the caste system. The fond notion that we can each cherish our own respective caste status and remove untouchability

30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, February 18, 1933, p. 387.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 391 f.

by allowing untouchables to enter temples, is rightly ridiculed by Dr. Ambedkar. But he misses the implications of this view of the question when he demands that caste Hindus should work for the demolition of the four castes only. That they should certainly do." But he would have Dr. Ambedkar make his contribution, as an outcaste, to the entire problem resting on caste.

While the claim is put forth that caste is non-essential in Hinduism, still as the author of *The Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals* points out: "Outcastes seem to have always existed in society and to have been regarded as untouchable. According to Apastamba it was sinful to touch, speak to or look at a Caṇḍāla, and penances were prescribed for this. Yājñavalkya provided for the punishment of a Caṇḍāla who touched a man of the higher castes. The Chinese traveller Hieun-Tsang noticed the segregation of the outcastes outside towns and villages. The same thing was also noticed by Fa-Hian who states that the Caṇḍālas 'live away from other people, and when they approach a city or a market, they beat a piece of wood in order to distinguish themselves. Then people know who they are and avoid coming into contact with them.' "[33]

There is considerable agreement amongst Indians that "the only solution of the problem is to abolish altogether the pernicious system of caste based on birth."[34] "The true remedy against the present evil of caste," says Dr. Ghurye, "is that we must fight it all round with a bold front without making any compromise."[35]

Among progressive Hindus there are some who propose modifications of caste. "Among these there are at least three, more or less clearly distinguishable, schools of thought. There are those who believe that the best way to bring about the desired end is to hark back to the imagined pure state of Hindu society which was characterized by the existence of only the four traditional castes, viz., Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya, and Shudra. The greatest exponent of this point of view is Mahatma Gandhi. There are others who would go ahead rather than look back on the past in the vain hope of reinstating it under totally different conditions. But they think that the only way in which abolition of caste can be achieved as a concrete fact is, in the first place,

33. *The Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals*, p. 84.
34. *Indian Social Reformer*, July 30, 1932, p. 744.
35. *Caste and Race in India*, p. 184.

to amalgamate the various subcastes of a present-day caste which have much cultural and economic similarity. Then the castes which are approximately on a footing of equality should be consolidated, and the procedure may be followed till society becomes casteless. They contend that this process being slow would afford sufficient time for education and the formation of informed opinion, with the necessary adjunct of the requisite mental adjustment of those classes which are not yet prepared for a wholesale change in their age-long customs. The third point of view considers caste, especially in its present form, so degrading in some of its aspects, and so anti-national in others, that it would abolish it altogether without any hesitation or delay."[36]

There are some who go the whole way in insisting that the caste-outcaste element in Hindu society must be eradicated, but who at the same time defend the scriptures, meaning the authoritative revelation, as not sanctioning the caste system. This, of course, excludes the Dharma Shastras from the list of authoritative works on the Hindu social system, and it would place the whole discussion outside of the realm of realistic thinking, making the whole consideration of the problem of untouchability artificial. Even if the Sutras and Shastras are viewed as tradition rather than as revelation, still, as was shown above in the reference to *The Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals*, these works belong to the body of the Sanatana Dharma. The *varṇāśrama* idea is older, however, being referred to as early as the Rig Veda (X.90). In the Chandogya Upanishad (5.24.4) the leavings of the Caṇḍāla are mentioned. In 5.10.7 of the same text the ideas of clean and unclean, based upon karma and birth, are emphasized, and the "mixed-caste" doctrine appears as early as Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (4.3.22). There is really nothing to be gained by quoting from the Law Books on this point, for by the time that the Manusmriti appears, the whole system is basic in Hindu society.

Not the least interesting of the re-examinations of the scriptures is that of the editor of the *Indian Social Reformer*, who holds that the Bhagavad Gītā does not countenance untouchability. On the contrary, he insists that its liberalism is a refuge for the Harijans. The editor feels that the leaders of Hinduism should concentrate their efforts on "the essential need of Hindu society, namely, vigorous propaganda for the removal of many popular misconceptions of Hindu religion and

36. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

its promulgation in its purity and simplicity as set forth in the Bhagavad Gītā."[37] Of the Bhagavad Gītā, Mr. Natarajan writes: "What are the social implications of the religion of the Gītā? In the first place, it wipes the slate clear of the discriminations against women and Shudras which, at some time, somehow, crept into the Vedic religion. It goes further and enjoins non-discrimination against the lowest of outcastes who eat dog's flesh. The entire teaching is clinched by the declaration that the Supreme Being dwells in all, that all, to use the words of St. Paul, live and move and have their being in Him. Worship of God is divested of ritual and priestly intervention. Whoever offers in a spirit of devotion, a leaf, a flower, water, fruit, is assured of Divine grace. Even the worst sinner need not despair. The moment he experiences devotion to the Supreme Being that moment he is regenerated. . . . A broad tolerance pervades the whole teaching. Its conception of caste is the complete antithesis of what caste has come to be. It is not a matter of birth but of qualities, aptitudes. The abolition of caste will no more imperil Hinduism than the abolition of the House of Lords would imperil Christianity or even the Church of England. . . . For the individual the pursuit of the law of his being, *svadharma*, is the highest duty."[38]

One may question this interpretation of the Gītā, for the whole of its message is cast in terms of *varṇāśrama*, and the various groups are what they are in their very nature (the doctrine of the *gunas*). It is one thing to grant to women and Shudras the religious privileges of *bhakti*, and quite another to repudiate caste. One of the cut-and-dried proofs of the doctrine of *karma* has been, for a long while now, *caste* or birth (*jati*), so that the system rests upon a cosmological principle. This is one of the reasons which Professor Archer gives for insisting that the Indian must have a change of mind before he can solve the question of untouchability.[39]

A point can be made for the practice of the rites of purification (*śuddhi*) which have been brought into use in recent years to "make" Hindus of those without the pale, those whose ancestors were converted to Islam, or others, like the Doms of Benares, who had become Christians. With the latter at least, as has been the case with Chamars

37. *Indian Social Reformer*, January 4, 1936.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
39. *Modern Review*, March 1935, pp. 266 ff.

and others, their status within Hinduism was not raised. They became just outcaste Hindus. It may be questioned whether Pandit Malaviya has taken the Harijan any further by his giving of *Deeksha*. He, apparently, recognizes that untouchability is a concomitant of birth in certain castes, but disagrees with certain doctors of the law in saying that it can be remedied by *Deeksha*. There is textual evidence for both points of view.

Whatever the outcome of the effort to reinterpret the scriptures in the interests of the eradication of untouchability may be, there seems to be growing opinion on the part of radical Hindus that caste must go. At the Indian National Social Conference in 1933 Mr. S. Ramamadhan said that without fighting the question of caste they could not solve the problem of untouchability, and that, if they were going to be true social reformers, they must stand for the abolition of *varṇāśrama dharma* as unscientific and unsound.[40]

Sir Govindrao Madgavkar, in an open letter to Mr. Gandhi, writes: "Whatever its origin and its growth, caste is a human institution which has existed in other countries and has been modified by human agency, conscious and unconscious. In India, on the contrary, it has grown to monstrous dimensions, undreamt elsewhere. It divides and weakens Hindus and, like a cancerous growth, absorbs all the vital forces to itself at the expense of the community."[41]

Turning now to those who face the problem of untouchability realistically, let us note what H. H. the Gaekwar of Baroda has to say: "So the history of the caste system unfolds itself, now strong, now weak, but never constant, until under the Mohammedans, and then under the English, no caste distinction has even been recognized in the eye of the law—and wisely, too. Moreover, such a hypocritical idea of social relationships gave rise to practices which, in our time, have made it impossible for the caste-man to lead anything but a double life. The belief that the law of God commands the observance of distinctions between untouchable and caste-man is a falsification of history. Far from being according to divine law, such an observance is directly contrary to the true spirit of the Shastras. Nor is it any way supported by reason. Instead, it is the direct outcome of the growth of super-

40. Reported from "Justice" in the *Indian Social Reformer*, January 13, 1934, p. 313.

41. *Ibid.*, November 23, 1935, p. 185.

stition and ignorance, which have played havoc with the soundness of our social system." He continues: "It is true that we are chiefly concerned with abolishing the social disabilities under which fifty millions of our brethren suffer. These fifty millions are utterly outside the pale. But the shameless condition of these millions cannot be bettered unless we resolve at the same time to reform the caste system itself. For within the pale there exist distinctions between man and man which are nothing less than an expression of this idea of untouchability. There is no actual solidarity within the caste system itself. There are circles within the major circles, and all of them are, basically, vicious. Consider for a moment the attitude of the caste Hindu to marriage, to dining with his fellow-castemen, and to similar elements of social intercourse. When a man refuses to allow his daughter to marry outside the cramping limits of a few families with whom, and with whom alone, he allows himself fully to associate, is he not branding the man whom she may wish to marry with the scar of untouchability? And if he will not dine with a fellow-casteman, is he not calling him unclean? The arguments which are urged in defense of these degrees of untouchability within the caste system itself are the same as those which that system uses against those who are not part of it. And chief among them is tradition. Custom and habit have a stranglehold upon society, which gasps for life in the fierceness of their grip. Pride walks stiff-necked among them. The low-caste man who passed the untouchable by in the market place, is in his turn spurned from the table of the man whose caste is higher than his. Orthodoxy can even become so absurd as to cause a maidservant who was on my staff when I first went to Europe, to jump over the carpets for fear of pollution."[42]

H. H. the Gaekwar insists that "the rules which govern the game of life today do not allow of the rigid observance of such distinctions." He then goes on to show how the principle of untouchability, which permeates Hindu society, has to make way for the exigencies of life at every turn: "There is a passage in the Sanskrit scriptures which, being translated, runs—'Take a purificatory bath with garments on when touched by the Buddhist, Pasupatas, Lokayats, and the atheists, and also by Brahmans who indulge in heinous deeds.' I want you to remember the latter part of that quotation, gentlemen, because it has particular bearing upon the conclusions I shall draw from this exami-

42. *Ibid.*, March 4, 1933, pp. 421-22.

nation. There were, however, some exemptions from pollution. Certain commodities necessary in daily life become pure, we are told, as soon as they have been taken from the vessel in which the untouchable brings them; nor does contact entail pollution on festive occasions, in time of public danger and distress, on a journey, or in battle. The most casual survey of these exemptions can not fail to impress one with the fact that, whenever occasion demanded, the strict rules of caste were relaxed, simply because without that relaxation, life could not go on. There is no avoiding the fact which emerges from this admission, that on every occasion when he found he could not do without the untouchable, the caste-Hindu absolved himself from those very rules which made him a caste-man. He took the line of least resistance and compromised with his beliefs. On the battlefield, when the untouchable was fighting by his side for a common cause, he was glad of him; in the market place he would pass by on the other side, for fear lest his fellow's very shadow should defile him."[43]

We may conclude this section of the discussion with a quotation from *The Vedanta Kesari:* "The modern movement for the abolition of untouchability is an attack directed against the most vulnerable nerve-centre of the caste system; for beside being a humanitarian movement, it is also a challenge to the notion of congenital purity and impurity which Hindu fundamentalism has been maintaining by what appears to our mind a misapplication of the doctrine of karma and transmigration. That is why we find today Hindu fundamentalism in deadly opposition to the anti-untouchability movement—not because fundamentalists are devoid of humanitarian sentiments, as it is sometimes supposed." The writer continues: "The weight of educated opinion today seems to be on the side of these caste-breaking tendencies."[44]

IV

Where are the Harijans to go? In this connection the reputed agreement on principles between Dr. B. S. Moonje and Dr. Ambedkar in 1936 is very informing. Dr. Moonje suggests that Dr. Ambedkar would favor the Sikhs rather than Islam or Christianity as a refuge from Hinduism; this, being interpreted to mean that the Harijans would remain within the Hindu fold, suggests further that the

43. *Ibid.*, February 25, 1933, pp. 405-6.
44. *Ibid.*, August 8, 1936, pp. 778 f.

Mahasabha would be prepared to announce that it would not object to such "conversion"; that they would include the neo-Sikhs in the list of the Scheduled Castes; and that the Depressed Classes would be allowed to exercise the political rights secured by the Poona Pact.

The most interesting part of the communication is that in which Dr. Moonje outlines Ambedkar's point of view:[45] "There are three faiths from among which the Depressed Classes can choose: (1) Islam, (2) Christianity, and (3) Sikhism. Comparing these three, Islam seems to give the Depressed Classes all that they need. Financially, the resources behind Islam are boundless. Socially the Muslims are spread all over India. There are Muslims in every province, and they can take care of the new converts from the Depressed Classes and render them all help. Politically, the Depressed Classes will get all the rights which Muslims are entitled to. Conversion to Islam does not involve loss of such political rights, as the right to special representation in the Legislature, right to services, etc.

"Christianity seems equally attractive. If Indian Christians are too small numerically to provide the financial resources necessary for the conversion of the Depressed Classes, the Christian countries such as America and England will pour their immense resources if the Depressed Classes show their readiness to embrace Christianity. Socially, the Christian community is numerically too weak to render much support to the converts from the Depressed Classes but Christianity has Government behind it. Politically, Christianity will give them the same rights which Islam gives. Like the Muslims, Indian Christians are also recognised by the Constitution for special representation in the Legislatures and in the services.

"Compared to Christianity and Islam, Sikhism has few attractions. Being a small community of 40 *lakhs*, the Sikhs cannot provide the finance. Socially they cannot be of much help to the Depressed Classes, they are confined to the Punjab, and as for the majority of the Depressed Classes the Sikhs give them no special support. Politically, Sikhism is at a positive disadvantage compared with Islam or Christian-

45. The quotation marks would indicate that these words were Dr. Ambedkar's. As a matter of fact, they are Dr. Moonje's own summary. The papers, other than the *Times of India*, omitted those portions of the report which seemed to put Dr. Ambedkar's position in a different light. Dr. Ambedkar himself says: "In fact it was they who took the initiative and pressed it on me. If I had gone to the length of considering it as an alternative it is only because I felt a certain amount of responsibility for the fate of the Hindus."

ity. Outside the Punjab, Sikhs are not recognised for special representation in the Legislature and in the services."

Dr. Moonje continues: "Looking at these three alternative faiths purely from the standpoint of the Hindus, which is the best—Islam, Christianity, or Sikhism? Obviously, Sikhism is the best. If the Depressed Classes join Islam or Christianity they not only go out of the Hindu religion, but they also go out of the Hindu culture. On the other hand, if they become Sikhs they remain within the Hindu culture. This is by no means a small advantage to the Hindus." Besides, "What the consequences of conversion will be to the country as a whole is well worth bearing in mind. Conversion to Islam or Christianity will denationalise the Depressed Classes. [But is this exactly true?] If they go to Islam, the number of Muslims will be doubled and the danger of Muslim domination also becomes real. If they go to Christianity, the numerical strength of Christians becomes five to six *chores*. It will help to strengthen the hold of the British on this country. On the other hand, if they embrace Sikhism, they will not only not harm the destiny of the country but they will help the destiny of the country. They will not be denationalised. On the contrary, they will be a help in the political advancement of the country. Thus it is in the interest of the country that the Depressed Classes, if they are to change their faith, should go over to Sikhism." [One must repeat, is he not arguing for Hinduism rather than Indian Nationalism?]

"The third question is, if it is in the interest of the Hindus that the Depressed Classes should go over to Sikhism, are the Hindus prepared to make Sikhism as good an alternative to the Depressed Classes as Islam or Christianity is? If they are, then obviously they must try to remove the difficulties which lie in the way of Sikhism as compared with Islam and Christianity. The deficiencies are financial, social and political. The Hindus cannot help Sikhs to remove the social difficulty. But they can certainly help the Sikhs to remove the financial and political difficulties. Of these, it is most urgent to remove the political difficulty because it might become an obstacle in the way of the Sikhs."[46]

Rao Bahadur M. C. Rajah, in commenting upon Dr. Moonje's communication and speaking from the point of view of the untouchable, insists that this would mean that the Depressed Classes were

46. *Indian Social Reformer*, August 15, 1936, pp. 794, 795.

being dissected, being affiliated religiously to the Sikhs, and retained politically as Hindus. "The whole thing," he says, "seems to me not to be conceived in the interest of the Depressed Classes, but, on the other hand, to be planned in the communal interest of the Hindus and the Sikhs." Furthermore, "If the Depressed Classes are all to become Sikhs and call themselves neo-Sikhs, it will create all over India a Sikh-Hindu-Muslim problem as in the Punjab made more complicated by the fact that the so-called neo-Sikhs belong to the Depressed Classes even among Sikhs." And his final remark is: "I would urge the Hindu Mahasabha to address itself to the task of making it easy for the Depressed Classes to stay within Hinduism and Hindu society instead of arranging for a ticket for entraining them to some far-off destination."[47] Mr. Rajah is not in favor of leaving the Hindu fold. Pandit M. M. Malaviya agrees with Mr. Rajah. This is, in short, the aim of orthodoxy, to keep the Harijans within Hinduism.

But there is more to this movement towards the Sikh fold. Last fall there was a meeting of the Mahasabha in Lahore, presided over by Dr. Kurtkoti, a *sannyāsi*, bearing the title His Holiness Shri Shankaracharya and called Jagadguru (world teacher). The guru was an open supporter of the "Ambedkar-Moonje Pact" to make over Hindu untouchables to Sikhism; and his presidency seemed to indicate that the Mahasabha as a body supported this idea of mass conversion as the only means of conferring upon the untouchables equality with caste-Hindus. But Dr. Kurtkoti's solution of the problem was repudiated at the meeting and a great deal of excitement has followed the events at Lahore.[48] Dr. Kurtkoti said at Lahore that he had himself advised the leaders of the Depressed Classes to become Sikhs because they could not hope to obtain the recognition of equal status from "so-called Sanatanists."[49]

The trend of opinion growing out of the Lahore meeting seems to be definitely away from Sikhism. And critics are now saying that "for some years past people belonging to one religious sect of the Hindus have gained predominance in the Mahasabha and it is as clear as noonday they want to force through such a reformist programme as cannot be accepted by the orthodox Hindu community."[50] Later, Dr. Kurtkoti issued a statement in which he said that "untouchability cannot

47. *Ibid.*, p. 795.
48. *Ibid.*, October 24, 1936, p. 114.
49. *Ibid.*, October 31, 1936, p. 133.
50. *Ibid.*, November 7, 1936, p. 150.

be abolished without making a change in the *varṇa-* (caste-) system. Untouchability will go finally only with the abolition of *varṇas*. If Hindus are prepared for this abolition, he has no objection to telling the untouchables not to go out of the Hindu fold."[51] The editor of the *Indian Social Reformer* remarks: "We must face the problem of making Hinduism casteless. And this can be done. The advice to untouchables to shift to some other religion is calculated to sidetrack the main issue."[52] The final appeal of those who stand for reform within Hinduism so as to take care of the Harijans is that Hinduism is broader than any of its divisions, such as the Sikhs, or the Arya Samaj, or the Sanatanists.

On October 9, 1936, Mr. J. Holmes Smith had an interview with Dr. Ambedkar in which he reports the latter as having acknowledged that he considered the alternative religious groups which held out hope for the Harijans to be Christianity, Sikhism and Islam; but he insists that he had made no declaration in favor of Sikhism and this his correspondence with Dr. Moonje was purely tentative and exploratory. The Doctor adds that if he became a Sikh, he would not hesitate to quit his new religion, if it did not come up to his expectations in social life. He is at least keeping his attention fixed upon the main issue, the emancipation of the Harijan. As Dr. Ambedkar says, there was nothing like unanimity of opinion amongst the untouchables on these points. The question as to where the Harijans will go is to be taken up at their all-India convention to be held some time this year.

V

The movement for liberation on the part of the untouchables is not of recent origin. For many years now such groups as the Doms of Benares, the Chuhras of the Panjab, the Lal Begs of the United Provinces, the Chamars in various parts of India, especially in the United Provinces and Bihar, and the Shudras of South India, have been under instruction by Christian agencies and many have left Hinduism. At the rate of 10,400 a month the untouchables came into the Christian fold during the ten years ending in 1930. Since then the rate has increased, even though the missionary agencies have been greatly handicapped. Christians from amongst the untouchables now

51. *Ibid.*, December 5, 1936, p. 213.
52. *Ibid.*

amount to several millions. There must have been considerable movements towards Islam as well.[53] The conversions(along with the educational agencies which have been at work, have exerted influences far beyond the ranks of the new accessions to the non-Hindu faiths. Besides, The Depressed Classes Missionary Society of India was twenty-four years old in 1931. And there are other organized agencies at work amongst the Depressed Classes.

Moreover, during a long period now, other influences have been at work, tending towards unrest, and the changing of the status of caste. The development of industrial organizations and the movement of large groups from among the lower classes to the cities; the intermingling of strange castes and local groups in these industrial centers; the great increase in railway travel; the movements towards public and free education for the outcastes; and the development of representative government in India, with its political advantages to the Depressed Classes, have all made their contributions to the upheaval.

There is a difference between this new unrest and the anti-caste movements of the past. The former great upheavals occurred within Hinduism, rather than as threats to abandon it altogether. The low-caste disciples of Ramananda, who inaugurated new religious movements, were all functioning within Hinduism. To take one example, Rae Das was, after all, only a Chamar; even today, the leather-worker who follows him uses the title "Raedasi" merely as a synonym for Chamar. Today's movement is a frontal attack upon the caste-outcaste system, demanding a complete remaking of the Hindu social order from within; otherwise the untouchables will abandon their old affiliations. It is insisted that Hindus must go all the way into equality by abolishing the hereditary castes. Those who believe that the change can be brought about call upon the outcaste to join hands with the caste-man in an effort to achieve that end.[54]

But the way is not easy. An example of the conservative and very widespread attitude of the Hindu may be found in the reaction of the orthodox to the opening of State temples in Travancore to untouchables. The Sanatanist Brahmins of Kumbakonam made public protest against the order of the *Maharajah,* holding that the action was con-

53. Mr. J. Holmes Smith, after making considerable inquiries, expresses the opinion that the movements towards Islam, among the untouchables, in recent decades has been practically nil.

54. *Indian Social Reformer,* July 18, 1936, p. 731.

trary to the tenets of the Śastras. A learned Pandit said that "the proclamation was unshastraic and was calculated to cut at the very root of the principle of temple worship in South India"; and that "the silence which followed the Proclamation indicated that there was great suppression of opinion in Travancore." "Temple-worship," he said, "presupposed the rigid observance of the injunctions laid down in the Agama Shastras. Some of these rules could not be violated without detriment to the spirituality of the deity installed in the temples. The immanence of God in the temples was dependent upon the strict observance of the Agamas and if one rule was infringed, the sanctity of the temple would be gone." Another prominent Hindu said, at the same meeting, that "the Shastras were emphatic in their assertion that the untouchables should not be allowed to go into the temples."[55] Orthodoxy is by no means reconciled to the thought of equality and its ranks embrace a great majority of caste-Hindus, Vaiśyas as well as Brahmans.

Mr. Gandhi, and others, believe that the change can be wrought within the social order, "but Hinduism is decidedly a silent partner." Dr. Ambedkar sees no fundamental change in the attitude of Hinduism, saying, "We shall cease to fight for equality where we are denied it." There is widespread opinion that the only hope of the untouchables is outside Hinduism. The changes which the times demand would amount to very much more than a social revolution, for both philosophical positions and religious convictions would be profoundly disturbed as well. Senart writes: "It is not an exaggeration to say that the domination and prestige of the Brahman caste are the most incontestable characteristics of Hinduism. . . . The prestige of the Brahman class is the cornerstone of the whole organization."[56] His position is still deeply entrenched. Not only does he occupy the highest social position, but he stands at the very apex of the whole Hindu scheme of ultimate release (*moksha*) or, as we say, salvation.

A writer in *The Vedanta Kesari* says that caste-consciousness must be divorced from the Hindu spiritual ideal. Caste Hindus must abandon the position that "salvation can be obtained only after one passes through the discipline of the caste system." They must separate caste

55. *Ibid.*, January 30, 1937, pp. 346, 347.
56. *Caste in India* (1930), pp. 85, 88.

from Hinduism and "reduce the former to the position of a *social institution.*"[57]

Hinduism is profoundly shaken, and very considerable adjustments are being made, even if fundamental changes have not been effected as yet. Although the untouchables are on the move, not all will leave Hinduism. Many, however, will seek liberty in Islam and in Christianity. The primary problem for the untouchables and for Islam and Christianity alike is to develop new religious thought and action backgrounds for those who would leave Hinduism. Unless this is done, the movement away from Hinduism will be "emigrations" rather than "conversions." Only the latter is desirable and it will take time. Temptation lies along the way of impatience and hurry. In the emergency what Hinduism finally works out will be of great importance not only to herself, but to the other faiths as well. Christianity everywhere must rise to new opportunities and assume greatly enlarged responsibilities.

57. *Indian Social Reformer*, August 8, 1936, p. 779.

Magie et Religion. By Raoul Allier. Paris: Ed. Berger-Levrault, 1935. xv + 467 pp. Fr. 36.

Like *The Golden Bough* of Frazer, and like many lesser works, this one contains a quantity of most interesting data about primitive culture, and a thesis. It has long been my habit to say that Frazer's encyclopaedia of data has been and still is of inestimable value, but that his thesis, that the "golden bough" was the mistletoe, is of relatively small consequence. Whether that thesis is true or not, the mass of "case" illustrations of primitive culture was worth neither more nor less to any student of the picture. About this work on the interrelation of magic and religion I venture the same distinction between data and thesis. The former are of much value to anyone concerned with that theme of infinite variety called primitive culture. The value of the thesis is something apart.

Since the work is about magic and religion and their interrelations, M. Allier begins by seeking a definition of magic. He seeks a definition rather than a description. He objects to the concept of Hubert and Mauss that "Magic is any rite that is not a part or detail of an organized cult, a rite that is sacred, mysterious, tending toward something forbidden as its limit." This definition cannot apply to enough real cases. It assumes that all magic is black magic, which is far from being the case. Also, M. Allier's thesis denies the widespread assumption that historically magic comes before religion. His thesis is that religion comes before magic, and that except in the case of Israel and the Christian religion, magic has always brought about the deterioration if not the death of religion. Far from admitting that magic is the cradle of religion M. Allier insists that these two types of experience have always spoken different languages. The earlier experience is one of fear in the presence of danger or great need mixed with very extreme emotion. Later, with a greater complexity of tribal life came the medicine man with his elaborate technique; came also animism, gods or spirits of many rivers, trees, etc. Religion is the passionate appeal or prayer for help; magic is the method of what is supposed to be mechanistic control the content of which is, however, pure superstition. It is generated out of faith in primitive medicine as practiced by the shaman, and is a way of controlling or compelling higher powers. This thesis,

directed against Frazer and the French sociologists of the school of Durkheim, is based largely on subjective and individualistic interpretations which, though supported recently by Father Schmidt, hark back to earlier days of speculation, especially to Andrew Lang, as the author points out. The essence of the thesis is that the data of primitive belief favor the theory that the belief in one Supreme Being came first, and that the belief in many spirits and higher powers with the methods of controlling them came much later.

M. Allier makes much of what is, I think, a new emphasis in the study of primitive culture, namely, the overwhelming power and influence of primitive emotion.

Thus, more than the first half of the work consists of three parts: Part I devoted to the description of magic; Part II devoted to religion; Part III devoted to the ways in which religion and magic are related, and how religion deteriorates into magic. M. Allier is right in his description of how, when an early stage of civilization has been reached, as in ancient Egypt, Babylon, early Greece, the wild spontaneity of primitive experience comes into the harness of official religious authority. Of this the great example is Western Asia, except Israel and the world of Christian faith which grew out of that nation. Parts IV and V are accordingly entitled, "Illustrations from History," and "The Mystery of Israel." I will not raise the question whether the book ends on the note of Christian apologetics, but I am by no means sure that it does not.

This is but a superficial review of a very interesting piece of work. The illustrative data from history, prehistory and primitive culture are striking and valuable. It is a pity not to be able to quote any of this, but to do that would require the space of a considerable essay. How a reader values the thesis may depend upon his personal equation.

WENDELL T. BUSH

Columbia University

Zuni Mythology. By RUTH BENEDICT. 2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935. xliv + 344, viii + 348 pp. $4.00 each volume.

The Zuni represent one of the few American Indian tribes whose culture has not been crushed by that of the whites. In fact, they have

taken White civilization in their stride, and assimilated it to their own pattern. The myths, then, which are contained in this book function in a living culture. As Professor Benedict has ably demonstrated in the introduction, they reflect living attitudes and beliefs, present ideals and compensatory dreaming.

The myths at the beginning of the collection are concerned with cosmology. In common with the myths of many other American Indian tribes they assume the existence of things, but in a state different from the present. The people lived in the darkness of the underworld. "They could not see one another. They stepped upon one another, they urinated upon one another, they spat upon one another, they threw refuse upon one another. They could not breathe." Sun sent his two sons to them, and the sons led them to this world. The people had hands and feet, but these were webbed. Their bodies had no openings for feeding or elimination. The world was full of evil monsters. The sun and the moon were kept hidden in a box. All these things were corrected by the sons of Sun. The account of the cosmology is an account of correcting and changing, not one of cosmogony.

These first myths, furthermore, show an interdependence between gods and men. The supernatural beings are not self-sufficient, since in the absence of men they receive no worship. Sun caused the people to be led out of the underworld, so that there should be people to offer him prayersticks. The Corn Maidens, after their desertion, return so that they may be danced by the people during the great Corn Dance.

The Zuni attitude toward nature is apparent in the myths. Nature's gifts, however plentiful, must be cherished. "They found pretty turquoise there, and they . . . had so much they wasted it. Turquoise then said to himself, 'My flesh is valuable but they waste it.' " They treated their supply of salt even worse. "They spat and eased themselves thereby, and when they brought salt home they wasted it." As for corn, "they scattered it everywhere. They stepped on it and dropped it in the dirt. It was wasted." Corn and Turquoise and Salt leave them, and only after the people have been chastised into respectful appreciation can they use these gifts of nature again.

The Zuni attitude toward the world, apparent in the myths, is kindly. The Corn Maidens promise to return "if nobody is worried, if everybody is happy all the time, if they always pray as they should,

if they always think good thoughts." In plot and incident, we never find utter condemnation of the evildoer. Those who misbehave, those who refuse to follow the cultural pattern are chastised and taught to live normally. We find, not vengeful punishment, but discipline, painstakingly administered by supernatural beings. We find no vindictive righteousness.

Professor Benedict has presented the material in exceptionally usable form. She has made abstracts of the tales aand discusses them in relation to all Zuni tales recorded over the past fifty years. Incidents are listed and indexed. The introduction, which covers thirty-three pages, represents perhaps the most illuminating study ever made of a single body of mythology. With insight and intensive analysis, she has brought to light fundamental attitudes which are implicit in the myths and perhaps never articulated by the people themselves. She studies the myths in relation to their changing cultural setting, and even in relation to the different narrators. She shows, in this way, how much the emphasis of each myth depends upon the personality of the individual story-teller: how men and women differ in the choice of incidents, in the choice of themes developed. The myth emerges as an aspect of Zuni culture; at any rate, as a part which, detached from the culture and the narrator, becomes meaningless. Her introduction thus supports her statement that "no folktale is generic"; that it is always "the tale of one particular people with one particular livelihood and social organization and religion."

D. Demetracopoulou Lee

Pomona College

Naven: A Survey of the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture of a New Guinea Tribe Drawn from Three Points of View. By Gregory Bateson. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1936. 306 pp. 18 s.

This thought-provoking volume is one which every serious student of anthropology will read and ponder with pleasure. It should have wide reading in addition among thoughtful students of philosophy, sociology and psychology, for it is the first careful and sophisticated consideration of the relation to each other of the different fruitful points of view from which social phenomena can be investigated. These fundamental points of view which the author distinguishes are (1)

that of cultural structure, i.e., the sum total of "logical" premises and syllogisms which underlie a given culture. These are the cognitive emphases of the culture. Among the Iatmul under consideration, for example, such a structural premise is the syllogism: A mother gives me food; a mother's brother is the structural equivalent of a mother; therefore mother's brothers give me food (and it is courting disaster for them to give me a valuable such as a shell armlet.) (2) That of ethos, used as the Oxford English Dictionary defines it: "The characteristic spirit, the prevalent tone of sentiment of a people or a community," and which is the system of emotional attitudes which govern what value a community sets upon the satisfactions and dissatisfactions the contexts of life offer in that culture. These are the emotional emphases of a given culture. (3) That of sociological relationships, between the behavior of individuals and the needs of society as a whole, i.e., the maintenance of solidarity, etc.

As the author says, the last aspect stands somewhat apart, but all these aspects are involved in the consideration of cultures. Structure, ethos and sociology are each the consideration from a certain standpoint of local traditional behavior and belief and their consequences. This involves of course a basic recognition of the fact that culture does standardize the cognitive and emotional behavior of its members, and that the needs of society as a whole can be met only by arrangements promoted within this framework. It is not, therefore, any general "human" premise that can be invoked in the study of society, i.e., gregariousness does not explain large villages among the Iatmul, nor natural hostility between males explain the lack of villages among the Mundugumor. Such explanations are relevant only when the facet of human nature invoked can be shown to be elicited and reinforced by the institutions within the culture itself.

The author has cast his discussion in the form of an account of his own growing understanding of the implications of a New Guinea culture, that of the Iatmul of the Sepik River, which he studied in the field for two years. Specifically he considers this culture from the vantage point of a single fundamental ceremony of these people: *naven*, the rite which focuses the mutual behavior of the mother's line—particularly that of the mother's brothers—and the patrilineal line. This male line, the gens, is the formal unit among the Iatmul, but as is usual among primitive peoples it is knit in traditional ways with the

lines which have been and will be united with it in marriage. The cultural premises which underlie these mutual relationships among the Iatmul are bizarre in the extreme, and the author's description of his growing understanding of the melodramatic *naven* behavior, in terms of the premises of the total culture, should give valuable insight to those who have not themselves been faced by the difficulties of studying an alien culture at first hand. Again, those readers who are primarily interested in a brilliant description of the way of life in a very intriguing culture cannot do better than to begin the reading of this volume with the chapters on "The Ethos of Iatmul Culture: The Men; The Women" and the chapters that immediately follow these.

The volume is not specifically concerned with religion, but the theoretical discussion is as relevant to fruitful discussions of religion as it is to such a ceremony as *naven*. The discussion of any religion will be clarified not only by a recognition of the structural, ethological and sociological aspects it presents, but in most religions Mr. Bateson's specific discussion of a major ethological mechanism, which he calls schismogenesis, is also relevant. Schismogenesis he defines as a process of differentiation in the norms of individual behavior resulting from cumulative interaction between individuals. He differentiates two contrasting forms: complementary schismogenesis where the behavior of one individual or group is answered by contrasting behavior, e.g., where arrogance must be answered by humility; and symmetrical schismogenesis where the answering behavior is of the same sort as that which calls it forth, i.e., where boasting is answered by boasting. In both forms there is cumulative effect upon the type of behavior displayed in the group or the community, but the effect is different. In our own religious background a study could profitably be made of the change from the complementary schismogenesis between priest and worshippers in the Catholic Church to the markedly symmetrical schismogenesis of Protestant religious life. The contrast is even more extreme between most forms of ancestor worship (symmetrical) and most temple religions (complementary). The recognition of the importance of this mechanism will, as the author points out, contribute towards eliminating mystical phrasings of "social behavior," and in religion will help to place religious forms in relation to similar forms in the total culture.

The ideas which are handled in *Naven* are often difficult and de-

mand precision and clarity. It is the greater matter for congratulation that the author expresses himself clearly and forcefully.

RUTH BENEDICT

Columbia University

La Religione degli Hittiti. By GIUSEPPE FURLANI. Storia delle religione a cura di Raffaele Pettazzoni, Volume Tredicesimo. Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1936. xx + 431 pp. L. 20.

This book, the author states in his preface, is the first complete and detailed treatment of the religion of the Hittites. It is based almost wholly on the Hittite cuneiform texts and on the so-called Hittite monuments of Asia Minor and northen Syria. Almost no use is made, however, of the inscriptions in hieroglyphic "Hittite," which, through the recent studies of Hrozný, Meriggi, Gelb, Frank, and others, have now reached a fair stage of interpretation, with an increasing number of texts appearing almost daily. The book begins with a brief historical excursus (pp. 1-21), which, perhaps because of its brevity, permits a number of unfortunate inferences. Thus, the extent of the First Hittite Empire (*ca.* 1900-1700 B.C.) could not have been as great as Furlani implies, nor was there any continuity between the Early Empire and the classical Hittite period (*ca.* 1400-1200 B.C.). The author also neglects the three centuries (*ca.* 1700-1400 B.C.) of Hurrian overlordship in the Ancient Near East (and even Egypt, with the Hyksos), and thus leaves virtually unexplained the profound influence of these peoples upon the culture and civilization of the period with which he is most directly concerned. Furthermore, an examination of the literature on hieroglyphic "Hittite" (especially Hrozný, *Les inscriptions hittites hiéroglyphiques*, I., Prague, 1933, pp. 12-16, and II., Prague, 1934, pp. 121-3), would tend to establish that the Hittite state in northern Syria was largely inhabited by those very invaders who overthrew the "classical" Hittite empire! The historical account provided by the author must, therefore, be used with the utmost caution, especially in view of its notable omissions.

The book properly begins with an account of the Hittite divinities (pp. 21-80). Here Furlani performs invaluable service. Out of the bewildering host of divine names mentioned in the Hittite texts, he arrives at a very plausible hierarchy in the Hittite pantheon com-

prising several ranks of gods, Manes, and demons, and, beneath these, exalted mortals and animals. At the head of the pantheon stands the weather god IM or U, of whom there are almost as many varieties as there are cities and towns in the realm, and his consort, the sun-goddess of Arinna, who may, perhaps, be identified with the Hurrian goddess Hepit. Although the names of the chief gods of the pantheon are always written in Sumero-Accadian ideograms, the identity of these gods is by no means sure; Furlani infers that their origin is essentially Mesopotamian and Egyptian, but this reviewer sees in them nothing essentially different from the chief gods in the pantheons of other Indo-European peoples. After the chief deities come a host of gods and goddesses, many of them the offspring of the union of the weather god and his consort. There are a number of ISTAR goddesses, notably the ISTAR of Samuha, the patron diety of Hattusilis II. There are at least three manifestations of the sun-god (sky, earth, and water), and a moon-goddess, Arma, of whom practically nothing is known save the name, and who does not seem to have played as important a role in the Hittite divine hierarchy as elsewhere in the Ancient Near East. Mezullas and Zintuhis (little more than names) are the daughter and granddaughter of the divine pair. Telepinus is a god of vegetation and fertility whom the author identifies with the Accadian Tamuz, although a connection with the Lycian Telefos is also suggested. Halkis (the name suggests the Urartaean deity) is a god of grain, and Hinkallus of abundance, whom Furlani makes of Mesopotamian origin (cf. the Accadian word *hegallu,* 'abundance'). Finally, among the principal gods of the pantheon are Innaras and Ilbaba, the former connected by some scholars with the Indian Indra, and whom the author would like to identify with the ideogram ^{D}KAL (p. 42), despite the partial reading *Ta-a . . . ra . .* (cf. n. 114a, p. 75) for the ideogram. Ilbaba is Furlani's reading of ^{D}ZA.BA.BA, although there is no syllabic reading for this ideogram in the Hittite texts; the author makes him a Sumerian deity of war. These are the major divinities of the Hittite pantheon. All of them, especially IM or U, the chief weather-god, recur in so many manifestations as to swell the number of divine names to about 2,500 (p. 21). Of the minor dieties (pp. 43-4) there are Hasamilis, who hides people, especially armies; Yarris, god of pestilence and war; Kamrusepas, goddess of health; Hatapinus, wife of Telepinus, func-

tions unknown; Kumarpis, who bears the curious title "father of the gods"; Halmasuittis, whom Furlani calls the god of Anittas, a king of the Early Hittite Empire, but which seems to be, rather, the name for the deified throne (cf. Sturtevant, *Hittite Glossary*[2], 1936, p. 40); Kulses or Kulsas, a protective deity, and Hilassis, god of the *helas*, the temple antechamber or forecourt. Personifications are Wastulassis, of sin; Sakuwassas, of sincerity; Hantassas, of equity; and Istamanassas, of hearing. Because Furlani can find no counterparts for these personifications in the religious thought of the Ancient Near East, he suggests that these may be dieties of the Luwian pantheon; here again, however, it may be pointed out that such personifications are not unusual in the religious thought of other Indo-European peoples. Luwian deities (p. 45) are Santas, corresponding to the Hittite weather-god (whose name may be Zashapunas), and to the Hurrian Tesup and Dattas; Kupapa, patron deity of Carchemish (Luwian?); Tarhunza, worshipped especially in Cilicia; Biruwas and Askasipa, of unknown functions; the Annarummenzi (the author seems to take this word for a single god, but the form is a typical Luwian plural, and from the so-called bilingual KUB 9.31.1.36 ff. and KUB 9.31.2.29 ff. it seems to be equivalent to the Hittite Innarawantes, probably gods of strength); and Huwatassas, the gods of the winds. Two "Palaean" divinities (p. 45) are mentioned in the Hittite texts, Zabarwa and Wahisi, of unknown functions.

The Hittites did not scruple (or were possessed of the classical Roman tolerance?) to include within their pantheon the gods of all peoples with whom they came into contact, as is especially evidenced in the oath-formulas (pp. 286-91) and treaties with foreign powers (p. 47). We thus find mention made of a large number of Egyptian and Mesopotamian deities, the latter, the author states, transmitted to the Hittites *via* the Hurrians, who had always (!) been in contact with the Babylonian-Assyrian civilization, being neighbors of the inhabitants of the Valley of the Two Rivers and the conquerors of the Hittites (see, however, Götze, *Hethiter, Churriter und Assyrer*, Oslo, 1936, and the review of that book in *Classical Weekly*, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 53-4, where it is fairly well established that the Hurrians conquered not only the Hittites, but the rest of the Ancient Near East and Egypt as well; and far from having always been in contact with the Babylonian-Assyrian civilization, Götze advances a

number of very plausible arguments which tend to show that the Hurrians had been last in contact with Indo-Iranians before sweeping over the Ancient Near East). Sometimes gods are mentioned in groups, as the thousand gods (the number probably having about the same connotation as Gk. μυριάς), the gods of heaven and earth (the *sarrazzes* and *katteres*, literally, 'upper' and 'lower'), the *damnassarus* (always accompanying the tempest-gods), and the *attas* DINGIR.MEŠ-*aš*, whom Furlani calls obscure, and for whom he suggests the rendering 'gods of our fathers' (can there be a suggestion of ancestor-worship here, so that the phrase should be translated 'our deified fathers'?). Finally, there seems to be a trace of animism in the Hittite worship of mountains, rivers, the sea, and other natural phenomena (p. 46).

Myths of a religious nature were current among the Hittites (pp. 81-107). Our information here, however, is lamentably small, since by a curious accident (?) all the mythological texts thus far unearthed are not only in a bad state of preservation, but also have offered practically insuperable lexical barriers to their interpretation. Here again Furlani has been of invaluable service in collecting widely scattered literature on the subject, and in reducing his material to a workable form. Thus the myth of Kumarpis (p. 82), the author observes, corresponds more or less to the Mesopotamian *enuma eliš*, and deals, perhaps, with the story of creation; the myth of Telepinus (pp. 82-6) the author likens to the Mesopotamian Tamuz, dealing with a tale of death and resurrection, a myth similar to the story of Attis and Adonis (Furlani admits that the theme of death and resurrection may be native to Asia Minor; it certainly is not peculiarly Babylonian); the myth of Kamrusepas (p. 86), goddess of health and protection, a tale of a mortal translated to heaven; the myth of the serpent Hedammu, of whom little more than the name is known (p. 87); the myth of the struggle between the tempest god and the serpent Illuyankas, usually recited at the festival of Purilliyas (time of year unknown), in which the author sees an echo of the struggle between Zeus and Typhon (or Indra and Vṛtra?), though he regards as the prototype of this myth the combat between the Babylonian Marduk and the monster of the deep, Tiamat; the myth of Kissis (p. 91), which the author thinks is related in some way to the Gilgames-epic; the epic of Gilgames (pp. 92-6), found in thirteen

fragments in the texts from Boghazköi, of each of which he gives a précis; and the myth of Atrahasis, of which only the name is known. The myths do not appear illustrated in reliefs so far excavated, but are seen on some cylindrical seals of so-called Syro-Cappadocian provenience.

Only the barest references are made to demons (pp. 108-11) in the Hittite texts; the author assumes that Hittite concepts did not differ materially from those of the Valley of the Two Rivers. Thus the Hittite demons were, in general, hostile to man and sought to effect his injury and disgrace; they were also the agents of the gods for the punishment of man. The GEDIM, Hittite *akkantes*, 'Manes, spirits of the dead,' were also dangerous and required constant propitiation. Furlani believes that the fantastic shapes of the sphinxes, griffins, etc., found at the portals of Hittite edifices provide a clue to what the Hittites thought was the appearance of these demons; but since demons could be scared away (cf. p. 109), it may be that these fantastic shapes are found precisely at the portals of edifices to guard entrances by frightening away hostile spirits (cf., one of the functions, perhaps, of the mediaeval gargoyle).

The king (pp. 113-7) is the representative of divinity upon earth. While not a god during life, he becomes one after death (indeed, the conventional euphemism for the death of a Hittite king is, 'when he became a god'). The king takes the gods and GEDIM into battle and transports them to new capitals. Without being a priest himself, he is, nevertheless, at the head of the priesthood, and as such plays an important role in the state-rituals. Furlani makes him far too ubiquitous, however; it seems physically impossible for the LUGAL.SAL. LUGAL, 'the king and the queen,' actually to have participated in all the rituals in which they are mentioned, and the inference is plain that in many of these rituals the LUGAL.SAL.LUGAL were 'king and queen of the May' rather than the actual heads of the state. As to the relations between god and man (pp. 118-23), these were the same as those between king and subject, master and servant. This leads to an aretalogy (pp. 126-37) in which the author sees a complex of ideas met everywhere among the peoples of the ancient Orient, "especially Mesopotamian and Egypt," with the exercise of *para handandatar* (which Furlani takes to mean divine protection; the precise meaning is *numen*, 'divine power,' see Sturtevant, *Glossary*, p.

41) by the gods in return for piety and the virtues practised by men. In this connection he takes a bit too seriously the piety of Hattusilis in his *apologia* (pp. 127-31), which is, after all, a rather specious bit of propaganda in defence of his usurping the throne. He also takes too seriously the ideographic writing of Hittite names with divine names, as ^{I} ^{D}SIN^{D}U (=Armadattas), which, he believes, indicates a desire to signify the equal power of the moon-god and the weather-god (!), but which seems, rather, to have been little more than a touch of orthographic pedantry.

Hittite ideas on destiny and judgment (pp. 138-41), the author states, are again wholly drawn from Babylonian-Assyrian religious concepts; what these ideas were is a bit vague, since the Hittite texts give us little direct information. At any rate, Furlani infers that destiny (Hitt. *henkan*) was the means by which the gods administered the universe; since the will of the gods was mutable, man could change an evil destiny to a good one by following the proper procedure. In intimate rapport with the doctrine of destiny stands judgment, the deserts meted out by the gods to their subjects, men. The gods decided between princes and between nations, although, as in the case of sin and punishment, their decisions sometimes were not handed down for long periods of time.

Soothsaying (pp. 149-79), common to all peoples at certain stages of their development, and a religious phenomenon which is almost universal, plays an important role in the religion of the Hittites. Furlani believes (not without justice, cf. the Etruscans and their influence) that all the peoples of antiquity were more or less indebted to the Ancient Near East for its wealth of lore in this respect, and that eventually phases of this lore extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Among the Hittites, however, soothsaying was considerably less astral in character than it was elsewhere in the Ancient Orient, especially Mesopotamia, although some astrological observations were used for purposes of divination. More common were hepatoscopy (some clay liver-models have actually been found at Boghazköi), viscera examination, prediction by defective parts, the flight of birds, and other natural phenomena, as well as by lots, oracles, interpretation of dreams, incubation, and divine inspiration.

Magic and incantation (pp. 180-222) played a greater role among the Hittites than in Mesopotamia and Egypt. Magic rites, while prin-

cipally of the sympathetic variety, also included pure conjuration. The main use of these rites was by mortals against their foes and the demons, but the gods also indulge in these practises. Magical objects included snakes (especially the sympathetic killing of snakes), the sow and her litter (cf. the Roman sow and her litter), knots, nooses, and snares, the hearth or fireplace (KI.IZI, p. 194, is better read GUNNI), certain articles of clothing, and a host of implements from the temple, palace, and private life. Incantations are many and of varied character, and of some of these Furlani gives an account (pp. 195-210. ZÚR.ZÚR, better read SISKUR.SISKUR, and taken by Furlani to mean 'incantation,' has no such specific meaning, but rather that of a sacrifice, a religious rite in general, cf. Sturtevant, *Glossary*, pp. 189, 140, 22); such are, for instance, the ritual of Papanikri of Comana (an incantational text to assist the processes of child-birth), rituals for driving out demons and hostile deities, scapegoat-texts, incantations for the relief of sexual impotence, and many prayers of a magical character, especially those of blessing and cursing (pp. 142-8). Of a magical character must also be the evocation of divinities of hostile cities (pp. 223-7; cf. the Roman *evocatio*), and the cursing of conquered cities (paralleled by the Roman cursing of the cite of Carthage), which the author believes to be strictly of Mesopotamian origin. The rituals themselves (pp. 228-32) he regards as similarly influenced, saying (p. 228): "Particular dependence of the Hittite rituals on the Babylonian even in their formal aspect is easily seen by the fact that the Hittites adopted the cuneiform orthography peculiar to the Valley of the Two Rivers" (a dangerous practise, surely, to base conclusions on origins of any nature upon an orthographic vehicle!). Of Babylonian provenience, also, are the interdictions and purifications (pp. 233-42), which are mainly for the purpose of rendering sacrosanct the person of the king and the priest.

Among a people essentially agricultural and pastoral, the divinities having to do directly with these pursuits were frequently honored with festivals, banquets, and processions (pp. 243-58), while the military side of national life was duly recognized by racing and war-games (pp. 259-61) sacred to the gods of war. Festivals and games were for the diversion of their gods; their daily food came from sacrifice and offering (pp. 292-346). Since the Hittite gods were conceived of as anthropomorphic, their desires were similar to those of men, and

offering was made to them of objects like clothes, diadems, chariots, etc. Objects of sacrifice had to be the very best, and without any defects. All sorts of animals and birds were offered (many of these undoubtedly of meal or clay), as were a large variety of breads and cakes. Incense was freely used (most frequently burning cedarwood). Blood was not an important sacrificial element, although it did have some uses for the lustration of implements used in the sacrifice. There are texts containing minute instructions for the behavior of sacrificants, and for the disposal of parts of sacrificial victims not given to the gods, etc. Archaeology comes to our assistance here with sculptured representations of sacrifices at Hüyük, Boghazköi, Malatya, Farahettin, Isbekcir, Carchemish, and on cylindrical seals (pp. 324-33).

While there are no texts consisting of a prayer as such, prayer accompanied most of the Hittite rites (pp. 262-80). For its effectiveness submission and humility were necessary, while the chance of success was greatly enhanced by flattering the god. Objects of prayer were health, long life, many sons, wealth, power, victory over enemies, freedom from sorrow, from illness and disgrace, and the remission of sins. Prayer was both public and private, and could be submitted in writing. Within or accompanying a prayer, or any other religious ceremony, were many hymns (pp. 281-5), which were chiefly for the praise and glorification of the principal divinities, following again the practise of Mesopotamia and Egypt, says the author (it is to be noted that most of these hymns are composed in languages other than Hittite, and often constitute our only source for some of the languages of Asia Minor of the second millenium B.C.). Omission of rites, sacrifices, prayers, etc., and rebellion against constituted authority were infractions against divine precepts, and, therefore, sin, *wastul* (pp. 347-75). Sin, divine offense, divine wrath, and punishment, according to the author, formed an unbreakable series of consecutive acts (might we not add expiation and forgiveness?). Offended divinity could allow great periods of time to elapse before the punishment of a sin, and then could visit the sins of the father upon the head of the child. Expiation, however, could be hoped for by penitence and public confession, an absolute prerequisite for the remission of a sin.

Of life beyond the grave and of sepulture (pp. 376-9), the Hittite texts again tell us nothing directly. The GEDIM, 'Manes,' were generally dreaded and had to be constantly propitiated. Nothing is

known of Hittite funerary rites; Furlani assumes that inhumation rather than cremation was the rule; but if kings actually carried their Manes into battle, there is a possibility that reference is made to funerary urns and the ashes of the dead.

To regulate this heterogeneous mass of religious concepts there must have been an elaborate hierarchy of priests (pp. 380-97) deriving from Hattic, Hurrian, Mesopotamian, and Indo-European sources. A large number of priest-names occur in the Hittite texts, written both ideographically and syllabically (cf. especially pp. 381-2); but the precise meaning of most of these names is unknown. On the other hand, although the priestly hierarchy is as yet impossible to distinguish with any degree of accuracy, the functions of individual priests can often be determined by context. Of Hittite temples (pp. 406-20) we know nothing archaeologically, since the great edifices at Hattusas, of which the foundations are preserved at Boghazköi, were most probably the royal dwellings. From the texts we have the names of parts of the temple, but the meanings of these names are not sure, as is also the case even if certain articles of temple-furniture and of musical instruments used in connection with various rites.

The index (pp. 421-31) is not too complete, but the bibliography and documentation are superb. The most serious objection to the work as a whole is the fact that the author seems to have come to his study with the preconceived idea that here was just another Mesopotamian religion (in which he is unquestionably well qualified to speak), whose elements could readily be resolved along, to him, familiar lines; consequently, he overlooks or underestimates whatever religious concepts the Hittites may have imported from their original homeland, and which they shared in common with other Indo-European speaking peoples. This bias somewhat distorts an otherwise masterly presentation of practically all the material in the complex euphemistically styled "the religion of the Hittites." The mystery of the Hittite religion will, I fear, remain unsolved; too many peoples, too many ancient civilizations poured their elements into a melting pot which, although it never succeeded in dissolving these elments into an homogeneous whole, did succeed in confusing their sources for the rest of time.

Benjamin Schwartz

New York City

Monotheismus und Dualismus in Indien, Iran und Palästina. By Theodor Weindl, M.D., Ph.D. Vienna: International Society of the Psychology of Religion, 1936. 137 pp.

This work is the third of a series of monographs being issued under the auspices of *Die Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie,* edited by Dr. Karl Beth of Vienna. Its sub-title designates it a study in the psychology and mythology of religion, with special reference to the religious results of the penetration of conquering nomads into areas of higher culture, e.g., Aryans, Iranians and Hebrews in their respective places of settlement. In such connection it expounds a very definite theory toward the "newer understanding" of several ancient Oriental religions and of religion in general. We might call the theory, for the moment, that of "zodiacal light." Or, in other words, by the theory of "the dark night-time sun," "the light of the dark moon," and the fire of "morning and evening twilight," the author proposes to account for the origin and development of religion. Other ideas, as well, are included in his total exposition, as we shall see.

This little comparative study is presented in eight parts, exclusive of an introduction and a conclusion. They include such headings as Judaism, the Iranians, Krishnaism, the monotheism of anterior Asia with examples of tribal gods, certain advanced tendencies toward monotheism in antiquity, detailed analyses of Vedic and Avestan myths and the rise of Krishnaism (Vishnuism), and Islam. The story of Islam illustrates, so the author thinks, within the range of historical control, several of his main contentions, with special reference to the development of "dualistic" monotheism. Other fields brought in, incidentally, for comparison include the ancient Egyptian, Greek, Assyrian and Teutonic. Many of the comparisons (identities) are very significant, if true. The whole discussion has, in the words of the editor, "*grösste Bedeutung,*"—if its method and contents be sound.

The work took a decade to mature. Within small compass lie multitudinous data patiently gathered from wide sources. The results, including many conjectures and deductions by the author, are put together with ingenious skill. A competent review in brief is hard to formulate, since to that end its writer should be at once historian, ethnologist, etymologist and psychologist. This reviewer is least competent in the realm of psychology. Nevertheless, what, we may ask, is the author's method? Dr. Beth's *Geleitwort* expresses the

standpoint of the *Zeitschrift:* the psychology of religion and the history of religion are interdependent, and both are indispensable to the right understanding of religion. And the author commits himself at once to the theory of change and development. He would understand development by means of historical, psychological, linguistic and other evidences. And not the least interesting and important aspect of his work are the authorities he makes use of in support of this or that contention of his own.

These are some of the main positions of the work: genuine monotheism lay inherent from the first in the essential mind of the Indo-Iranian and the Israelite; monotheism may be as old as human consciousness (p. 13); monotheism is or becomes fundamentally dualistic (p. 132); conflict (cf. the reference to Hegelian dialectic p. 16), provides certain aspects of development, as when the god of the conquered becomes the devil of the conquerors; pantheism may be degenerate monotheism (cf. p. 15) and mysticism may be fundamentally monotheistic (cf. p. 136); and race-consciousness and a sense of inferiority play their part (the nomad conqueror stands in awe of the higher culture subject to him, but has he not a great God as Aid and Guarantor?). And we must not forget the zodiac! and the Pleiades! Perhaps the *"psychologisch-historische Grundlage"* (cf. pp. 10-11) which the author lays down lies most of all in the *"Minderwertigkeitsgefühl"* (inferiority complex) to which he often refers—unless, indeed, the zodiacal light first greatly stirred the religious consciousness.

This reviewer knows the editor and the author through this monograph alone (except for a casual reading of Beth's *Religion und Magie bei den Naturvölkern*), whose linking of Indo-Iranian and Semitic elements seems at times astonishing, unless it be that one fact merely "reminds" us of another, or "we think" we see a resemblance or a common cause (this is, at times, the author's method). This is too subjective, we must grant. Nor can the reviewer feel convinced that Krishna is the root of Aryan monotheism, that a nature-myth lies behind the moral Adityas, that Śiva was the *antagonist* of Vishnu (Krishna), that Indian Mitra and Avestan Mithra ran parallel in development. Indeed, the problems offered are too numerous to mention. The work is not wholly convincing. The reference to zodiacal light seems something less than scientific (how much of this light was

the primitive, or any other, aware of, and *when* did he see it?). Psychology, of course, must aid us in determining origins, if history does not reach that far; but when myths are encountered, how may we explain them—psychologically? Weindl has not discovered what the people themselves said with reference to their development. Neither history nor psychology has cleared up the Indian field for him, nor does etymology avail. The records themselves do not show *primitive* monotheism among the Indo-Aryans. Both monotheism and monism appear in the Rig Veda. In India long before 500 B.C. (the Krishna legend is dated around this era) the conquerors had been conquered by the conquered, and neither monotheism nor dualism was the chief result! The Pleiades theory cannot be based on historical connection between India and Babylon. Sure conclusions may not properly be based on dubious etymologies, e.g., Mordecai is Marduk, Esther is Ishtar, etc. (cf. p. 51). Nomadism and agriculture may not be so clearly separated as in the author's method, for purposes of development portrayal—at least not easily separated *by the written records.*

As we have already intimated, the night sun shines all through the pages of this work. We may, perhaps, place the author among the panlunarists (the moon is very serviceable, having many forms, whereas the sun has only one). He offers what he takes to be something further and better than the original and persistent German nature-mythology method, which based all myth, and hence religion, mainly upon sky and sun. He modifies, also, the theory of the astral-mythologists by stressing the relation of the heavenly phenomena to the zodiac. Like them he lingers under the influence of ancient Babylon, gazing fondly at the Pleiades. Like some of them he finds a Supreme Being beyond the heavens and the twilight, *always* there—the author is no progressive evolutionist. Now and then he seems to drop into the mood and method of psychoanalysis (cf. pp. 32 f., 42, 69 f.). Very largely he gathers materials to prove his theory—such is a strong impression made on this reviewer. That is, the author re-quotes many writings in support of his Idea. Just as the author sometimes uses "secondary meanings" (cf. *zweite Bedeutung*, p. 36), and appeals to the "harmony" (*Anklang*. cf. p. 37) of words, so he seems often to interpret history merely psychologically (subjectively), and to identify different deities through the similarity (even identity) of

their qualities or appellations (how else could Narāyana become the Cinvat Bridge? Cf. p. 35 f.) We are not disposed, however, to question the soundness of his view that monotheism is "primitive," that it becomes dualistic (manifests its dualism) through the processes of creation and human development (in this latter phase, through racial and cultural conflicts). If, in some respects, we disagree with the author's method and interpretation of materials, we, nevertheless, most heartily approve his and all efforts to answer the ancient Vedic query, *Ko veda*, "Who knows"?

JOHN CLARK ARCHER

Yale University

Annual Customs and Festivals in Peking. As recorded in the Yen-ching Sui-shih-chi. By TUN LI-CH'EN. Translated and annotated by Derk Bodde. Fully illustrated. Peiping: Henri Vetch, 1936. xxii + 147 pp. $4.50.

Frankly, I want less to review this book than to recommend its possession and use. It is a thoroughly charming book for anyone interested in China to read. But it is doubtful whether one should attempt to review it, because of the impossibility of doing justice to its many delightful qualities in that way. At the very close (p. 105) the author himself says:

> This record has everywhere followed accurate historical material. The things described in it are most varied and miscellaneous, so that it will be difficult not to criticize it for being confused and mixed-up. Yet its purpose . . . has been to include nothing outside the four classes of customs, sight-seeing places, natural products, and amusements. . . .

The present reviewer is certainly not disposed to criticize the miscellany for being "mixed-up." But the continual enjoyment which he has had from reading it seems virtually impossible to communicate. Perhaps the reader will understand this difficulty if he is told that Appendix C of the book is entitled: "Lists of the Fire-Crackers, Pigeons, Popular Forms of Entertainment, Sweet Melons, Crickets, and Chrysanthemums Mentioned in the Text." The author ends his list of chrysanthemums with the remark:

> This makes a total of one hundred and thirty-three kinds, all of which I remember. But for those who can think of them, there are still more than two hundred other kinds among these four classes. Some day when I have leisure, I certainly intend to compile a list of flowers.

Students of religion who are seeking either the more solemn or the more philosophical aspects of Chinese religions will find some interesting hints here and there, yet not much more in this book. But I do not know where else in the brief compass of one hundred and five pages one can find so authentic, many-sided, and sensitive an impression of how religious folk-practices among the Chinese of Peking in recent times (c. 1900) have been interwoven with the incidents of daily life: the seasons, society, food and clothing, excursions and pilgrimages, fairs and street-cries, plants and pets, entertainments and toys. I do not in the least mean to suggest that the book is unsuited or unimportant for serious study. Besides consulting it for many specific details, I should certainly present it to students in any general course dealing with Chinese religion, precisely because of the qualities already mentioned. The mellow and cheerful humanity of the Chinese, and the pervasive connections of their customary sentiments with the seasons and circumstances of nature are presented in a thousand telling details.

The book is very attractively illustrated, and most usefully annotated by its translator, Derk Bodde. His notes, without being cumbersome, give needed historical identifications, references and explanations in terms of the latest scholarship, at many important points. I think it will be well to close by quoting a few pages from Bodde's introduction, which states more exactly than I have done the author's systematic purpose and his particular Manchu background and perspective.

> This little book is a translation from the Chinese of the *Yen-ching Sui-shih-chi*. . . , a title which literally means "Record of a Year's Time at Yen Ching," Yen Ching being an ancient name for Peking. It is a record, day by day, and month by month, beginning with Chinese New Year's Day and taking us throughout the year, of what used to take place in Peking: its festivals, temple pilgrimages, fairs, customs, and the clothing, foods, and animals of the season. Many of these, of course, were peculiar to Peking, but many others were and still are widespread in China, and will have general interest, it is hoped, to all those who wish to study the popular and everyday expressions of thought of the Chinese.
>
> [The date of the book (1900)] and the fact that the book is written by a Manchu, have for us a special significance. They mean that in it are recorded many Manchu customs and many ceremonies of the Imperial Court which of course have utterly vanished today, and that the picture it gives us is that of the prosperous Peking of olden days before the great

changes wrought by the disastrous Boxer Rebellion of 1900. But at the same time the work is modern enough, so that probably the greater part of what is described is still applicable to what happens in Peking today.

Though the author, as a gentleman accustomed to luxury, is chiefly occupied in this book with the niceties of life under the last dynasty, his attitude is not merely one of aesthetic appreciation nor of complacency with the advantages of China's traditional culture. Thus, he not only shows his critical intelligence in his alert eye for superstitions and many social weaknesses, but also in "a keen awareness of the problems of the unscientific and non-industrialized China of his time, facing an industrialized West. . . . He mentions the fact that he has read western books on agriculture . . . and attacks whole-heartedly China's self-complacency."

The book is equipped with a valuable, selected bibliography of other Chinese and European works on its subject. The translator, comparing it with European works many of which are longer, comments very much to the point:

> . . . It is valuable because it gives an account, in a concise and straightforward manner, of Chinese life and customs as a Chinese himself would look at them. It avoids those two besetting sins of foreign books on the subject: either a tendency to sentimentalize in a way which is western rather than Chinese, and which tends to throw a wrong coloring on what is described; or to compile a bulky disquisition so learned and profound as to repel the average reader. At the same time it is valuable because it gives a large amount of information, culled from earlier Chinese sources, describing the origins of various festivals and antiquities.

In other words, this book calls for appreciation as an appealing, recent example of a certain genre of Chinese literature. The present reviewer, however, is not competent to compare it, in this light, with other books in the Chinese.

Horace L. Friess

Columbia University

Das Judentum und die geistigen Strömungen des 19. Jahrhunderts in the series Grundriss der Gesamtwissenschaft des Judentums. By Albert Lewkowitz. Breslau: M. & H. Marcus Verlag, 1935. xii + 570 pp. R.M. 10.50.

In this work the author completes a series of monographs concerning the interrelations between the main European and the Jewish intel-

lectual currents in modern times. Two smaller books dealing with the periods of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment respectively appeared in Breslau, 1929. The more extensive treatment of the nineteenth century explains itself, not only by the greater richness and variety of intellectual attainments on the part of both the Jewish and the general European thinkers, but also by the author's conviction that "mankind will always measure the depth, profundity and truth of its intellectual endeavors by the yardstick of nineteenth century culture since, like the philosophy of the Greeks, that of the nineteenth century is the self-knowledge of man."

According to the author the following three trends are to be mainly considered: Ethical Rationalism, Pantheism or Romanticism, and Naturalism. While Ethical Rationalism is represented only by Kant and his school, Romanticism includes such diverse doctrines as those of Rousseau, Hamann, Herder, Goethe, Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Savigny, and Ranke, and Naturalism covers such a multitude of contradictory teachings as those of Feuerbach, Spencer, Freud, Marx, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson. Many Jews actively co-operated in the formulation and spread of all these teachings, and others, in their more strictly Jewish activities, were deeply influenced by them. So Bendavid, Maimon, Lazarus, and Cohen were exponents of Kantianism, with special reference to Judaism. Offshoots of Romanticism were such contradictory Jewish movements as the struggle for Emancipation led by Börne, Heine, and Riesser; the Neo-Orthodox reformulation of Judaism by Bernays and S. R. Hirsch; the foundation of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* by Krochmal, Zunz, Geiger, Frankel, and Graetz; the new isolated attempts at reviving a philosophy of Jewish religion by Steinheim, Samuel Hirsch and Formstecher, and, finally, Jewish Nationalism from the forerunners of Hess to Buber (the author reprints here [pp. 420-27] the interesting "Address of a German Jew to the President of the Congress of the United States of America," which appeared in June 1783 in the periodical *Deutsches Museum*). Naturalism, on the other hand, is presented in its negation of Judaism and the undermining of the traditional Jewish elements even by Jewish thinkers, such as the "positivism" of Freud, the "materialism" of Marx, and the "irrationalism" of Bergson.

The author's ambitious purpose is not only to clarify the points

of contact between Judaism and the European cultural trends, but to "perceive the factors operating upon one another as intellectual forces" in their specific structure and outlook. This program misled him into assigning the same fulness of treatment to the general European Rationalism, Romanticism, and Naturalism as to their interrelations with Judaism. It is disturbing, for example, to find 137 pages devoted to a discussion of the various subdivisions of Romanticism, with but slight occasional references to the Romantics' views on Judaism, and then find its influence on the struggle for Jewish Emancipation, the Neo-Orthodoxy and Jewish Nationalism dealt with in 19, 10 and 32 pages respectively. The positivism of Feuerbach and Spencer is treated in over 30 pages, while only 17 pages are allotted to that of its Jewish representative, Freud, whose intrinsic Jewishness as well as positivism, moreover, may appear dubious to many readers. Even more serious is the evident lack of integration of European and Jewish elements, even where they can be ascertained rather easily. For one example, the two great historians, Ranke and Graetz, are treated here in separate chapters, without any reference to their deep affinity in method and outlook (cf. the present reviewer's article on "Graetzens Geschichtsschreibung," *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums,* LXII [1918], 5-15). The underlying socio-economic transformations are frequently referred to, but nowhere is an attempt made to analyze their manifold profound influences on the intellectual formulations. The systematic division necessarily involves generalizations and a disregard for chronology which sometimes obscure important relationships. For example, the treatment of Lazarus as a Kantian relegates the Hegelian-Rankean elements of his philosophy of history into a distant background. Ahad Ha-Am, because of his nationalism, is treated along with the romantics, while he intrinsically belongs to the positivist school of philosophy. Neither can one fully reconcile oneself to the exclusion of the Eastern European and Italian Haskalah (apart from a brief sketch of Krochmal and Rappaport) from a treatment of nineteenth century currents in Judaism. The Jewish Reform movement, too, would have deserved more than incidental treatment in connection with Geiger and Samuel Hirsch. The work would also have gained considerably by greater brevity and lucidity in style.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, most readers will be grateful

to Dr. Lewkowitz for his courageous, pioneering attempt, and for having raised many vital issues for more specialized research. The work undoubtedly fills a widely felt lacuna and offers a good deal of material for a much-needed reinterpretation of the position of the Jew in the modern world.

Salo W. Baron

Columbia University

The Gospel Parables in the Light of Their Jewish Background. By W. O. E. Oesterley. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. 245 pp. $2.50.

This book by the well known authority on postexilic Judaism, especially its apocrypha and pseudepigrapha, is a useful addition to our literature on the Gospels. The author has collected a great deal of material scattered in Hebrew writings of the third century B.C. to the fifth century A.D., and presented it in connection with the several Gospel parables. He draws upon the apocrypha and the pseudepigrapha directly. For his material from the Rabbinical literature, he depends largely upon the works of Bugge (*Die Haupt-Parabeln Jesu*), Fiebig (*Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*), Montefiore (*Rabbinical Literature and Gospel Teachings*, etc.), Strack-Billerbeck (*Das Evangelium nach Matthäus*). Besides a wealth of material gathered from these and other sources, the author gives a great deal of information on the life and the manners of the Jews of Jesus' time: on masters and slaves, marriage, fishing and farming, etc. This reviewer knows of no other book which supplies the ordinary reader with so much "background material." What has been scattered in many volumes is thus made easily available.

Of course, there is little in this book with which a fairly thorough student of the New Testament is not already familiar. Yet, few could read it without receiving some light on one point or an other in the Gospel parables. "In the East the mustard seed was, and is, proverbially used as the ordinary designation of anything very small and insignificant. . . . In the *Talmud* (Berakoth 31a) a microscopic drop of blood is said to have been no bigger than a mustard seed" (p. 76). "According to an ancient Jewish tradition (Bereshith Rabba to Gen. vi. 7), the tares originated from the time of the Flood; for men, animals, and plants all went astray and brought forth contrary to

nature; thus, when wheat was sowed it brought forth tares" (p. 61). "Thou hast presumably come from Pumbeditha where they can make an elephant go through the eye of a needle" (p. 101). The parallels to the parables of the Two Sons (p. 117), the Wedding Feast (pp. 128-129), the Good Samaritan (pp. 167-168), and the Prodigal Son (p. 188), are interesting; although one is not sure as to what is to be made of them. Of course, most of them come from a time later than that of Jesus. Perhaps, they were common "parabolic themes" which were "utilized and adapted" by the rabbis other than Jesus, as well as by him. The chief value of knowing parallels to the Gospel parables is that it gives one insight into the Hebrew mind and the manner of its working. But seldom if ever can a rabbinic parallel be used to enable one to understand what a New Testament parable means. It seems that the ordinary method of text analysis and comparison of passages in the Gospels with each other is still the best way to approach the problem of understanding what is in the Gospels. The case is different with regard to the value of the apocryphal and apocalyptic literature. The author's use of this material throws considerable light on the Gospels. For example, his discussion of Matthew xxv. 31-36 in the light of the apocalypses of Enoch, 2(4) Esdras, and Baruch, is truly enlightening. His use of the much neglected Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs is most fortunate, because this book is certainly earlier than much of the rabbinical literature, and its ethics is very close to that of the Gospels. The author's discussions of the rabbinical conceptions of forgiveness, repentance, good works and rewards, ought to be brought to the attention of those who are not acquainted with the writings of Abrahams, Montefiore, and Hereford.

This book contains a great deal of criticism and exposition which seem to be independent of the Jewish background of the Gospels. As a commentator, the author is conservative and often difficult to follow. He is evidently out of sympathy with recent "form-criticism," and does not care to consider the relative dependability of the several groups of Gospel material. He attributes the parable of the Wicked Husbandmen to Jesus, and comments: "In view of the frequent occasions on which our Lord foretold His death, there should be no difficulty here" (p. 120). In the case of the parable of the Wedding Feast, Matthew xxii. 1-14, he separates verses 1-10 from

the rest, eliminates verses 6-7 from the first section, and attributes it to Jesus (pp. 122 f.). He is also convinced that the parables of the Wheat and Tares and of the Draw-net came from Jesus.

There are frequent explanations of parables with which this reviewer cannot agree. For instance, the introduction of the problem of "grace and free-will" into the discussion of the parable of the Talents is misleading. In the parable of the Laborers in the Vineyard, I do not think that "being taken into the householder's service . . . constituted an act of grace on his part" (p. 109). Laborers cannot always be expected to be impressed with the privilege of "serving." In the parable of the Ten Virgins, the author explains the refusal of five of the virgins to give oil to the other five on the basis that "if the teaching of Christ is to be followed, duty to God comes first" (p. 140). This seems to be rather far-fetched. Besides, the parable inculcates watchfulness, and does not seem to be concerned with the ethics of the conduct of the wise virgins toward the foolish. According to the author, in the parable of the Sheep and the Goats, the question "Lord, when saw we thee an hungered and fed thee?" points to the "truth that benevolence becomes second nature to those who constantly practise it; they are kind intinctively, unconsciously" (p. 155). We do not know why the author is not impressed with the more obvious meaning of the question, namely that those who fed the hungry were not aware that they were feeding the Lord. There seems to be little reason for accepting the author's judgment that in the parable of the Lost Sheep, "the divine mercy, presented pictorially in the parable, is the pattern which man must follow" (p. 179), that Lazarus went to the bosom of Abraham because he was righteous (p. 209), or that the parable of the Unrighteous Steward teaches consistency (p. 199). The reviewer's notes contain many other instances where he is unable to follow the author's interpretation and elaborations of the text of the parables. He is inclined to advise that this aspect of the author's work be read with a New Testament within easy reach.

However, the students of the Gospels must be grateful to Dr. Oesterley for having put together a great deal of extracanonical material which places the Gospels in their proper setting of Hebrew thought.

Joseph Haroutunian

Wellesley College

Religious Tradition and Myth. By Erwin R. Goodenough. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937. 97 pp. $1.50.

There are, as every scholar regretfully recognizes, far too many syntheses and popularizations of Christian thought written by uninspired and often uninformed preachers and lecturers. But a work, such as this, which gives the results of competent research and intelligent reflection in simple aand interesting language is as rare as it is welcome.

Professor Goodenough begins his slender volume, which is based upon lectures delivered at Colorado College, by pointing out the uncertainty of the present generation in matters of religious belief, and the corrosive influences of modern relativistic science, morality and politics. The present-day intellectual is obviously not to be satisfied with the formulas of faith generally accepted in the nineteenth century. Goodenough, therefore, offers a more inclusive definition of religion (he assumes that he is addressing a Christian audience primarily) as "what a man does (mentally as well as physically) in response to his convictions, or possibly to his unconscious assumptions, as to the nature of the forces which really control himself and his environment."

He then proceeds to examine Christian tradition and myth in an effort to show what were the main contributory streams which flowed together to make historical Christianity, aside from the universal human tendencies which were present in the religion of early man and which, in altered form, have survived in modern religion, such as the belief in "luck" and the "right." The assumption is made that Christianity began as a fusion of elements from Palestine and Greece, and the question is raised, "what were those elements in their simplest terms, and what value have they for us today?"

The first element is Judaism, and in discussing the Jewish tradition incorporated in Christianity, Goodenough performs a useful and by no means unneeded service in reminding his readers that the religion of Jesus, as it is presented in the Gospels, is only a reaffirmation of the spiritual and moral teachings of the Hebrew prophets, and that Jesus was not unique in protesting against externalism in worship and practice at the expense of inner religion. As for the supposed contrast between the severity of the Jewish God and the loving-kindness of the Christian God, he justly remarks, "It is hard to see whence the fable arose that Jesus was the first to teach men to regard God as their kindly and merciful father. Jesus did teach men to do so, in

imperishable language, but his teaching was here again the expression of Judaism at its noblest." He sums up his chapter on the contribution of Judaism to the Christian tradition and myth by enumerating the following ideas: the loving Father-God, the necessity of moral conduct and repentance of sin, and the belief in a Messiah.

In the next chapter Goodenough rapidly but expertly sketches the development of the Greek idea of the divine, and stresses the influence of Platonic idealism and Aristotle's Absolute on Christian theology. Worthy of quotation for its felicity and economy of language is his remark that "from Aristotle on the tendency was unbroken to picture God, the only ultimate, as a sort of glorification of the vanishing point of perspective."

With the subject of "The Contribution of Greek Religion and Hellenistic Judaism" the author is peculiarly familiar. In a few pages he indicates the part played in later popular Christianity by what survived of early Greek-Italian (or generally Mediterranean, one might add) nature-religion with its mythopoeic richness, by Greek mysticism as symbolized in Orphic cult and rationalized in Platonic-Pythagorean theology, and by the salvation cults of Hellenistic-oriental syncretism. The religious appeal of these cults is succinctly described in these words, "In such prayers mythology and the gods of mythology had obviously become only stimulants to the imagination. The man was praying to an idea of deity, and that idea, when we can get behind it, invariably turns out to be the idea of God as the Absolute who is connected with the world by the Logos or streaming radiation. The mystic hoped to become one with God by becoming one with the Logos radiation." This leads into a discussion of the Logos theology of Hellenistic Judaism (Philo), where Goodenough in a few paragraphs sums up the content of his distinguished work, *By Light, Light,* and concludes that it "was from Greek religion, then, as adapted by Greek Jews, that Christianity got its idea of salvation and learned to think that the lowly Jesus of Nazareth was its heavenly Saviour, the Logos, Son of God."

Having briefly and convincingly sketched the origins of the central beliefs of Christian tradition and myth, the author undertakes in his final chapter, "A Reconcilation," to attempt to decide which of these inherited beliefs may be of value to the modern (Christian) intellectual, who still feels the need of some kind of religious experience,

however skeptical or agnostic about traditional theology he may be. Goodenough thinks that recent Christian scholarship of the Harnack school has been mistaken in limiting the "Wesen" of Christianity to the essentially Jewish morality of the Gospels. "Today the logic of Harnack would take us one step farther and lead us to the conclusion that the separation of Christianity from Judaism had been an error." He insists that the other elements of Christian tradition, derived from Greek philosophy and Hellenistic religion, are equally important factors. "Christianity was the great religion it has been precisely because it included all these types of religious experience." Accordingly he declares that there is still value in the notion of an Absolute and in mystic communion with a Power not ourselves, as well as in the ethic of Jesus. The former two religious elements need not, of course, be present in their ancient forms. "When psychoanalysis suggested that our experience of the Power was only an experience of the Super-ego or a case of auto-suggestion, both the followers of traditional religion and those attacking it assumed that this interpretation invalidated the reality of the experience itself, apparently on the common assumption that prayer was impossible for man with any but the supreme God. That is a pathetic delusion and utterly un-Christian in the original expression of Greek Christianity."

His parting *Cohortatio ad Fideles* is that "a modern individual, like an individual Greek, will find one myth more suggestive than others, and may choose or make some myth for himself. The myth of a mediator between us and the Absolute is a convenient one. Another is the myth of psychoanalysis by which the personality we experience is called the super-ego. The religious possibilities of this myth, for such of course it is, have by no means adequately been explored. For if this myth implies that the object of our religious experience has no objective reality, it would remove the chief difficulty of many minds, uncertainty about that very problem, and leave us free to get the value which comes from the experience itself."

Thus, in brief, Goodenough disposes of the difficulties in the way of religious experience raised by the teachings of modern science. But there is a more formidable difficulty which he does not mention, and this omission seriously detracts from the value of an otherwise

very rewarding study. What he unconsciously takes for granted, it seems, is that the Christian intellectual whom he is addressing lives in a sociological vacuum. I do not mean to suggest that he is at fault for neglecting to refute, or at least clarify, the somewhat absurd Marxian dictum that "religion is the opiate of the people," but I do mean to assert from tested knowledge that there are Christian intellectuals who feel it their duty to discard all but the prophetic-moral elements of traditional and mythical Christianity because they believe that the religious experience connected with the philosophical and mystical elements of this faith have interfered with the realization of the moral element, which to them seems paramount. In other words, many intellectuals feel that they cannot afford the luxury of the complete Christian tradition so long as the present state of society continues to deny millions of people, intellectuals and workers, the necessity of other experiences which religion seems unable either to replace, or adequately compensate for.

It remains to comment briefly on some details concerning which an historian of religion may differ with the author. I doubt whether the Orphics used the term "wheel" of the cycle of reincarnation as did the Buddhists (p. 59). The author exaggerates the paucity of our philosophical sources for the three centuries after Alexander the Great when he says (p. 44) that we have only fragments of three or five lines left of these writings: we have much more extensive fragments from the older Stoics, from Epicurus and his school, and even from less well-known philosophers such as Euhemerus and Posidonius. He is inaccurate, I think, when he says (p. 30) that the Zoroastrian Saviour was often called the Son of Man; he was thought to be of the seed of Zoroaster, and indentified with Primal Man (Gayomart), but I do not think that the name Son of Man occurs in the Iranian sources. One last—perhaps picayune comment on the curious plural form "axia" which occurs on the first page; apparently Goodenough has absent-mindedly been thinking of a non-existent Latin *axium* instead of Greek *axioma*. I cannot end this brief list of slips, however, without hastening to add that here as in his other works Goodenough writes with clarity, elegance and ease.

Ralph Marcus

Columbia University

Seven Books of History Against the Pagans: The Apology of Paulus Orosius. Translated with notes by IRVING WOODWORTH RAYMOND. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. 436 pp. $4.50.

To the medieval mind History was Orosius. Despite, however, the wide influence and use of his History down to the time of Dante (there are extent nearly 200 MSS), only abridgements and excerpts of his work have been available in English. In attempting to satisfy this long-felt need for an accurate and standard translation Professor Raymond has well fulfilled his task.

Previously English readers have had to be content with the modern version of King Alfred's abridgement (e.g., B. Thorpe in "Bohn Library" 1859). But as Dr. Raymond aptly remarks, King Alfred's work was little more than a "loose paraphrase," and "so different are the texts" of Orosius and Alfred, "that the reader must recognise them as two distinct books" (p. 23). While excerpts and abridged translations of Orosius have appeared from time to time in many modern languages, this work of Dr. Raymond rightly claims to be the only complete translation in any tongue.

To the History Professor Raymond has appended an introduction (pp. 3-25) on Orosius, which though brief reveals sound scholarship and good judgment. It begins with an account of his life which is followed by a discussion of his philosophy of history. The author gives a good summary of his main convictions. Orosius did not set out to write formal history (though it must be admitted that much of his work is about as dry as formal history) but to defend a cause. All early Christian history was an *apologia* and the same purpose that Augustine had in view in the *De Civitate Dei* is to be traced in Orosius. Indeed it was Augustine who actually furnished him with the inspiration and philosophical basis of his task. Augustine, then engaged on the eleventh book of his great work, requested Orosius to confirm his thesis that such evils as pestilence, famine, and war were not unique phenomena since the coming of Christianity but were constant factors in all pagan civilizations. He claimed these calamities were the direct result of pagan worship and not the visitations of pagan gods upon an unbelieving generation. He believed an appeal to history would justify his case but, dissatisfied with his own examples from Roman History, he wished Orosius to collect a more complete series of these tragedies from a study of the history of the world.

This basic apology underlay the work of Orosius and determined both the materials he selected and many of his digressions. His main thesis was that the evils in the world were to be explained as "either the open sins of man or the hidden punishments of God" (p. 11).

There is perhaps one further point in connection with the early Christian conception of history which we may mention, though the author does not dwell upon it. What the early Christian writers from Eusebius to Augustine accomplished was to present history as a living whole, motivated by a single purpose and moving to a single climax. Their work may have been apologetic and frequently distorted, but they presented history as a divine drama from the Garden of Eden to the Second Coming. They were the first real philosophers of history. Only in that setting can Orosius be fully appreciated. He started with the creation of the first man and, though he ended with his own times, the Christian eschatology is the presupposition of his whole apology. The closing words of his work concern "the true God who can do all things" and whose Providence is the guiding hand of history.

The author's paragraphs on the literary qualities of Orosius are illuminating. He speaks of the uneven style that characterizes the History, but remarks on "the cosmic sweep, sombre ideas and austere approach" which in occasional vivid passages reveal "the true Spaniard." As a whole, however, Orosius is certainly dull, and his frequent digressions only emphasize his lack of clarity.

Yet the work of Orosius is not without merit. Though he furnished little new in the way of historical data "his approach to history placed the facts in a new light" (p. 19). As a Christian "Orosius seems to tear aside the veil behind which the patriotic historians concealed the ugly spots which marred the features of the history of their countries and to reveal less pleasing aspects of ancient civilizations in their true light" (p. 20).

Professor Raymond's discussion of the chronology (pp. 17-19) of Orosius is clear and very careful. He mentions the main discrepancies in his reckonings and points out some of the sources of his errors. It is not surprising that a work of such length, composed in a little over a year, should have been faulty in chronological accuracy.

The indebtedness of Orosius to his predecessors was very great. For his geography he relied upon a work based on Agrippa. His

history of the ancient civilizations depended largely upon Justin, while for the Roman period his sources were Eutropius, Livy, Caesar, and Suetonius. In the chronology he was greatly indebted to Eusebius, whose *Canon*, in Jerome's translation, was the standard work in the field for centuries.

Professor Raymond does not deal with the vexed question of the name by which the History was known to later generations. It appeared in several variant forms, Ormesta, Ormista, Ormesia, Hormesta, etc., and many ingenious conjectures have been put forward to explain it. Perhaps the most satisfactory suggestion, so far advanced, is that the word represents the contraction *Or.m.ista* for *Orosii mundia istoria.*

As the basis of his translation Professor Raymond has used the 1889 text of Zangemeister, whose careful and elaborate revisions superseded the work of Havercamp, which was included by Migne in his *Patrologia Latina.*

The footnotes to the translation are brief but always apt. For the most part they concern the dating of events to which Orosius refers, though sometimes the translator points out mistakes and confusions in the original (e.g., p. 145, n. 58 etc.) and frequently gives precise and succinct information on obscure names and places.

The index is confined to names and events but has been very carefully prepared. The reader is referred to Zangemeister's edition of 1882 for more complete analytical indices. The book itself is excellently printed and well bound. Altogether, historians may well rejoice to have in their possession this complete, scholarly and clear translation of Orosius, for it is both accurate and readable.

Cyril C. Richardson

Union Theological Seminary

The Complete Works of St. John of the Cross. Translated from the critical edition of P. Silverio de Santa Teresa, C.D. and edited by E. Allison Peers. 3 vols. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, Ltd., 1935. 478 pp. 15 s.

St. John of the Cross is so important to the historian, the philosopher, and the psychologist of mysticism that a critical translation of a critical edition by so acknowledged a scholar in the field as Professor E. Allison Peers is an event of capital importance to

English speaking students of this at once most subtle and poetical "doctor of the Church." The writings of St. John of the Cross, for all their curiously Spanish quality, have long since transcended national lines. It is astonishing in reading him to see how much of later psychological analysis is implicit in his own refined but ingenuous pages.[1] As a practising mystic, and a leader of others along the Mystic Way, St. John fixed the vocabulary in which non-mystical analysts of the mystical experience are to this day constrained to speak, and marked out for them with a rhetoric curiously mingled of directness and sophistication the end toward which the mystic moves, the point from which he begins, and the stages through which he must pass.

Not the least valuable part of Mr. Peers' work is his translator's preface, his general introduction to the works of his author, and the separate introduction to the principal works. In the first mentioned he makes very clear to the reader how recent is the availability of a really critical edition, finally achieved in the 3-volume Toledo edition of P. Gerardo de San Juan de la Cruz, C. D. He makes clear, furthermore, how delicate a task it is, in the case of this mystic among all mystics, to obtain the most precise possible rendering of the text, and to keep at the same time the elevation and eloquence, along with the precision of analysis characteristic of the saint. In reading one mystic in one language, one seems to recognize all mystics in all languages. Only a student of the Spanish tongue could speak of the quality of this translation as translation, but this writer can report the continual parallel sense of precision of epithet, and prose beauty. One never gets the feeling of distortion for the sake of elegance or exaltation, though both are present.

The general introduction is a model of exposition, always a peculiarly difficult problem in the case of a mystic. Mr. Peers wisely restricts his analysis to a definition of the influences which moulded St. John's thought. He leaves its lyric and essential character, on the whole, to speak for itself, noting for the reader only some of its characteristic devices.[2]

The three intellectual sources of the *thinking* of St. John of the

1. Cf. for one instance among many St. John's account of spiritual gluttony and spiritual self-deception: I, 106; 363-8; 390; no contemporary analysis of rationalization could do better.

2. Cf. Professor Peers' valuable analytic essay in his *Studies of the Spanish Mystics*, Vol. I.

Cross (his fame as a poet has obscured to many readers his discipline as a thinker) are: first the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy, his familiarity with which he owed to his brief but apparently intensive study of scholastic philosophy in the University of Salamanca; his second source is sacred theology; one does not have to read what Mr. Peers has to say on this subject; one has only to read at random in St. John's writings to see how close his scriptual knowledge was, to see how much it influenced both his language and habits of thought, and how much he turned to it, not only for illustration but for moral and spiritual confirmation. There is a heretic lurking in the heart of any profound mystic; there would not otherwise be such startling unanimity in mystics of different faiths. But it is striking none the less that St. John, for all his transcendence of scholasticism and biblical textualism, was an orthodox enough believer. Like St. Paul he may move into the Platonic empyrean, but the Bible story and the biblical tradition are the framework of his faith. The third formative influence on St. John was that of mystical theology. Mr. Peers does not try to track down St. John's exact reading, but even without his explorations and guesses the historically informed reader would recognize beyond any doubt the echoes of, or allusions to, Plotinus, the fifth century Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Bernard, and Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, whose maxims had become almost *clichés* in the renaissance of mysticism in sixteenth century Spain. A little later in this essay, I propose to comment, as Mr. Peers does briefly himself, on the way in which St. John turns the stock formulas of mystical literature to his own original uses, and how in turn his own fresh forms become formulas. It is perhaps going a little far in admiration, and forcing a metaphor, to call St. John of the Cross "the St. Thomas of mysticism, the true *summa angelica* of mystical theology." It is going too far because, though St. John makes himself as clear as the subject permits, what he has to say is not susceptible of the same kind of clarity as that to which scholastic principles lend themselves. The ineffable demands a poet, not a logician, and St. John might better be described, perhaps, as the literary psychologist rather than the metaphysician or logician of mysticism. The weakest pages in Mr. Peers' general introduction are his rather pedantic section entitled: "Outstanding Defects and Virtues of the Style." He becomes inarticulate in the momentum of his own admiration. The introduction ends with a useful account of

the diffusion of the writings of the author, and some textual criticism of the relation particularly of the ascent of Mount Carmel and the Dark Night of the Soul, all of which are of first importance for a studious acquaintance with the work of the Saint. Also helpful to the reader will be found the brief chronology of St. John's perilous and complicated life, among the vicissitudes of which he found time for his unworldly work. St. John's career itself throws light on the relation of his spiritual enterprise to the distracting absorptions of the world.

What was that unworldly work of St. John?[3] The phrases in which his achievement have become classical are nearly all of them his own. They are uttered chiefly in a poem only sixteen lines long. His intellectual contribution to mysticism consists chiefly in his commentaries on that poem. Each of these commentaries in isolation is a philosophical vignette; taken together they constitute a system of mystical theology. The poem itself, *The Dark Night of the Soul*, has in its title become, along with Plotinus' *Alone with the Alone, the* classical phrase in mystical literature. It defines the passage of the soul through the dark night of sense and spirit, of will and memory and understanding, clarified by the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, to reach unity with the divine. St. John, in the process of definition, traverses the primary and the ultimate meanings of the spiritual life, and writes a whole comprehensive psychology and morality of affection and detachment, and the relation between them. There is scarcely to be matched in mystical literature his analysis of the darkness that follows the first detachment from things and persons, and from the desire for them. Nowhere in the literature of mysticism has anyone better succeeded in intimating what is meant by the ultimate light, and those lesser lights, that relative darkness upon which will and desire first fasten, a darkness that obscures the final sun.

The term *the Mystic Way* has become so much a staple of the literature of the subject that it has been forgotten how much, at least for modern times, that Way has been marked out by St. John of the Cross. It is true that in the second century A.D. Plotinus had deline-

3. There are four indices, valuable to those wishing to explore the work with special attention: Subject-Index; Index to the principal figures of speech used by St. John of the Cross; Index to the Scriptural quotations and references; and Index to the principal persons referred to in the introductions, text and notes of this edition. Volume III gives a selection of letters and documents written or signed by St. John.

ated what he called the Upward Path and the Way Home. There are resemblances in his description of the journey from the World of Sense, through the World of Mind, ecstasy in the One, and St. John's description of the soul's leaving the House of Sense to pass through Understanding, to Contemplation, to Absorption in God, but there are certain distinctive analogies made by St. John of stages of the journey not even broached, or certainly not discussed in detail by Plotinus. Particularly should be mentioned St. John's extraordinary and subtle description of "The Dark Night of the Soul," the first line of his famous poem. The Dark Night has latterly become a sentimental epithet to describe any state of discouragement which anyone gets into in any human enterprise. The enterprise St. John is describing is quite specific: it is that of progress from absorption in and distraction by the things of this world, and our desires for them, to absorption in and possession by God, the perfect and indeed the only authentic and unillusory being.[4]

The Dark Night, moreover, is for St. John two Dark Nights, which our author is quite careful to distinguish: the first is that aridity and discouragement called by him "The Dark Night of Sense," which comes when the soul is first learning to separate itself from the usual objects of sensual desire and sensuous satisfaction. St. John, for all his unworldliness, is no fool, and he quite understands the worth of that world which he thinks it of supreme worth to transcend. He understood the blankness that must come to the soul which, previously nourished on color, form and texture, on taste and perfume, had steeled itself to do without them. He might have said with Masefield:

> "What are we given, what do we take away?
> Five little senses startling with delight."

Destroy that delight and the desire for it, and not the peace of happiness but the oppression of dulness seems to result. St. John, being a poet, and as his own lyrics prove, one preternaturally sensitive to the sensuous surface of things, must have known himself the pain of sensuous privation. He certainly describes that poverty as an exquisite agony, but such agony is the first necessity of the journey, for to the "proficient" it turns out to be the darkness which, purged

4. Cf. Vol. III, p. 210, "God (contains) all creatures in himself, virtually, presentially and substantially."

of illusion, allows the first ray of brightness to appear. It is significant, incidentally, that it is not things so much as our desire for them that St. John counsels discipline in renouncing.[5]

The importunate senses are silenced, the soul is ready to approach God through meditation and understanding, guided by Grace. Indeed, as St. John describes prayer, the latter is really a form of meditative, devotional soliloquy, but understanding is not enough, as our author repeatedly points out that truth and being, which are clearest in themselves, may be, in fact must be, most opaque to the understanding. It is in connection with this point and at this point that develops the second "Dark Night of the Soul," the "Dark Night of Spirit," a much more refined and sophisticated period of discouragement than the first, and an agony so complex that only those far along the journey come to it at all; and so terrible that few can bear it or persist beyond it. It is a depression that comes to those who have finally, after a long vigil of purged senses and disciplined understanding, arrived at what St. John calls the illuminative state, the first in which there is intimation of, though not access to, the final rapture. It is just here that there supervenes the tortured sense of failure; intimation turns into perplexity, illumination into obscurity, and understanding into bafflement. The soul seems to have come a long journey, and in vain.

St. John (Book II, Chapter VI; p. 411 *et seq.*, Volume I of this edition) describes this stage as a "dark contemplation." The darkness is twofold; it is a privation of all the natural supports and nourishments which enriched and energized the soul; it is a blindness caused by the opaqueness to the ordinary channels of understanding of precisely that light which the soul is seeking. All lesser goods have vanished and the great Good is as yet unseen. "The understanding (is) here purged of its light and the will of its affections" (Vol. I, p. 419). "Meanwhile the brighter and more manifest in themselves are supernatural things, the darker are they to our understanding" (p. 420). "And this is the characteristic of the spirit that is purged and annihilated with respect to all particular affections and objects of the understanding, that in this state it has pleasure in nothing and understands nothing in particular, but dwells in its emptiness, darkness and obscurity"

5. Cf. the famous "ray of darkness" passage, Vol. I, p. 406. St. John acknowledges the authorship of the phrase to "St. Dionysius and other mystical theologians."

(Vol. I, p. 422). . . . "In this state the soul fancies that it is lost, and that its blessings have gone forever" (p. 427). It is hard to convey without more extensive quotation the subtlety with which St. John conveys the blackness which is (or in fortunate eventuality is) the prelude to dawn, the tragic sense of failure that is the prelude to success. It is even harder to communicate what that success is, a union with God in which the self is at once fulfilled and lost in the godhead. The final passage to such union is in a "secret wisdom," compounded of quietude and an infused grace. All the faculties, even understanding, are stilled and the wisdom instrumental to the ultimate is a strangeness to all earthly wisdom and a secret between the soul and God, a secret whose voice is a "living flame," flowing from God into the soul, a flame of soul flowing back into God; all dross is burned away by it, and only the flame itself burns, and that burning is at once the soul's rapture and God's being.

St. John is driven to metaphor to express this finality, for analysis can define only the steps of the understanding and the moral discipline, the astringencies of negation requisite to its approach. These negations are necessary conditions but not sufficient ones. The flame comes only of itself; it is an overflowing of grace into the chastened spirit:

> The breathing of the air.—The song of the sweet philomel,
> The grove and its beauty in the serene night
> With a flame that consumes and gives no pain

("Spiritual Canticle," verse 38, Vol. II, p. 30); or from the "Dark Night," verse 8 (Vol. I, p. 10):

> I remained lost in oblivion. My face I reclined on the beloved.
> All ceased and I abandoned myself, leaving my cares forgotten among the lilies.

The rereading of St. John of the Cross in this excellent version that does justice at once to the realistic, psychological subtleties and the lyric afflatus of the saint, prompts the student to certain general reflections about mysticism, of whose discipline and whose fruit St. John is so cardinal an exemplar. Mysticism seems in St. John on its beautiful surface to be the soliloquy of an impassioned solitary privately communing with his God. The language, especially of his lyrics, lends itself to such an impression and such an interpretation. The

whole tenor of the discipline is the withdrawal of the soul into its own centered quietude, into its (the adjective is a favorite one with our author) "secret" contemplation. The whole fruit of the discipline is that of a silent and lonely identity with God. And yet a striking set of counter-facts are to be observed. St. John was a poet, but a poet with a program, as an examination of the mere chronology of his life in these volumes will show. His account of the Mystic Way is something more and something other than lyric introspection. It was a discipline specifically addressed to monks and nuns, to those who, already dedicated to, wished to become proficient in, the spiritual life. The Mystic Way as St. John conceives it was to be a soliloquy in which all, though unknown to each other, secretly followed the same path and joined hands eventually at the same goal, as the climber toward a mountain peak at sunrise, having come through mist and darkness, would find to his surprise a friend who had traveled the same path to the same radiance. This is confirmed by the fact that St. John may be said to oscillate between the poles of affection and detachment in his description of the mystical life. He preaches detachment from all lesser loves that one may finally be lost in and saved by the love of God. But this counsel of separation is affectionately addressed to others whom he wishes to make the same journey and arrive at the same goal. There is another fact which it would require more space and more inquiry than are here possible or relevant to explain,—the extraordinary outburst of mysticism in the sixteenth century in Spain, when private communion with God became almost a large-scale social enterprise. But St. John was not only a member of an active group of his mystical contemporaries, but may be said by a not too strained metaphor to have been a member of that society of mystics deployed in time rather than in space. It is, or ought to be, arresting to students of the phenomena of religion to note how much religion, even in its most lyric instances and apparently most private practitioners, has a social origin and a social reference. St. John, who gives as the height of the mystical life a solitary absorption in God, is also aware of the communion, the spiritual correlate for a community, of saints. It was indeed to a *community* of *potential* saints that both his discipline and his promise were addressed.

Finally the reader leaves these volumes with a sense, particularly confirmed by "the spiritual maxims" and the letters, that as in the

case of earlier mystics St. John, using with sincerity the language and the tenets of the Christian tradition, was uttering a statement of the spiritual life that transcended and, closely examined, would perhaps contradict the orthodoxy St. John surely supposed himself to have been expressing. The Mystic Way is for him the path from the soul's distraction by earthly things to its absorption in God. But drop away biblical imagery, conventional spirtual exercises, and there still remains something that belongs in the trans-sectarian sacred writings of intellectual mysticism: a connected discourse on the possibility of traversing and transcending the distraction of things and of desires and of achieving through contemplation and through love a clear and selfless identity with pure being. At this level Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza and St. John of the Cross move in the same realn of discourse. Differently put, the least important thing about St. John was that he was a Christian and a Saint: he was a philosopher of Mysticism at its intellectual height.

Irwin Edman

Columbia University

Die Darstellung Christi in der Kelter: Eine theologische und kulturhistorische Studie zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Volkskunde des Weinbaus. By Alois Thomas. Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1936. 200 pp., 47 illustrations. RM 9.50.

Dr. Thomas investigates in a detailed manner, describing all known examples, the iconographic conception of Christ in the Wine-Press and the related images of the Messengers returning from the Promised Land with the Grapes, the Mystic Mill, the Fountain of Life, etc., in mediaeval and later art. The images of Christ in the Wine-Press presuppose first of all the actual cultivation of the grape, the importance of wine as a secular and religious drink, and the religious protection of the vineyard. But the history of the conception, its variations and development, its geographical distribution, depend more essentially on changing religious attitudes. The texts of the Bible which are the literary bases of the images, poems, popular beliefs and theological constructions cited by Dr. Thomas, are constantly reinterpreted and adjusted to new interests. The immediate source of the image of Christ in the Wine-Press was the passage in Isaiah 63, 1-6:

"Who is this that cometh from Edom, with dyed garments from Bozrah?

this that is glorious in his apparel, travelling in the greatness of his strength? I that speak in righteousness, mighty to save.

"Wherefore art thou red in thine apparel, and thy garments like him that treadeth in the winefat?

"I have trodden the wine-press alone; and of the people there was none with me: for I will tread them in mine anger, and trample them in my fury; and their blood shall be sprinkled upon my garments, and I will stain all my raiment.

"For the day of vengeance is in mine heart, and the year of my redeemed is come.

"And I looked, and there was none to help; and I wondered that there was none to uphold: therefore mine own arm brought salvation unto me; and my fury, it upheld me.

"And I will tread down the people in mine anger, and make them drunk in my fury, and I will bring down their strength to the earth."

For the church fathers these lines of Isaiah had a varying significance, 1) as a direct prophetic anticipation of Christ, 2) as a symbol of his passion, and finally 3) as a eucharistic metaphor. Christ is both the presser of the grapes and the pressed grape from whose body issues the blood which will redeem mankind. The figure of Christ in the Wine-Press has therefore the double sense of Christ victorious and Christ suffering. Still another ambivalence of the text is clearly stated in the commentary of Rupert of Deutz (†1129):

"In the wine-press . . . that which is pressed is other than that which presses. But in the suffering on the cross he who presses and he who is pressed are the same. He pressed, in that he gave himself up for us; he was pressed like a grape, in that he let the wine, under the pressure of the cross, separate from the shell of his body, and breathed out his spirit. Moreover he presses himself, because through his suffering he separates the good and the evil, rewarding the one and punishing the other, exactly as the wine is separated from the grounds in the press."

Although the text of Isaiah was the subject of Christian commentary since the 4th century, it was not until the 12th century that Christ in the Wine-Press appeared in art. The early Christian images of the vine have either an ornamental and *genre* character, or refer to Paradise rather than to martyrdom. In the 12th century the few paintings of Christ in the Wine-Press illustrate the words of Isaiah literally as a prefigurement of the Crucifixion. In the deeply mystical and pathetic art of the 14th century, especially in Germany, the subject is transformed; the wine-press itself becomes the field of Christ's

Pacific School of Religion Berkeley, Calif.

passion, and Christ is shown naked, crowned with thorns, standing in the press, pouring out his blood for mankind's salvation. The press is designed with cross beams weighing down on Christ, and with a screw operated by God the Father. In the later 15th century the theme acquires a dogmatic value as an example of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharistic ceremony, and references to the Eucharist are multiplied.

Dr. Thomas refers constantly to the "folk" character and the underlying folk sources of these iconographic types. It is unclear from the context just what he means by the "folk," since peasantry, clergy and townspeople are included. Further, in no case are the decisive innovations or broad stages in the development of the theme initiated by the folk, in the sense of the masses of the people or the lower classes; the author shows clearly enough that they depend on new religious movements like those of the Romanesque period, the late Gothic, the Renaissance and the Counter-Reformation, which cannot be explained by the psychology of the supposedly stable and traditional "folk." The latter absorbs, rusticates and simplifies the new types, and preserves the old ones long after they have been replaced in the great centers. The uncritical aspect of this concept of the "folk" reappears in the lengthy introduction by Prof. Schreiber, who closes significantly enough with an invocation of the well-known scientist Adolf Hitler "for his fundamental and guiding explanations" of the nature of *Volkstum*. It is interesting that although the development of the theme of Christ in the Wine-Press takes place chiefly in Germany, Dr. Thomas can give no adequate explanation of this fact.

MEYER SCHAPIRO

Columbia University

The Purpose of God. By W. R. MATTHEWS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. 182 pp. $2.00.

Re-Thinking Religion. By A. E. AVEY. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936. 294 pp. $2.00.

These volumes are significant for the positive rôle which they find for reason in religion in contrast to the strong current of irrationalism in present religious thought.

Dr. Matthews, Dean of St. Paul's, holds that the reign of Kant is coming to an end and points to Whitehead's philosophy as an indica-

tion of what he means. He presents the doctrine of a teleological universe as the rational ground for Christian theism, after weighing the criticisms of Hume and Kant, and maintains that all the historic arguments for theism should be taken together as forming one system of rational proofs. None of these arguments, taken separately, affords a purely logical demonstration; but the ontological argument contains the intuition that what the mind necessarily thinks is true, and that accordingly there is objective reality and absolute truth; and the cosmological argument upholds causality as a metaphysical, and not merely formal, idea and expresses the necessity for a sufficient reason for the universe.

The emergence of mind in the evolutionary process, Dr. Matthews asserts, is the secure foundation for the teleological argument, since it is intelligible only if that process is directed. Mind is a true cause, and the interaction of mind with environment forms one teleological order. This order we can understand as the working of a Creative Mind and not otherwise. Indeed, on any non-teleological theory of the world, the power of the human mind to arrive at truth cannot be understood. Similarly the objectivity of our judgments of value, ethical and aesthetic, becomes intelligible only if the supreme Creative Mind is characterized by Goodness and Beauty.

An important part of the author's work is his discussion of the problem of teleology and history, and it is in this connection chiefly that he deals with the problem of evil. He rejects the view that all the events of history are ordained as part of an all-inclusive teleological order, because history is the sphere of freedom and "freedom means the potentiality of exercising undetermined acts of choice." He also rejects the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of God, though to do so is heresy. The reality of a cosmic purpose in history he maintains because history shows a notable conquest of the material environment, because religious redemption has made possible the conquest of the self and of sin, and because of the emergence of a social ideal, divine in meaning, to which there can be an endless approximation through divine enlightenment and redemptive power. One may not assume, however, that the cosmic purpose is concerned solely with human ends, and one must recognize that the Kingdom of God cannot be fully realized on this earth and can come to complete fulfilment only in a realm which transcends mundane history.

The reader will be stimulated by Dean Matthews's clear and comprehensive thought, and will find in this book a significant union of reason and faith.

Professor Avey, in addition to his teaching of philosophy at Ohio State University and his important philosophical writing, has found time for an active service to practical religion of which *Re-Thinking Religion* is the product. Its choice of themes and its material are largely the outcome of his participation in student discussion groups and religious assemblies through a considerable period of years. In this book he deals with basic religious doctrines from the standpoint of a monistic interpretation of the universe and with a view to showing the reasonableness of religion.

Revelation is treated from the standpoint of the monistic conception of truth, since coherence is mind's fundamental law. Religion may lead us to where direct apprehension of spiritual truth may be gained, and the intuitions which result have the value of revelation if they are sustained by the test of coherence. Further, religion stands for the expression of divinity in real lives. Hence "the conception of incarnation must necessarily be its central idea." This means incarnation in the life of every devotee. "The claim of Christian doctrine rightly understood is not that Jesus is the only incarnation of God, but that he is the most complete one" (p. 9). At a number of points Professor Avey makes a wide survey of the world's great religions and seeks to view them impartially. He suggests that the impartially appreciative view may one day produce "a new canon of the whole world's finest religious literature."

The author carries through his monistic interpretation in the treatment of such major topics as "Good and Evil," "God," and "Salvation." The Good and the Real are identified, but Evil is a potent factor in existence, because error occurs, because destructive events take place, and because there is a drag which every effort at constructiveness feels. The antinomy which these judgments involve is resolved on the basis that the opposition between Reality and Unreality is not merely a formally logical one, but a real opposition in tendency in things. The question of how non-existence can affect existence cannot be answered, "because it is a request for the explanation of the unintelligible" (p. 99). At all events irrationality is found to fulfil a rôle in the rational universe.

God is the ideal element in the universe. Thus far Avey finds himself in accord with Dewey. But as a monistic idealist Avey goes much farther and finds God to be the general ground of values and, indeed, to be reality itself. God is immanent in his universe, and is incarnate in nature and history in varying degrees, and at the same time is super-personal. From this point of view salvation is interpreted as moral growth. It is salvation from ignorance, weakness, and ugliness, and brings to pass the well-rounded integrated personality. In his discussion of the Church Professor Avey shows that his conception of salvation is also a social one. The primary function of the Church is educational and includes adult education, for which it is peculiarly fitted. Ideally "the Church becomes a growing organization aiming at the inclusion of the whole human race within its scope, and working for the unification and co-operative, mutual support of the spiritual powers of all races" (p. 210). Religion itself should become "an all-pervading influence, raising toward The Ideal every moment of every day's activity."

There are important differences between Dean Matthews's teleological view of the universe and Professor Avey's monistic interpretation, but they have in common the establishing of a co-operative relation between reason and faith.

EUGENE W. LYMAN

Union Theological Seminary

Some Problems of Life. By RUFUS M. JONES. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1937. 214 pp. $2.00.

This book by the Professor Emeritus of Philosophy in Haverford College contains the Cole Lectures which he delivered in Vanderbilt University. He states as his theme "a consideration of the life of a person" (p. 12), or, more definitely, an inquiry into what constitutes in the higher sense the "good life" (p. 24).

The full realization of life, which may be taken as the equivalent of "good," demands an examination of certain inescapable problems. These are: "What is it we are all seeking to attain? What is our fundamental aim or end of action? What is the highest good that attracts us and explains our decisions of choice? How do we test life and assess its worth? How do we know that we are on the way to our true goal, and how shall we know that we have reached it? What

are we going to *be* when we arrive at our terminus, if there is a terminus?" (p. 23)

It is noticeable that the author speaks of these questions as "the kinds of problems that I have been in the habit of discussing with a long succession of Haverford students" (p. 20). From which practice we have his view that "one of the main problems of education is to discover how to make life expand and increase in values" (p. 113).

There is the recognition that "no single rationalized scheme of life-aim will ever wholly fit the flowing stream of life itself." "Life is primarily *living*, not a definition." "Our purposes of pursuit run far ahead of our patterns of thought" (p. 34). But Professor Jones nevertheless emphatically believes in the necessity of right thinking. "What a person *thinks* about the meaning of life more perhaps than anything else determines what life will be. There is no greater handicap to a person than a wrong *theory*, which blocks him at every turn and may defeat the noblest intentions" (pp. 128-29). Mystical as is the conception of life which underlies the argument of this book, it is not a mysticism which obliterates reason in emotion, which leaves life undirected by critical intellgence, and which presents no goal for the response of the will. It is a mysticism which is essentially an ethical bond whereby man is related to God, and which has the vividness of a personal experience. Loyalty to divinely-ethical purpose is thus in line with the tradition of the fourteenth century mystic who said, "I would fain be to the Eternal God what a man's own hand is to the man" (p. 135).

In discussing the problems involved in the quest for life, Professor Jones brings to bear the contributions of philosophy and psychology as well as the insights and convictions of religion. Holding that intrinsic goodness is revealed only in persons (p. 52), he finds that "to be a person is to be an ideal-forming being, . . . is to expand life in ideal directions." "He thinks beyond his achievements. He is all the time on ahead of the situation at which he has arrived." (p. 97 cf. pp. 153 and 169) When a man so thinks and strives, he has taken the first decisive step toward the realization of the good life. "The moment one passes over from the aim of continuing biological functions to a way of life that centers on *realizing what eternally ought to be in this universe*, regardless of cost or consequences, he passes over the greatest divide there is" (p. 17). "The good life . . . is busy creating

what ought to be but is not yet, and its sphere of life is action" (p. 71).

To live a life of creative activity is to pass the "great divide" in the further sense that thereby a man's life is related to a transcendent spiritual universe where the higher moral values for which he strives have their enduring validity. Professor Jones is well aware that "as is always the case with the values of life, our deepest question will be whether religion is built out of subjective hopes and wish-urges, or whether it rests on the rock-bottom of objective reality, grounded in the eternal nature of things" (p. 74). Again, "whether these avenues of value-experience are subjective urges, one-way streets to nowhere, or actual highways of life which organically link us with a real world of objective being, a world which is *eternally* real. . . ." (p. 81).

It would have been helpful, we think, if Professor Jones had devoted a chapter to this question, so that his answer could be readily examined in one place. But his argument underlies the entire book and is clearly stated in many connections. "There are certain realities in our world, which, we all feel, have a different status and belong in a different order of being from that of the objects which we describe in our scientific accounts, or the things which merely occupy space" (p. 54). "When it comes to a question of what we may call 'the heart of the whole matter,' what eludes the scientific account becomes the reality we care for most. The central life within ourselves, and the central world of spiritual reality within the visible world which we describe, are bound to elude our most exact methods of reporting and explaining." This "overplus" which gets omitted in the mere description "turns out to be *That for which all the rest exists* (p. 55).

It is in this spiritual world that the moral values which are the goal of the creative efforts of the good life are found. An adequate understanding of reality involves a recognition of spiritual values no less than an account of external facts. "We do not leave the *supremacy of facts* behind and leap out into an imaginary world where facts no longer matter. We have just as profound a respect for truth when we discover the value of an action in reference to an ideal standard as when we with scrupulous accuracy describe the factual aspects of the action" (p. 64). Further, the nature of proof of spiritual values must also be recognized. They are verified "only in terms of life-experience

and life-results" (p. 82). "They can, however, be tested, experimented with, and verified in the life-experience of the individual and the race" (p. 83). "The good life travels all the time on faith, in expectation; but it is a faith which constantly tests and verifies its ventures." "Our world of moral and spiritual values" rests, like the world of science, "upon the fundamental buttresses of Reason" (pp. 52-53). His conclusion is: "Our universe, the one we have been dealing with in these chapters, is a universe which has produced *values;* it does reveal truth, beauty, goodness, freedom, love, it is a realm of persons living for ends that are good. It must be the kind of universe that moves toward such realities, for they have actually emerged and are here" (p. 190).

The conception of God is that of a Transcendent Being, but the author does not therefore accept the Barthian emphasis which denies His immanent Spirit in the lives of men. This belief in immanence does not lead to an easy-going optimism. The good life of creative effort is not that. But there is not the repudiation of human reason and endeavor in the supposed interest of glorifying God. "The fact that God can be revealed in a personal life carries momentous implications. It means that the divine and the human are not so far sundered as had been persistently supposed. It means that human nature *can* become an organ for the life of God" (p. 196). And it is "this revealing union of the divine and the human in a life of love and service and self-giving" which supplies the key to an understanding of the central purpose of Christianity to establish on earth the Kingdom of God (p. 197).

As a practical consequence of this relation of man to God, the writer of the book feels that the "favorite method" of "convicting the individual of sin" does not produce the best results, however effective it may prove in some cases. He recommends, especially in dealing with young people, as a much better way, "to *convict* the youth of the possibilities of goodness, of righteousness, to awaken his spirit to the pursuit of the unattained, to quicken his imagination, to arouse in him the irrepressible urge to explore, to adventure, to make something of his life" (pp. 116-117).

As for the problems of life which society has now to meet, it is pointed out that a new world cannot be made "by schemes of human betterment that ignore basic spiritual laws of the universe." Religious

experience is not "a substitute for sound economic or social or financial or political solution of the world's troubles." But "we must deepen the quality of life and enlarge our faith in the scope of human destiny before any of the fine schemes on hand will work" (p. 206).

RAYMOND C. KNOX

Columbia University

Man Answers Death: An Anthology of Poetry. Ed. by CORLISS LAMONT. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1936. xvii + 283 pp. $3.00.

This volume consists of three hundred poems about death written in many lands over a period of three thousand years. There have been anthologies of poetry on this subject before, but all of these have given the conventional religious answer to the tremendous question which death raises. Such answers, we know, deny the apparent permanence or reality of death and affirm another existence which may occur on earth once more, though in most of such affirmations the re-enactment takes place in remote regions; again, such a new life is sometimes entered upon at once subsequent to death; generally, however, another existence is as remote in time as it is in space. Dr. Lamont's anthology differs from all previous ones in that he has selected poetic variations in all keys and moods on the theme that death extinguishes human personality completely and forevermore.

These poems bear witness to the beauty, the generosity and the natural piety with which gifted minds and hearts have been able to meet the most wrenching of human experiences. As such, the Anthology is a very moving and also a very heartening document. Moreover, in this collection of simply stated naturalistic reactions to death, the reviewer can think of no better introduction to the problems of philosophy or religion, since our systems basically are an attempt to explain the very elementary fact that living things do not continue their terrestial career indefinitely. Finally, this volume is an attempt to string poetic pearls on the thread of Humanism. Dr. Lamont divides the Anthology into twelve sections, of which some of the titles are: "If a Man Die, Shall He Live Again?", "The Sting of Transiency," "Let Us Live Then and Be Glad," "The Affirmation of Life." Since the poems in themselves are not formal or exact expressions of this philosophy, the editor in brief introductory remarks to each section de-

scribes its dominant motif, and incidentally outlines the Humanist attitude toward death.

Dr. Lamont first introduced his philosophical position in "Issues of Immortality," and then stated it more fully in the "Illusion of Immortality." If the latter volume presents the intellectual rejection of the immortality idea, the current one may be taken as its emotional counterpart, for this time the rejection as expressed through the poems is on the fugitive and subtle level of feeling. As such, it may be even more persuasive, perhaps because "the heart has reasons of which the head knows nothing." For the believer can counter naturalistic facts and atheistic arguments. But the courage, the devotion and the optimism of the non-believing Humanist are harder to meet because these do not permit of logical refutation.

However, Humanism is not merely an intellectual or emotional rejection of immortality. Were it this alone, it would be no more than the negativism of a crude and vulgar atheism. On both levels, the rejection of a future life is followed by the affirmation of our earthly existence, its value and significance. The best of answers to death is living. On the surface the Humanist view here may seem to coincide with that of the great religious systems. But the latter hold that the manner of life is important as determining the quality of our post-transitional career. The Humanist, on the other hand, finds life a complete and perfect pattern in itself. He sees no need to apologize for life and to seek extenuating reasons for our earthly plan. Life, like virtue, is its own reward. If it is just and fitting to die, it is even more just and fitting to live.

Again, Humanism apparently seems to serve the same function as religion, and to be only one more way of reconciling man to dying. We all refuse to leave the banquet hall willingly, aand by one subterfuge or another try to protect ourselves against the bleak knowledge that mortality alone is immortal. However, if we judge philosophical systems not merely by their healing and soothing functions, but by their value in reorganizing institutions and relationships so that the number of satisfactions and achievements possible to human beings are permanently increased, then Humanism, according to its advocates, can contribute more to the well-being of mankind than the religious systems, since the focus of its interest is the fullest development of

human personality, without recourse to extra-human guidance or post-mortem beacons.

The psychic trauma inflicted on the Victorian generation by the Darwinian theories met with its first kind of compensation in the "bloody but unbowed" defiance of Henley, and the similar attitude in Russell's "A Free Man's Worship." With the Humanists, we have now reached the next stage. Taking the offensive against death and going back to a very early tradition, they find death not merely endurable, but beautiful and useful. There is still a third and final stage, and this in Humanism also, but as yet only sketchily presented: namely, that man may or may not be immortal—the chances being that he is not—but that he does not need to be, and does not want to be, even if he could. Only when Humanism gives up the struggle to save man from the clutches of immortality will it become a fully adult naturalistic philosophy.

Dr. Lamont, it is true, states that "though Humanism constitutes the most effective of answers to death, it has by no means been motivated primarily by the fact of mortality. It stands on its own feet as an independent and forthright expression of life at its fullest and best." Nevertheless, it is an interesting commentary on the sources of poetic inspiration, and on the difficulty of the editor's task in this connection, that these poems should be mostly an attempt to explain death and not to define life. The reviewer could find very few poems which dealt with the "free, the abundant and the beautiful life" of Dr. Lamont's thesis which were not, at the same time, haunted by the thought that life is a loan payable at any moment.

When the Humanist has fully emancipated himself from the Darwinian disillusionment, he will offer a blue-print in the greatest detail of the work, progress and happiness of mankind, dedicated to human possibility. Here will be charted all the earthly hindrances of mankind: dullness, ignorance, frustration, pain, hunger, destitution, together with the measures for removing these. But in this blue-print to come, the word "death" will nowhere appear.

GEORGE LAWTON

New York City

BOOK NOTES

Les Saints irlandais hors d'Irlande. By Dom Louis Gougaud, O.S.B. Louvain: Bureau du revue [d'histoire ecclésiastique] and Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1936. xiii + 218 pp.

Praise of any work by Dom Louis Gougaud, of St. Michael's Abbey, Farnborough, Hants, author of the indispensable *Christianity in Celtic Lands* (London, 1932), and the greatest living authority on the Celtic Churches, is superfluous. In his latest book, in which he has given us a complete revision of his "Saints irlandais dans les traditions populaires des pays continentaux," which appeared in the *Revue Celtique* in 1922, he discusses in alphabetical order forty-four saints, fifteen of whom may not be Irish, who have cults outside of Ireland—in England, Scotland, Wales, and Cornwall, and on the Continent. Referring for details to his *Christianity,* he records, after a brief biographical setting, all known data on the area of their cults, their place both in liturgy and in popular devotion, their rôle in folk-lore, their iconography, and pilgrimages in honour of them. The book is full of interesting details, such as the various transfers of the feast of St. Columban and the relatively late date of the feast of St. Patrick in the official calendar of the Roman Church. His last chapter (pages 175-184) is a most interesting excursus on *Insula Sanctorum* as a name for Ireland, a term which seems first to have been coined by Marianus Scottus (†1082 or 1803), and which not only due to the vast number of Celtic saints who went out from Ireland to foreign lands, but also was doubtless fostered by the famous purgatory of St. Patrick on Station Island in Loch Dearg.[1] The reviewer can make only one small addition to the mass of material gathered by Dom Gougaud. In the Scottish Prayer-Book, which contains a beautiful prayer from St. Columba's *Altus* after the Collect of the day or before the Blessing, the calendar records black-letter feasts for St. Patrick (17 March) and St. Columba (9 June), and gives a Common of Collect, Epistle, and Gospel for them together with the non-Irish Saints Kentigern and Ninian; while the "Proposed Book" of the Church of England in 1928 had in its calendar the names of St. Patrick and St. Columba, and also of St. Aidan (31 August), but no Common.

L. H. G.

1. It may be noted, however, that at least as early as the fourth century Ireland had been known 'from ancient times' as 'Holy Island' ('ast hinc duobus in Sacram (sic insulam | Dixere prisci) solibus cursus rati est. | . . . Eamque late gens Hiernorum colit,' Avienus, *Ora maritima* 108-109, 111), a name apparently derived from the Greek form *'Ιερέρνη (cf. Greek 'Ιουέρνη, Latin *Iuverna,* etc.), which, becoming 'Ιέρνη, was popularly connected with ἱερός 'sacer' (see J. F. Kenney, *Source for the Early History of Ireland,* i, New York, 1929, p. 121, note 33). Ireland was, moreover, distinguished not only by the saints who went forth from her, but equally by those who remained there or visited there; and at least three 'islands of saints' (*inis,* or *oilén, na-naomh*) are listed in Middle Irish documents, besides Ára na-naomh 'Aran of the Saints' (E. Hogan, *Onomasticon Goedelicum,* Dublin, 1910, pp. 468, 557, 32).

Étude sur le Legendier Romain: Les Saints de Novembre et de Decembre. By HIPPOLYTE DELEHAYE, Bollandiste. Bruxelles: Societé des Bollandistes, 1936. 273 pp.

In this number of the *Subsidia Hagiographica* Father Delehaye continues the well known series that many of his friends and admirers, scattered up and down the Eastern American Universities, are familiar with. The Roman Legendary is a veritable gold mine of names and epithets which puzzle the scholar because they seem to throw light on several periods of persecution which have always loomed large in the local history of the Roman Church. The title of the present work, Father Delehaye reminds us, is a guarantee that, although the story of the Saints which began under the great Jesuit scholars, Bolland and Rossweyde, nearly three centuries ago, must keep its slow majestic pace, modern methods of publication have made it possible to give students of present day Hagiography the immediate results of scholarly research. It is a work carried on by an *élite* body of men. The *Acts of the Martyrs*, as has been pointed out, more than once, are not history in any modern sense of the word. Yet the story of Saint Felicity and her sons, like that of Saint Cecily (Sainte Cécile), embody in their way data out of which a sober account of the struggles of the Christian faith, during catacumbal times, may eventually be elicited.

C. C.

The Life of Christ in Old Italian Masters. Edited by EDWARD HUTTON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1935. xvi + 96 pp. $2.00.

This splendid collection of reproductions of masterpieces of Italian art should prove useful to students and teachers of religion. Beginning with the miraculous conception of the Virgin Mary the story runs consecutively through the principal incidents in the life of Christ to the Ascension. And what an impressive panorama it is, embellished by the genius of some of the world's greatest artists! However, some of the selections might have been improved upon. It seems a pity not to have one of Fra Angelico's exquisite Annunciations. The four Nativities do not present enough variety,—the Botticelli "Nativity" with its dancing angels might well have been substituted for the Daddi. The series of pictures representing the calling of the disciples, the miracles, and the parables, are especially well chosen, the six by Feti being interesting for the modernness of their feeling. A strange error occurs on page 43 where a detail showing the central group of Massacio's "Tribute Money" has the caption: "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are God's." As a matter of fact, the picture represents an entirely different incident, namely, the episode in Matthew, 17, 24-27, where the tribute money is taken by Peter from the mouth of a fish. In the Passion scenes there is also too little variety, too many representations being chosen from Duccio

and other primitives,—why not Tintoretto's "Christ before Caiphas," Sassetta's "Christ in Limbo," and Cima's "Doubting Thomas"?

In his excellent Introduction Professor Hutton gives an historical résumé of the development of the life of Christ in art forms, beginning with the catacomb frescoes, and the mosaics of the Byzantine style, in which the influence of the classical art of Greece and Rome still persisted. It is interesting to note that the central scene, the Crucifixion, appears first on the doors of S. Sabina (fifth century), and, in painting for the first time in the frescoes of S. Maria Antiqua (eighth century). It was during the sixth century that many of the subjejcts so familiar in later art came into use, especially in series such as the mosaics of S. Apollinare Nuovo in Ravenna, but some of the most important subjects, such as the Massacre of the Innocents, the Woman Taken in Adultry, the Temptation, the Flagellation, the Descent from the Cross, and the Resurrection make their first appearance some five hundred years later. "It would be impossible, I think, to find, anywhere in Italian art," says Professor Hutton," a serious mistake in doctrine or dogma,"—a tribute to the faithfulness and humility with which Italian painting served as "handmaid to the Church."

M. B.

Rom und Luther-Franck: Gottesdienst und Menschenadel. By EDMUND MUGLER. Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1935. viii + 196 pp. RM 3.30.

Before the advent of the august era of the Third Reich, Germans divided themselves naturally into Kantians and Hegelians, depending upon whether they envisaged the transcendental *terminus ad quem* of moral processes in the self-rotating activity of the Pure Will or in the sanctions of the social order. Both, however, were agreed upon the transcendental implementation of the conational and affective urges and desires of empirical selves. Thus they never ceased to heap scorn upon those "empiricists" for whom the individual human organism constitutes the ethical *terminus ad quem*.

These prefatory remarks serve to place the fundamental distinctions between cult and ethical religion which Mugler makes in the fifth volume of his ambitious attempt to rewrite the history of Judaism and Christianity in terms of the status of the ethical ideal in its relevant intellectual context. To Mugler a cult religion is a confession which has formulated the principles of its worship in creeds and dogmas, whereas an ethical religion is represented by a form of worship which is purely free from institutionalization. He thus raises an issue in terms of the Kantian critique of Hegelian institutionalism. The special purpose of this pamphlet is to elaborate the implications of the special form which the issue of cult versus ethical religion took on in the antinomy between the Roman institutional and the German ethical systems of religion.

Despite the fact that the title of the book announces a discussion of the status of ethical ideals implied in the Catholic and the Lutheran systems

respectively, there is little actual discussion of the Catholic system (except what might be called in contemporary parlance a debunking of it). The discussion is (actually) concerned with analyzing the positions of Luther and Franck in terms of the fundamental categories of cult versus ethical religion, and with contrasting Luther's exclusive concern with *Heilsgewissheit* and Franck's inclusive aspiration to integrate the values of the mystical union with the values of human conduct.

Mugler shows that Franck utilizes Eckhart's mystic-ethical position to elaborate his stand against Luther's insistence on "sin-consciousness" and on the correlative "justification by faith alone," which is a cult religion par excellence. The argument shows that Luther in his emphasis on human depravity, on dogma, on form, and on the cult of the "Word" constitutes the very antithesis to Franck's "human-ethical" position, rather than that there is a common front of Luther-Franck versus the Roman system.

There are many issues raised by this little book which cannot be discussed here, such as the relation between Eckhart's ethics and Kant's ethics, and the relation between Luther's mysticism and Luther's ethics. The position upon which Mugler's whole argument rests becomes intelligible only when we realize the characteristic which distinguishes German scholarship, the insistence, first, that all German contributions to theology must be fundamentally distinct from any non-German contribution and second, that only the Germans, and Luther in particular, have formulated a philosophy and theology of individuality.

ULRICH BERNSTEIN

Catholicism in New England to 1788. By REV. ARTHUR J. RILEY. (The Catholic University of America Studies in American Church History, vol. XXIV.) Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1936. ix + 479 pp.

American Opinion of Roman Catholicism in the Eighteenth Century. By SISTER MARY AUGUSTINA (RAY). New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. 456 pp. $4.75.

Though these two volumes cover in part the same ground, they really complement each other. Dr. Riley's account is a detailed report of the various aspects of anti-Catholicism in Colonial New England, with a minimum of critical background or interpretation. He would give the impression to a reader unfamiliar with church history that this anti-Catholicism is a characteristic expression of the "New England Colonial mind" and that its "moulding and development" (p. 307) can be understood in terms of New England Puritanism. The truth is, as the author himself realizes, that it is merely a chapter of Protestantism in general, and that there is little in New England anti-Catholicism that could not be found in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Protestantism anywhere. Some of this European background is supplied by the first chapters of Sister

Mary Augustina's work. Similarly, at the other end of the story, Dr. Riley notes the drift from religious to political anti-Catholicism, which, after the American Revolution, led directly to toleration; whereas Sister Mary Augustina gives a critical account of how this transformation under political circumstances took place and found expression in the constitutions of the original states.

It is evident that the opposition to Catholicism, especially in New England, was not merely a matter of "prejudice" (though Dr. Riley occasionally refers to it as such, somewhat anachronistically), but of genuine hostility. Protestantism and Catholicism were engaged in a bitter struggle, even a struggle for existence. Characteristically the Protestants were not content to express their own bitterness but attempted to give Scriptural evidence that God Himself had declared the doom of "Anti-Christ." Practically all of the seventeenth-century materials are variations on this theme: attempts on the part of Protestants to use the Apocalypse to fortify their own hopes and to determine even the date when "the Man of Sin," "Babylon," "the Beast," etc., would be overthrown according to divine decree. The only element in this story that might be singled out as distinctive of New England was the fact that to the later generations of Yankees the conflict against Catholicism became more remote, their contact with Catholics negligible, and consequently what they imagined "popery" to be became increasingly fantastic and mythical. The preachers, in their attempts to keep alive the sense of the conflict as it existed in England and in the experience of the emigrants, resorted to the wildest and most bigoted exaggerations. It may be significant, if one can generalize on the basis of Dr. Riley's findings, that the school texts were the least incendiary and vituperative.

As the Apocalyptic enthusiasm waned, the political motives of the conflict came to the fore. The dangers from the French Canadians, the French and Indian War, the Gun Powder Plot, etc., were magnified and contributed to the armed conflict. During the Revolution, on the other hand, as Dr. Riley fails to observe and as Sister Augustina proves in detail, political circumstances led not only to toleration of Catholics but to positive "cultivation" and diplomatic flattery. It is unfortunate, I think, that the economic factors, though they are occasionally suggested, are not given more adequate treatment, especially since they played so important a rôle during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in shaping the course of Catholicism in New England.

Apparently Samuel Adams' fears that "popery" might become dominant in New England were short-lived; but one can not help wondering what he would say if he could see New England today. It is fortunate that the Adamses and other Yankees became more interested in liberty than in Puritanism, for otherwise they might regret the opening of their doors to the Catholic influx from both North and South. At the close of his very admirable summary Dr. Riley says, "The New Englanders feared that

the presence of a large group of Catholics would nullify the political and religious institutions which had been established on the rock-bound coast. This was the existing situation which the nascent Catholic Church in Boston (1788) had to face" (p. 325). One can scarcely refrain from looking beyond 1788 to the nineteenth century and the present, hoping that this neglected aspect of New England's history will be brought up to date.

One of the most useful chapters of Dr. Riley's book, following upon his exposition of anti-Catholicism, is his account of Catholicism in New England. After surveying the evidence that Catholicism was negligible in New England before the Revolution, he devotes most of the chapter to a straightforward narrative of the misfortunes of the Canadian French Neutrals, or Catholic Acadian refugees, who had been shipped to Massachusetts in 1755.

H. W. S.

Essai sur la nature de l'homme dans la révélation chrétienne. By JEAN BOISSET. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1936. 303 pp. Fr. 30.

A mounting wave of interest in the Christian doctrine of man seems to be sweeping around the theological world. The sources of this interest are well indicated in the volume before us: a concern lest modern man lose all sense of his own value in the midst of the mechanisms he has created; and a concern lest certain contemporary prophets of doom (e.g., Karl Barth) should exalt God in such a way as to destroy all faith in man's power to do any good thing.

Against modern materialism, the author sets the Biblical idea of man as a creature of "eminent dignity," whose soul is of more worth than the whole world, since made in the image of God. Against Karl Barth, whose "non-Christian pessimism" is analyzed at some length, the author sets—piquantly enough—the "moderation" of John Calvin. Calvin's view of man was not complimentary, as is well known; but he saw in the darkened soul of man an ever-burning flame that testified to his divine origin; and he warned that if man were "denuded of all good" by his theological advisers, he would be likely to be overtaken by a sudden attack of "nonchalance."

The demonstration that Karl Barth, in his doctrine of man's moral impotence and rational helplessness, has literally "out-Calvined Calvin," is perhaps the most original feature of the book. It occupies only the last fifty pages. The rest of the book is devoted to a systematic and scholarly study of the idea of man in the religion of Israel, in the teachings of Jesus, and in the teachings of St. Paul—a study that should do something to restore our contemporary Christian pessimists to a more Biblical sense of proportion in their view of human nature.

WALTER M. HORTON

Der Schwedische Pietismus in seinen Beziehungen zu Deutschland. By Hilding Pleijel. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1935. 236 pp. 8 kronor.

A book on the history of Pietism in Sweden is of special interest just now in relation to the development of the Oxford Group Movement. The two movements present psychological parallels, both being outbreaks of the emotional and personal elements of religion as opposed to the formalism of a state church. But the contrasts are equally significant. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Pietism aroused the antagonism of an entrenched orthodoxy closely linked with an absolute monarchy. Its defeat was assured from the start. But now a quite different picture presents itself. Disturbed by the general indifference towards the church the high ecclesiastics are only too thankful for anything which promises to revivify a dying faith, and the Oxford Groups flourish under the wing of the authorities.

Dr. Pleijel's book (published as *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift.* N.F. Avd. 1. Bd 31. Nr. 4) is a thorough study of the relation of Swedish Pietism to that of Germany, but regardless of that emphasis it supplies an excellent history of the movement in Sweden. In Chapter I we find a description of the state of the church at the beginning of the pietistic movement—a forbidding picture of hidebound orthodoxy with all the power of government behind it—a situation in which to be a heretic meant also to be a traitor. Chapter II describes the gradual infiltration of the influence of Spener, which had become so strongly by 1692 that the Bishop of Strängnas felt constrained to express himself officially on the subject. In 1694 the first Swedish student matriculated at the newly founded University of Halle, and from this time on the influence of Halle was paramount in spreading the old, conservative type of Pietism. The most interesting section of the book is the description of the life of 30,000 Swedish prisoners who found themselves exiles in Russian prison camps after the fatal defeat of Karl XII at Poltawa. For fourteen years of terrible hardship these unfortunates, among whom were hundreds of women and children, were sustained and comforted by the new gospel stimulated by constant correspondence with the leaders in Germany. On their return home they found a new era, the so-called *Frihetstiden*, in which a certain amount of religious toleration accompanied political freedom. But not for long. The old forces of reaction came to life, and by 1727 Pietism had practically succumbed to repressive measures.

The author devotes his third and last chapter to the rise of the later form of radical Pietism with its overstrained mysticism and asceticism, and generally fanatical aspects. In 1727 the arrival in Stockholm of Conrad Dippel caused a schism in the already weakened ranks. Dippel fought the new mysticism with all the strength of a powerful rationalistic mind, but succeeded only in stiffening the resistance of the radicals, who later became the nucleus for a new cult of emotionalism from abroad, Herrnhutism.

M. B.

The Name Is Living: The Life and Teachings of Isaac Penington. Edited by M. Whitcomb Hess. With foreword by Rufus M. Jones. Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark & Company, 1936. 151 pp. $1.75.

Two of the most distinguished of those Seekers who found truth and peace in the Society of Friends were Isaac Penington and his wife, Lady Mary Springett. Their lives, which are briefly outlined by Mrs. Hess, are an impressive cross-section of English aristocracy, political drama, and religious unrest in the seventeenth century. Intellectually, too, the Peningtons lived in high society: John Milton, Henry More, Anne Conway, Van Helmont, were among their close acquaintances. Isaac Penington's "seeking," therefore, was enriched not only by intense experience but by familiarity with mystic philosophy, especially the Cambridge Platonists and probably Jacob Boehme.

The writings of Isaac Penington, first published in two large volumes in 1681, reflect the polemics of the age in which they were composed, and are well worth the historian's attention for the light they throw on the difficulties, both social and intellectual, which those faced who sought regeneration through internal instead of external (ecclesiastical) means of grace. But these writings have a direct religious value as well, quite apart from their historical settings. Mrs. Hess has made an admirable selection of reflections, meditations, and aphorisms, organized in terms of the cardinal themes of mystic doctrine: "The Light Within," "The Principle of Life," "The Divine Breath," "Letter and Spirit," "The City of Darkness," "Truth," and "Freedom." It is apparent at once that these "teachings" of Penington deserve to be ranked among the truly great expositions of mystic faith and doctrine. The classic tradition lives in them, as Mrs. Hess points out by references to Plotinus. Philosophically, however, it is noteworthy, as Mrs. Hess also points out, that Penington's conception of the spiritual life does not imply the usual aspersions on the world of sense experience. In this fundamental doctrine, and in several lesser ones, the Quaker faith is a significant and distinctive variant from the classic tradition of mysticism.

H. W. S.

The Redemption of Modernism. By Alan Richardson. London: Skeffington and Sons, Ltd., 1935. 127 pp. 2/6.

The Redemption of Modernism is a valuable little "tract for the times," and the "times," since the War, have been a period of retreat and digging in, of finding a line of trenches from which Christianity could not further be dislodged by the forces of secularism, Nationalism, Communism, and new cults. Under the pressure of necessity German theologians took the lead. The present work is highly recommendable as an example of how the younger Protestant clergy of Britain are using the new German

systematic and historical theology to gain a fresh confidence and point of attack. Mr. Richardson leans very heavily on Paul Tillich.

"My own generation," writes Canon Harold Anson in a foreword, "won what I feel was a battle well worth winning when we secured the position that belief in the Virgin Birth or the resuscitation of human bodies on the day of judgment, was not a part of essential Christianity, inasmuch as these doctrines were not necessary to belief in God as revealed in Christianity, and do not rest on any assured basis of sound evidence." The enthusiasm one feels for Mr. Richardson's book is generated by his valiant effort to show that the Church of England, in the persons of its younger clergy, is not so timid or so completely removed from the realities of the times as the words of Canon Anson would suggest.

An attitude opposite to enthusiasm is generated by the fact that Mr. Richardson reproduces with startling unoriginality all the familiar attacks upon capitalistic, bourgeois, humanistic culture and upon pre-War Liberal Protestantism that rolled off the presses of Germany during the decade after the War. The result is the usual anti-humanistic superhumanism which is avowedly not supernatural but which facilely distinguishes between the world of theology and the world of nature; which declares with a kind of boldness the autonomy of theology from science and the secular world of affairs but is then hard put to it to find a real function for this superhumanistic religion to perform.

Mr. Richardson feels that the redemption of Modernism would come (1) by holding in Protestantism to the principle of liberalism—free inquiry—and by recovering its somewhat lagging spirit; (2) by achieving a radical sincerity, both in specifically religious and in social matters, so that a new—more equitable—society and a new worship consonant with the times may be created; and (3) by recapturing the essential values of Christianity and defending them against Nationalism and Communism. Education, rather than missions, will be the method of the new modernism, as it was of the old.

The book is a forthright discussion of Modernism and is valuable at least as a lively, popular exposition of the new reactionary form of contemporary Christianity.

HAROLD BUSCHMAN

Ethical Issues Confronting World Christians. By DANIEL JOHNSON FLEMING. New York: International Missionary Council, 1935. vii + 280 pp. $2.00.

The term "World Christians" is at once intriguing, although the early disciples of Jesus quoted their Lord as bidding them "Go into all the world." In one sense, the world extensively has been always in the Christian view. It has been, however, an expanding world. Professor Fleming would suggest that now, at last, the Christian may indeed face and know and minister to the entire globe; whereas in former times there was on the

Christian's part a partial comprehension only, and, therefore, a limited service. And yet world-Christian represents something less than a Christian attainment, if not something of a too-great extension and strain of consciousness, if, having a "world-view," the "Christian" should feel sure of just what is to be done in every circumstance. There are still great handicaps to knowledge and to sound assurance—barriers of language, temperament, etc.

The "ethical issues" of this volume are classified as economic, national, racial-and-cultural, and personal-and-religious. The author has peculiar competence born of long consideration of the principles and problems he discusses. He would emphasize the fundamental character and place of *ethics* in world Christianity, and would find some dependable criteria of judgment and of action amidst varying values, changing times, and alterations of interest and objective. He also insists that Christians who deal with issues, for example, economic reconstruction, racial adjustment, etc., should first have a "special kind of preparation" in knowledge and in technique. Mere preparation in religion and in ethical theory is not enough. And he would keep the means and methods on a level worthy of the high goals to be attained. "Reforming zeal needs the check of Christian ethics," he asserts. And where there are inherent conflicts in ethical cultures, the resolution is rightly not that of employing, say what is "eastern" or what is "western," but of discriminating between what is Christian and what is less than Christian, or possibly altogether non-Christian.

The portion of the book best exhibiting the author's point of view is a brief section on "the social function of the Church" (pp. 83-85). He says, "A distinction must be made between the social message of Christianity and the social function of the church as an institution . . . the church's first duty is to minister to basal religious needs which are found in association with all sorts of social convictions . . . small minorities at home or abroad should not bring undue pressure to bear upon their church councils for resolutions or for actions far in advance of average conviction . . . the missionary enterprise . . . as an agency of the church can scarcely go further than the church itself." This is a conservative estimate or evaluation, rather than a doctrinally or socially radical judgment of the outreach of world Christianity, as it confronts a non-Christian world teeming with ethical issues.

JOHN CLARK ARCHER

Normative Psychology of Religion. By HENRY NELSON WIEMAN and REGINA WESTCOTT-WIEMAN. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1935. viii + 574 pp. $3.50.

A product of the co-operative endeavor of a consulting psychologist and a religious philosopher this book is intended to serve the practical purpose of promoting and guiding the religious growth of the individual and the com-

munity. It attempts to study the functions of religion in human living and to set forth whatever norms may be implicit in these functions.

Though dealing almost entirely with the Christian religion, its conclusions and normative criteria are intended to be valid for religious beliefs in general. Religion is defined "at its highest and best" as "the devotion of the total self, through search, service and adoration, to the highest cause of which one is now conscious, providing that cause is deemed worthy of the devotion of all men and is symbolic of ever higher unexplored values." The authors attempt to set up norms to select and evaluate the "best and most excellent" religious practices, methods and experiences. From their analysis of the functions of religion they arrive at the following norms by which they believe religion may be evaluated: (1) the worthfulness of the objective for human living; (2) the completeness of the loyalty implicit in the devotion; (3) the efficiency of that loyalty; (4) the sensitivity of that loyalty in concrete situations; (5) the progression of loyalties, values emerging in a progressively higher sequence of objectives of even greater value; and (6) the social effectiveness of the loyalty.

In these norms the authors believe they encompass all that is highest and best, and can truly be normative for all religious aspirations.

HENRY J. WEGROCKI

A Buddhist Bibliography. Compiled by ARTHUR C. MARCH. London: Buddhist Lodge, 1935. 257 pp. 21 s.

The work lists 2110 titles—books and periodical articles—of works on Buddhism in the English language. It should be useful to those who do not have access to the French *Bibliographie Bouddhique*, edited by Jean Przyluski, which is the best critical work of this kind. Some of the titles of the present work are descriptively annotated but without critical evaluation. Titles are arranged in the alphabetical order of authors and the addition of an Analytical Subject Index facilitates location when the reader does not know the author. The edition is limited to 500 copies.

C. H. HAMILTON

Living Religions and Modern Thought. By ALBAN G. WIDGERY. New York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1936. ix + 306 pp. $2.50.

The distinctive feature of this survey of living religions is its emphasis on liberal trends. With considerable restraint and judiciousness the author has kept his own opinions in the background, and has premitted recent or contemporary leaders of liberal thought in each religion to speak out. In a concluding chapter he then points out what has been amply illustrated in the book, that, though nationalism and secularism are controlling cultural forces even in religion, there are strong counter-currents. The increased sharing of goods and ideals between East and West, the similarity in social aims expressed by liberals in all religions, the decline in

religious exclusiveness, are impressive witnesses to a religious life that transcends religious traditions.

In addition to this chief theme Professor Widgery provides brief sketches of the origins and present beliefs and rites of each of the great living religions, but he wisely makes no attempt to give an historical or critical account of any, though he is evidently competent to do so. The reader must remember that this is a portrait only of modern religious liberalism as a defense against the usual charges of religious decay and impotence, and if to some even (or especially) such liberalism seems decadent and impotent, that is not the author's fault.

H. W. S.

Buddhist Cave Temples of India. By R. S. WAUCHOPE. London: Luzac & Co., 1934. x + 121 pp. 51 plates. 12/6.

The author has gathered together in convenient form a vast amount of material concerning the Buddhist Cave Temples hitherto available only in the monumental works of Burgess and Fergusson, and the publications of the Archaeological Survey, and put it into a form suitable to the general reader. A brief historical outline of the early history of Buddhism, a chronological outline and classification of the caves, together with a description of the principal symbols of Buddhist iconography, combine to make this a very useful book. Simple definitions are given of Sanscrit terms, and a map showing the location of the sacred sites. And in addition there are over a hundred well-chosen illustrations to illuminate the text.

M. B.

The Fundamental Conception of Buddhist Sociology. By KEN ASSANO. Tokyo: International Buddhist Information Bureau, 1936. 16 pp. 15 sen.

An attempt to inaugurate a study of Buddhism from the sociological point of view according to the theories of the Durkheim school of thought. The author of the pamphlet conceived his plan of study while working at the Sorbonne under Sylvain Levi and Paul Pelliot.

Rudolf Otto: Zum Gedächtnis. By HEINRICH FRICK. Leipzig: Leopold Klotz Verlag, 1937. 14 pp. 50 pf.

High Heritage. By Mary Chapin White. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1937. xviii + 226 pp. $2.00.

Onomasticon of Palestine. By PAUL ROMANOFF. (Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Vol. VII, pp. 147-227). Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1937. ix + 90 pp. $1.50.

The Text of Acts in MS 146 of the University of Michigan. By HENRY A. SANDERS and JOHANNA OGDEN. (Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. Vol. 77, no. 1). Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1937. 97 pp.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

The Roman "Virtues." By HAROLD MATTINGLY. *Harvard Theological Review*. Vol. XXX, pp. 103-117.

Aux Origines de l'Ecole d' Alexandrie. By GUSTAVE BARDY. *Recherches de science religieuse*. Vol. XXVII, pp. 65-90.

Manichaeism: A Rival of Zoroastrianism and Christianity. By JAL DASTUR C. PAVRY. *Journal of Religion*. Vol. XVII, pp. 161-169.

Parliament of Religions Number. *Prabuddha Bharata*. Vol. XLII, No. 4.

The Indus Civilization in Relation to Indian Religions. By JOHN MURPHY. *Religions*. No. 18, pp. 37-52.

Eternal Creation in the Rig Veda. By A. K. COOMARASWAMY. *Vedanta Kesari*. Vol. XXIII, pp. 342-344.

The Essence of Hinduism. By MAHATMA GANDHI. *Vedanta Kesari*. Vol. XXIII, pp. 412-414.

Temple of Bharata Mata. *Vedanta Kesari*. Vol. XXIII, pp. 353-354.

The Trinity of Yogas. By BIRESHWAR BANERJI. *Kalyana-Kalpataru*. Vol. VI, pp. 312-320.

Introduction and Development of Buddhism in China. By LUCIANO MAGRINI. *Orient et Occident*. Vol. II, *seriatim*.

Lamaismus in China. By G. SCHULEMANN. *Orient et Occident*. Vol. II, pp. 441-443.

The Final Words of the Ahl-I-Haqq. By CHARLES R. PITTMAN. *Moslem World*. Vol. XXVII, pp. 147-163.

The Renascence of Islam. By WILLIAM THOMPSON. *Harvard Theological Review*. Vol. XXX, pp. 51-63.

The Horns of the Altar in the Semitic World, Especially in Jahwism. By H. TH. OBBINK. *Journal of Biblical Literature*. Vol. LVI, pp. 43-49.

Melchisédech dans la polémique entre juifs et chrétiens et dans la légende. By M. SIMON. *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*. Vol. VII, pp. 58-93.

The Interpretation of Jewish Law. By BOAZ COHEN. *Reconstructionist*. Vol. III, No. 3, pp. 6-11; No. 4, pp. 11-16.

New Light on Hellenistic Judaism. By ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH. *Journal of Bible and Religion*. Vol. V, pp. 18-28.

L'autel est une table. By ROBERT LESAGE. *L'art sacré*. Vol. II, pp. 18-20; 72-74; 93.

Baptême et confirmation d'après les constitutions apostoliques VII, 44, 3. By DAMIEN VAN DEN EYDEN. *Recherches de science religieuse*. Vol. XXVII, pp. 196-212.

The Condemnation of Origen. By CYRIL C. RICHARDSON. *Church History*. Vol. VI, pp. 50-64.

Fides catholica S. Joannis Chrysostomi et recens quoddam opus auctoris or-

thodoxi. III. De processione Spiritus Sancti, de Sacramentis, etc. By T. Spáčil. *"Gregoricanum."* Vol. XVIII, pp. 70-87.

Thomas le Cistercien: Le commentaire du Cantique des Cantiques; pour dissiper une équivoque. By G. Théry. *New Scholasticism.* Vol. XI, pp. 101-127.

Les "Philosophes" dans la philosophie chrétienne mediévale. By M.-D. Chenu. *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques.* Vol. XXVI, pp. 27-40.

Religione e filosofia nel pensiero idealistico e nella gnoseologia tomistica. By Grazioso Ceriani. *Revista di filosofia neo-scholastica.* Vol. XXIX, pp. 16-43.

Neuere Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters. By Ernst Wolf. *Theologische Rundschau.* Vol. IX, pp. 35-64.

"Relief" in Mediaeval England. By Clyde Buckingham. *Colgate-Rochester Divinity School Bulletin.* Vol. IX, pp. 107-126.

L'Académie de Calvin. By Noëlle Roger. *Foi et vie.* Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 21-33.

Die deutsche Reformation. By Hans Leube. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 9-34.

Pope Paul III and the American Indians. By Lewis Hanke. *Harvard Theological Review.* Vol. XXX, pp. 65-102.

A Parallel to Lourdes. By David Cairns. *Hibbert Journal.* Vol. XXXV, pp. 259-267.

Historical and Superhistorical Elements in Christianity. By John A. Mackay. With critical comments by Edwin A. Aubrey. *Journal of Religion.* Vol. XVII, pp. 1-11.

Sacraments: Natural and Unnatural. By H. G. Hutchinson. *Modern Churchman.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 23-29.

Rudolf Otto.† By Herman Mulert. *Die Christliche Welt.* Vol. LI, pp. 254-255.

The Episcopal Church: Its Contribution to the Religious Life of America. By Frederick C. Grant. *Anglican Theological Review.* Vol. XIX, pp. 1-16.

What Has Happened to the Russian Church? By P. E. T. Widdrington. *Christendom.* Vol. II, pp. 74-83.

Zur Geschichte der Bibelkritik. By R. F. Merkel. *Nieww Theologisch* Tijdschrift. Vol. XX, pp. 27-36.

The Gospel and Our Situation. By Joseph Haroutunian. *Radical Religion.* Vol. II, pp. 29-34.

Preaching and the Christian Year. By Howard Chandler Robbins. *Religion in Life.* Vol. VI, pp. 235-243.

Theologische Wissenschaft und kirchliches Amt. By H. Grimm. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 1-9.

Why I do not go to Church. By T. B. Luard. *Hibbert Journal.* Vol. XXXV, pp. 327-340.

Thomism and the Rebirth of Protestant Philosophy. By CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON. *Christendom.* Vol. II, pp. 110-125.

The Sovereignty of God and the Dignity of Man. By J. S. BOYS SMITH. *Hibbert Journal.* Vol. XXXV. pp. 205-212.

Rationalism and Its Endowment. By STANTON COIT. *Literary Guide.* No. 488, p. 35.

Le "Ressentiment" dans la vie morale et religieuse, d'après M. Scheler. *Rescherches de science religieuse.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 129-164.

Character, Science and Religion. By ERNEST M. LIGON. *Religion in Life.* Vol. VI, pp. 218-234.

L'Evangile et la Loi. By Fernand Ménégoz. *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses.* Vol. VII, pp. 1-57.

La Conoscenza del vero messianismo die vaticini presso i Profeti. By A. M. VITTI. *"Gregoricanum,"* Vol. XVIII, pp. 30-51.

Le chrétien peut-il croire de foi divine en l'existence de Dieu? By N. BALTHASAR. *Revue neo-scolastique de philosophie.* Vol. XL, pp. 67-74.

"Tomber dans l'homme." By A. J. FESTUGIÈRE. *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques.* Vol. XXVI, pp. 41-42.

Natur als Offenbarung? By RUDOLF PAULUS. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 34-56.

Glaube und Sein. By H. C. EISENHUTH. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 56-75.

Christentum und naturliche Religion. By KARL BETH. *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie.* Vol. X, pp. 1-19.

"Hell or Heaven." By J. H. FUSSELL. *Theosophical Forum.* Vol. X, pp. 323-325.

The Problem of Compromise. By EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN. *Congregational Quarterly.* Vol. XV, pp. 38-49.

Ernst Kriecks "Volkischpolitische Anthropologie." By JOHANNA KONRAD. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 75-91.

The Baptist View of the State. By CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN. *Church History.* Vol. VI, pp. 24-49.

The Modern State. By Moorehouse F. X. MILLAR. *Thought.* Vol. XII, pp. 42-63.

Church and State: A Relationship in Equity. By NOLAN B. HARMON. *Religion in Life.* Vol. VI, pp. 208-217.

Disarmament. By G. DE PURUCKER. *Theosophical Forum.* Vol. X, pp. 321-323.